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“The long-term goal of relatively well-ordered societies
should be to bring burdened societies and outlaw states into
the Society of well-ordered Peoples.”
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Harvard University Press (2001, p. 116)
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preface
The vocation of the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy is to make
sure that the results of important scholarly work find their way into the realm of
political decision-making. Democracy is as much about power as it is about learn-
ing. In order to pursue future-oriented policy-learning, the council favours
research-informed dialogues between those who have the time to do research
and those that have accepted the responsibility to design policies and to make
decisions. In this book, the subject matter of these policies and decisions is as
important as it is complex and challenging: the domain of international peace-
building operations. These operations, many of which are systematically
explored and evaluated in this study, most of the time follow many years of
violent conflicts and civil wars, atrocious assaults on human dignity and interna-
tional military intervention. Many countries and policymakers have experienced
the dilemmas and uncertainties that accompanied these operations, that have
often not been much of a success.
The author of this book, professor Joris Voorhoeve, serving as a member of the
Dutch Council of State, is especially qualified and motivated to contribute to this
important field of study. Having served not only in politics (notably as minister
of Defence during the tragic failure of un peace-keeping efforts in Bosnia), but
also as a professor of international relations at Leyden University, he whole-
heartedly accepted the invitation to contribute to the body of knowledge that
might help us to improve our efforts to make future peacekeeping and –building
missions more successful. Such an effort demands an interdisciplinary and
future-oriented approach, one that dares to transcend and challenge the usual
divisions of policymaking routines and responsibilities.
The Scientific Council is proud to be able to publish the results of the research that
Voorhoeve was carrying out as a special guest of the Council. Indeed, the most
vexing questions of political and other social sciences are how political violence
can be avoided, how conflicts can be settled peacefully and how the safety of
human beings and their basic rights can be ensured. Voorhoeve explores these
urgent and difficult questions which need to be solved after a country has been
ravaged by war. Most war-torn societies return to political violence within a few
years. Wars, civil wars and other forms of contemporary political violence tend to
repeat and multiply themselves. To make the 21st century more peaceful than the
20th, it will be essential to better diagnose the pathology of different types of
wars, and develop more effective therapies for building sustainable peace.
The most rewarding approach is, of course, prevention of armed conflict. Where
prevention failed, a curative approach is needed to prevent a relapse of war. This
study focuses on the curative approach: how to rebuild a war-torn country in
such a way that the causes of the violence are reduced or removed.
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preface
As many decision makers and scholars already found out, this is a vast and
complex area. The present study explores the many questions with the aim to
suggest policy improvements. Peacebuilding can be most effective as a joint effort
of the population concerned with the aid of many members of the international
community. Also today, the Netherlands participates in several peace operations
in the world and is also engaged in civilian peacebuilding. The author has
suggested, on the basis of his research, a series of recommendations that will help
to improve decision making. As a center of international law, the Netherlands can
especially focus on assisting war-torn countries to (re-) build the rule of law
which is essential for sustainable conditions for human dignity, good governance
and peaceful conflict settlement. The council hopes that this study will be of
great use for all those involved in this important responsibility.
Prof. dr. W.B.H.J. van de Donk
Chairman of the council
from war to t he rule of l aw
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1 why this study?
“Currently, half the countries emerging from violent conflict revert to conflict within five
years”.
Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom, un Doc. 59/2005
War, civil war and other political violence often revisit countries after brief
periods of ‘peace’ or armistice. Some countries are ravaged by multifarious
violent conflict during two to four decades. Many cease-fires and peace
agreements do not cure the underlying social pathology which led to the
bloodshed in the first place. I started this study to explore how a country which
has gone through civil war might be helped to avoid the next war.
The journey which this explorative study maps out begins at the cease-fire line. 
It proceeds through the rough and risky terrain of post-war looting, military rule,
interim government, and ‘transitional’ justice. We will pass refugee camps and
come across heinous war criminals. Our destination is the promise of a peaceful
state in the distance, where stable and possibly good governance gives comfort to
the traveller. Grave threats to basic human rights dominate the entire region. The
grey zone between war and peace is a source of life-threatening problems, not
only to its inhabitants, but also to people in distant countries, far away from the
violence.
Around the turn of the twentieth to the twenty-first century, it became clearer
than ever before that war, civil war and massive, violent political crimes in a state
anywhere in the world can also pose risks to the well-being of other states, even
on different continents. In the era of global communications, the news about
political violence travels fast. Streams of refugees knock on the doors of other
states. The effects of different forms of terrorism, violent and oppressive govern-
ments, failing or collapsing states, widespread, abject poverty and virulent,
endemic diseases, as well as other sources of instability, can hardly ever be
contained to the areas of origin.
National stability and legal order, including human rights, suffer from lawless-
ness and instability of states elsewhere, as well as from the volatility of the
world’s political system. The serious deficiencies which exist in the maintenance
of human rights in many regions have a troublesome impact on stable states
which are trying to uphold those rights. Anarchy, violence and the absence of the
rule of law in several states undermine the maintenance of the global legal order.
The imperative of human solidarity prompts us to help avoid violence. It is not
only in the enlightened interest, but also in the narrower self-interest of well-
developed societies that try to respect all human rights, to foster the rule of law
in other societies. There can be no solid international peace without legal order.
11
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There is no effective legal world order when its foundations, the legal order of
stable states, are holes or crumbling stones. Encouraging effective states, based on
the rule of law, is a major task of foreign policy and civil society.
Fostering the rule of law in foreign societies is a daunting task, however. The
efforts of the international community to help build up the rule of law in other
states are not always successful. The assistance by the United Nations, the Euro-
pean Union, nato and many other international bodies, as well as many donor
countries and humanitarian or legal assistance organisations are often late, weak,
short, divided or ill-designed. Three examples from the mid-1990s illustrate this
point.
In 1994 the un Security Council decided not to provide additional peacekeepers
for Rwanda, after a multilateral peace operation in Somalia had become a fiasco.
While the un turned a blind eye to Rwanda, about 800,000 people were killed
in a genocidal wave of politically mobilised group hatred.1
In 1995, when the un’s peacekeeping effort in Bosnia collapsed, two enclaves,
Srebrenica and Zepa, full of Bosnian refugees, were overrun. un blue helmets
from the Netherlands were unable to prevent this. The Serb attackers deported
the women, elderly and children to Central Bosnia, but massacred about 7500
men. At the time of writing, the man who ordered the executions, Gen. Mladic,
was still to be tried for war crimes.
In 1994-5, the un decided to intervene in a small and extremely poor Caribbean
peninsula, Haiti, to end an illegitimate, suppressive regime and install a demo-
cratically elected president, Aristide. While the un’s peacekeeping operation in
Haiti was carried out successfully from a military point of view, the further
development of the country and its political, legal and economic system was a
failure.
Twelve years later (at the time of writing), Haiti was in as bad a state as before.
Bosnia appeared to be a relatively successful post-conflict peacebuilding opera-
tion, but if foreign peacekeeping forces would leave, local war might break out
again. In Rwanda, the future was still heavily mortgaged by inadequate provision
of justice vis-à-vis the genocidaires and, understandably, no real reconciliation
among Tutsi’s and Hutu protagonists.
These three examples show how mixed the experience is of countries which have
suffered massive violent political crimes. One can easily add other mixed exam-
ples: the un operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Ivory Coast are seen (at the
time of writing) as successful. In recent years, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan domi-
nate the news. The us, Great Britain and a small group of supporting states took
it upon themselves, without approval of the un Security Council, to remove a
very oppressive regime in Iraq and encourage this country to become a democ-
racy. The huge human and economic costs appear to make this intervention very
from war to t he rule of l aw
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unwise, and the outcome seems very unsettling to large segments of the popula-
tion and the Persian Gulf region, to say the least.2
A coalition of nato members has been attempting since 2001 to build up
Afghanistan after decades of war and civil war, in the hope of a better future for
the population. In Sudan the un and the African Union seem powerless to stop
genocidal campaigns encouraged by the government. In many other African
states, the African Union and the un have tried to end murderous political
violence, in some cases with success.
As the words of un Secretary-General Kofi Annan, quoted at the start, indicate,
about half of the countries which have gone through civil war fall back into
violence in only a few years. In 2006, a World Bank study concluded that 1/3 of
countries returns to civil war within 5 years and 1/3 within 10 years, meaning
only one in three can avoid a new war for 10 years or longer.3 This shows that
national and international efforts to maintain, re-establish, and develop peaceful
structures are often not yet successful. How can it be done better?
Purpose,  Method and Limitations
In the light of past failures and limited successes, it is necessary to get an
overview of the most relevant issues encountered by assistance programmes 
for post-conflict peacebuilding, in particular in establishing the rule of law, 
and to suggest ways to improve international action. The purpose of this brief
explorative study is to gain such an overview.
The literature on various peacebuilding operations has grown rapidly over the
last fifteen years, and this exploration is not a complete summary of all issues. 
Its purpose is more modest: to make a practical, provisional attempt to point out
the main questions which often arise across very different cases. It is based on
various case studies and a number of general works published between 2000 and
the middle of 2007. It was inspired by many visits to countries in South Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa between 1984 and 2005.
Involvement of the author in decisions about peace operations in Haiti, Bosnia,
Cyprus, West Sahara, Eastern Congo, Albania and other cases motivated this
study, particularly the disastrous fall of Srebrenica (Bosnia) and subsequent
massacre of Bosnian men and boys.
A chronological overview of main peacebuilding operations is presented in 
Table 1.1. Cases which received special attention for the purpose of the present
study are marked. Operations mentioned in this table were selected by three 
criteria:
– The post-conflict solution was sought in a unitary or federal political entity.
– The peacebuilding process was strongly influenced by external actors.
– Part of the peacebuilding process was focussed on reform of the rule of law.
13
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Table 1.1 Peace Operations since 1960
Period of 
Geographical location operations Executing agency
Congo * 1960-1964 United Nations (monuc)
Dominican Republic 1965-1966 United Nations (domrep)
Lebanon * 1978-present United Nations (unifil)
Angola * 1988-1999 United Nations (several missions)
Namibia 1989-1990 United Nations (untag)
Cambodia * 1991-1993 United Nations (various missions)
El Salvador * 1991-1995 United Nations (onusal)
Mozambique * 1992-1994 United Nations (onumoz)
Somalia * 1992-1995 United Nations (unosom) initially under American lead
Bosnia Herzegovina * 1992-present United Nations (unprofor), later nato (ifor/sfor) and eu in
concordance with osce and the Council of Europe
Rwanda * 1993-1996 United Nations (unomur/unamir) 
Haiti * 1993-present United Nations (various missions) and oas, usa and France
Liberia* 1993-1997 United Nations (unomil) and ecowas (ecomog)
Liberia* 2003-present Initially ecowas (ecomil), followed by United Nations (unmil)
Tajikistan (ceasefire 
monitoring) 1994-2000 United Nations (unmot), osce, cis
Croatia 1994-1998 United Nations (various missions), eu, nato
Sri Lanka 1987-1990 India unilateral
fry Macedonia * 1995-present un (unpredep), nato (Amber Fox and Essential Harvest) 
eu (Proxima) with osce and the Council of Europe
Croatia (Eastern Slavonia) 1996-1998 un (untaes)
Guatemala 1997 United Nations (minugua)
Sierra Leone* 1998-present un (unomsil/unamsil), ecowas & British forces
Central African Republic 1998-2000 United Nations (minurca and bonuca) regional states joint in
misab
East Timor * 1999-2005 un (various missions), initially under Australian lead
Kosovo * 1999-present un (unmik), nato (kfor) and eu, supported by osce and coe
Dem. Rep. of the Congo 1999-present un (monuc)
Albania * 1997-2002 Italian-led multinational force with eu and osce
Lesotho 1998-1999 South African (lead nation) and Botswana forces
Afghanistan * 2001-present nato and un
Iraq 2003-present Mainly American, British and other coalition forces 
Solomon Islands 2003-present Regional Assistance Mission, under Australian lead
Burundi * 2003-present Initially African Union (amib), as of June 2004 un (onub)
Ivory Coast* 2004-present ecowas (ecomici), un (unoci), au
Sudan (North-South) 2005-present un (unmis), au
Sudan (Darfur) 2004-present au (amis), expansion of role un under discussion 
Many of these cases have been analyzed in studies mentioned in the annex. 
For illustrative purposes, several cases are summarized in textboxes throughout
this book. These boxes of just one page do not claim to be complete, of course.
They only serve to remind the reader of various crises which received world-
wide attention since the Congo crisis of 1960, which can be seen as the first major
peacebuilding operation of the un in an (immediately) failing state. For analysis
of these country cases, we refer to Further Reading at the end of this book.
The line of thought in this explorative study is guided by practical considerations
concerning priorities and their interrelationships. Chapter 2 starts with a general
overview. In chapter 3 a tentative, simple theory of peacebuilding is formulated.
It also presents lists of states whose people are most in danger of political
violence.
Chapters 4 and 5 provide an overview of the vexing questions encountered in the
first phase after a violent conflict has ended. They focus on how to improve
personal security for the population and lay the foundations for a future legal
order. Chapter 6 discusses what criteria might be used when deciding which
countries to support with peacebuilding programs. It also gives preliminary cost
estimates of such programs. Chapter 7 takes a look at the possibilities for a larger
role of the eu in support of peacebuilding. Chapter 8 makes recommendations 
for improvement of international assistance and further studies.
The subject of this exploration is constantly changing due to new cases, new
research, and unfolding events. I acknowledge the valuable contributions which
many authors have made and are still being added to the field. It is my intention
to add to this book in the coming years, as time allows, to close some gaps in this
exploration and add other subjects, such as experiences with conflict prevention
programmes in a number of countries. An important limitation of this explo-
ration is that the recent, sobering experiences with post-conflict peacebuilding
in Iraq and Afghanistan have not been fully included. These subjects require
extensive additional study. For all these reasons, this exploration has to remain
unfinished and is of a provisional nature. It should be seen as a ‘growth docu-
ment’ that may, notwithstanding its shortcomings, still be of some help to others
who also are working in the unpredictable ‘post-war zone’. I welcome criticism
and suggestions at j.voorhoeve@raadvanstate.nl
July 16, 2007
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notes
1 The un Security Council had refused to expand the peacekeeping force and
strengthen its mandate, as had been urged by the head of mission, Gen. Dallaire,
to deal with the escalating violence. See further: Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands
with the Devil; the Failure of Humanity in Ruanda, Toronto, Random House of
Canada, 2003.
2 Preliminary cost estimates are: at least 70.000 Iraqis killed by internecine, 
terrorist and economic violence, combat operations and other causes related to
the war; 4 million Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons; 25,000
wounded us and uk soldiers; about 3500 us soldiers killed, and a total us expen-
diture since the beginning of combat operations till mid 2007 of $ 500 billion,
including economic reconstruction costs. Sources: cnn, July 1, 2007; unhcr;
Iraq Body Count; and the government of Iraq. Note that a cross-sectional cluster
sample survey of the medical journal The Lancet puts the total number of deaths
at about 650,000 in 2007. This is disputed by the governments of Iraq, the us
and uk.
3 K. Samuels, Rule of Law Reform, Conflict Prevention Paper 37, World Bank 2006.
www.worldbank.org/conflict.
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congo
Congo – The first large peacebuilding mis-
sion of the un
This large Central African country was a colony
of Belgium until June 30, 1960. Without any
preparation, it was suddenly granted independ-
ence, which resulted in political and social insta-
bility because of mutiny and the secession of 
the mineral-rich province of Katanga. A un-led
mission, onuc, was quickly authorized on July
14, 1960 to restore order and help establish a
government.
Within days after the independence, Congolese
members of the Force Republique mutinied, and
attacked white civilians. As a result, Belgium
sent forces to protect its nationals. In the midst
of chaos, Tshombe, the leader of Katanga,
declared Katanga independent and hired Belgian
military and Western mercenaries to prevent
government troops from retaking the province.
Prime Minister Lumumba of the Congolese gov-
ernment requested that the un dispatch troops
to restore order and oust the Belgian ‘aggressors’.
In total, 20,000 personnel were contributed to
onuc by approximately 30 countries.
Over the next three years, un
troops forced the removal
of foreign mercenaries
and suppressed the
Katanga secession,
while civil elements of the
mission provided a wide
range of humanitarian, eco-
nomic, and civil assistance to
the new Congolese regime.
Given the unprecedented
nature of onuc and the lack of
prior experience, doctrine,
expert staff or administra-
tive structure for this
operation, the United
Nations performed remarkably
well. Democratic objectives were
subordinated by the Security
Council to establishing stabil-
ity and territorial integrity.
Large-scale civil conflict was averted for more
then a decade following the un departure.
These achievements came at considerable cost in
lives, money and controversy. The costs associ-
ated with the un operation to end the Katanga
secession were huge. The Secretary-General of
the un was killed in what seemed to be a plane
crash. The corrupt and bloody nature of the fol-
lowing Mobutu dictatorship cast a pall over un
achievements in the Congo.
For the next 25 years the un restricted its mili-
tary interventions to interpositional blue-
helmet peacekeeping, where all the parties to a
conflict agreed with un intervention and where
the use of armed force by un troops was limited
to self-defence. The un learned that peace
enforcement is costly and controversial, even
when done well. It was a massive operation,
improvised by a very conscientious 
un Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld.
See also text box on Congo since Mobutu 
D e m  R e p u b l i c  o f  C o n g o
Pweto
Bumba
Bondo
Likasi
Kolwezi
Kikwit
Kabalo
Isangi
Gemena
Kindu-port-empain
Tshela
Madimba
Lisala
Kenge
Kamina
Dilolo
Boende
Uvira
Tshilenge
Mbanza-Ngungu
Lusambo
Luebo
Kalemi
Isirio
Inongo
Goma
Buta
Bunia
Basankusu
Kisangani
Kananga Mbuji-mayi
Mbandaka
Bukavu
Bandundu
Lubumbashi
Kinshasa
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2 an overview of peacebuilding
“If civilization is to survive, we must cultivate the science of human relationships – the abil-
ity of all peoples, of all kinds, to live together and work together in the same world, at
peace.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a draft speech before he died in 1945
2.1 what is peacebuilding?
Everything necessary for normal human life starts with the absence of violence.
The core tasks of any government are to provide physical peace, public security
and basic freedoms to its citizens. The common purpose of various forms of
democratic government is to create conditions which enable its population to
satisfy their needs and desires and enjoy human rights, to the extent that this
does not harm others.
Of course, no country is Utopia. Thomas More’s Utopia was a fantasy island
without international relations. There were no external security concerns. In 
the real world, the core tasks of maintaining peace, security and freedom require
international action. In the intertwined world of the 21st century, it is in the
national interest of democratic states to help end war, civil war, terrorism and
gross and persistent human rights violations outside their own states, to the
extent possible. (The degree to which this is feasible is discussed in the following
chapters.) Rapid global communications quickly spread unrest beyond state
borders. Territories which are plagued by political violence, large scale crime,
pandemic diseases and absolute poverty upset and ‘infect’ distant nations.
In this study, post-conflict peacebuilding means building or reconstructing a
country after its government, institutions, population and economy have been
ravaged by large-scale armed conflict. Experience shows that after an internal or
international war, and after a successful foreign military intervention, a peace
enforcement action or peacekeeping operation, there are serious reconstruction
problems which take a long time to resolve. Military intervention is usually
difficult and controversial in itself, but it is also the beginning of new, tough
challenges. At the end of a conflict there is often no consolidated central power, 
no functioning legal order, no good governance, no democracy, and no protection
of human rights. In many cases most of the population lives in poverty – already
endemic or worsened by the war. Hatred between groups exacerbated by war-
time violence and abuses often increases the risk of a return to war. Most wars
sow the seeds of new violence.
Post-conflict reconstruction faces the same challenges and requires the same
efforts as state-building in places where the state collapsed for reasons other than
war. In both instances, the lack of a functioning government and a collapse of the
19
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rule of law are the central problems. The problem of failing and ineffective states
is most pressing in large parts of Africa, some states in the Middle East, the Cauca-
sus region, South-Eastern Europe, and around the Caspian Sea. Some are also
found in South East Asia, the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean region.
It is not only states destroyed by war and failing or collapsed states that leave
holes in the international legal order. There are also areas within geographic states
which do not effectively fall under that state’s legal order, such as remote valleys,
mountains, jungles far removed from the state’s institutional reach, or territories
where existing governments are only loose structures with little claim to actual
control beyond the government’s quarters in the capital. Many such territories
have become havens for drug barons, heavily armed tribal potentates, pirates,
training camps for terrorist organizations, child armies and rebel groups operat-
ing across borders into neighbouring states. Conversely, there are also states in
anarchy, with very weak central governments, but in some regions or provinces,
local order is maintained by traditional or alternative authorities in better ways
than the central government is able to do for the country as a whole.
Peacebuilding should be pursued in ways which lower the risks that a country
falls back into violence. This requires many years of intensive efforts by all
communities in the country itself, and long-lasting, well-guided assistance from
other countries and international organisations – the so-called international
community which, in fact, consists only of a relatively small number of interested
states, international organisations, and many ngos, often rather small.
2.2 a history of failure?
Although the un peace operation in the newly independent Congo in 1960-64
helped to prevent secession of Katanga and stopped much bloodshed, it could 
not create a stable country. Congo, later Zaire and then the Democratic republic 
of Congo again, was ill-prepared by its colonizers for independence. It is still too
large and diverse to grow rapidly into a stable, sustainable and effective state.
Congo experienced more than four decades of violence, exploitation, bad govern-
ment and civil war.
The entire Great Lakes region in Africa has become a political disaster area which
is much worse in the late 20th and early 21st century than ever before. The geno-
cide in Rwanda in 1994 made the headlines. The following years, many more in
this region have been killed or maimed for life: perhaps more than 5 million
people died in the Great Lakes region as the result of the war since 1994. Some
died directly in fighting, but the vast majority died from poverty and disease
exacerbated by the war.
Thirteen years after the humanitarian intervention to end bloodshed and hunger
in Somalia, that country is still a shambles, lacking an effective central govern-
ment. The Transitional Federal Government, appointed in 2004, was unable to
from war to t he rule of l aw
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somalia
Somalia
During the colonial period, Somalia was divided
into British, Italian and French Somaliland. In
1960, Britain and Italy withdrew, which lead to
unification of the northern and southern part
and the establishment of Somalia as a state.
Between 1969 and 1990, a socialist military dic-
tatorship ruled the country. At the end of the
1980’s the authority of this government declined
when the end of the Cold War was coming close
and the population became disillusioned about
life under military rule. 
In 1991, resistance movements overthrew the
regime. Since then, Somalia has suffered from
instability and anarchy. In 1991-1992, a severe
civil war destroyed large parts of agriculture and
food distribution, causing widespread famine.
Talks between the parties led to a ceasefire; a
small un peacekeeping force (unosom) was
sent in April 1992 to monitor this ceasefire and
protect humanitarian aid.
The violence continued and in December
1992 the United States led an operation
(unitaf) to establish a secure environment
(authorized by the un to use ‘all neces-
sary means’). The tasks of unitaf were taken
over by unosom ii in March 1993; the mandate
also included disarmament, mine-clearing, repa-
triation of refugees, and the reestablishment of
national institutions in the country. The un
troops suffered significant casualties (for exam-
ple in the ‘Battle of Mogadishu’) and withdrew
from Somalia in March 1995, although the rule of
the government was not restored.
Somalia became the example of a ‘failed state’.
Northern groups declared an independent
Republic of Somaliland. Competing warlords
ruled over smaller territories.
The Transitional National Government (tng)
came to existence in Somalia in 2000 but lacked
authority because of opposition from warlords.
Between 2003 and 2006, a transitional constitu-
tion was created, followed by the election of a
president, a prime minister and the establish-
ment of an interim government. The un sup-
ported this process.
In June 2006, ‘Islamic court’ militias defeated
Mogadishu warlords and took control of the cap-
ital. The militias tried to expand over the rest of
the country, but the interim government of
Somalia responded with the help of Ethiopian
forces. Heavy fighting between these parties,
combined with severe droughts and floods, led
to a grave humanitarian situation. The un Secu-
rity Council authorized an African Union peace-
keeping mission; the first troops flew into Soma-
lia in March 2007.
un operations in Somalia taught that a profound
analysis of the tribal political situation is needed
before a humanitarian operation. Objectives
should be limited to what is feasible in a limited
number of years. A failure in one case can make
the un too risk-averse or even negligent in the
next one (Rwanda).
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overcome the complete anarchy that reigned before. It was incapable of establish-
ing itself in Mogadishu and had no effective control over Somalia or its territorial
waters. In 2006, it lost almost all control in the uprising of the Islamic Courts
movement. Neighbouring Ethiopia intervened militarily. At the time of writing,
it was unclear which direction the country would take.
Fortunately, there are also examples of relatively successful peacebuilding efforts.
Since the Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995, Bosnia is at peace, although twelve
years on, tensions in the country are still too strong to allow for a withdrawal of
international troops. Mozambique is an African example of a very poor country
that has experienced peaceful growth, some freedom, and has held several elec-
tions, after a long war of decolonisation followed by civil war. Its success story is
partly explained by relatively large assistance over a long period of time, in partic-
ular from some member states of the European Union, which adopted Mozam-
bique as a ‘donor darling’ for development assistance.
In general, development cooperation with poor countries, as it grew since the
1960s, was first focussed on fighting poverty and improving socio-economic
conditions after a country became independent. Originally, development cooper-
ation steered clear of political questions such as mismanagement of the country
by its own leadership.
Similarly, peace operations were originally limited to establishing military peace
and trying to maintain it. The two, development cooperation and peace opera-
tions, were separate activities, far removed from each other, carried out by differ-
ent organisations, under the responsibility of Ministries which did not commu-
nicate much with each other. A merger of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and
peace support operations, with such civilian tasks as emergency assistance,
peacebuilding activities and development cooperation has become the norm only
recently. In a small number of countries, the international donors have pioneered
an integrated approach, for example in Kosovo and East Timor.
However, such joint operations often lack clear leadership and a common
purpose of the various donors. In Bosnia, 450 international organisations, large
and small, have been working since 1996, with different mandates, sometimes in
fragmented ways. A common complaint heard from staff engaged with the vari-
ous facets of peacebuilding in the field is: we are doing too little and our work is
too fragmented; the causes of the violence are not really tackled.
2.3 elements of peacebuilding
There is often no clear division between war and peace. There is rarely one exact
date marking the transition from one to the other. Violence tends to linger on
after a cease-fire. Reconstruction has to start in an environment of insecurity. 
As a result, the new (interim) government has to begin many of the tasks of
peacebuilding and reconstruction at the same time, in a high risk environment.
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The main elements of peacebuilding are: establishing security, renewal of
government institutions, (re)starting the rule of law, possibly sowing the seeds of
democracy, and socio-economic rehabilitation and development. In the begin-
ning, emergency powers are needed for stabilisation. Ruined infrastructure
needs to be repaired. Mines have to be cleared. Refugees need protection and
assistance to return safely to their homes.
The sense of security and faith in the future will increase if an international peace
force disarms and demobilises former warring parties, disbands paramilitary
forces, reintegrates combatants and builds law-abiding security forces, including
professional police, embedded in a new legal order. Progress towards democracy
needs to be entrenched through national, regional and local elections. Prosecu-
tion, arrest and trial of war criminals is needed, while a new professional justice
system has to be built up, for which officials have to be (re)trained and laws have
to be enacted. These tasks are formidable, as they encounter much opposition
from old vestiges of power.
Good government, based on an internally recognised and legitimate legal order
with clearly defined powers, accepted by the population, is the basis for lasting
internal peace. In countries outside the oecd-area (comprised of Europe, North
America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and Mexico) donors are
tempted to transplant European multi-party democracy. They might instead help
to create conditions for power sharing, pluralism and inclusive participation in
political decision making. Security for individuals and respect for basic human
rights are crucial. An independent, well-functioning, professional justice system
and independence of the media are the best checks on corruption and abuse of
power.
Peacebuilding requires patience. Instant solutions and quick fixes, often advo-
cated by donors who think that their electorates are averse to long-term
involvement, do not bring lasting stability. Peacebuilding takes more nerve 
and stamina than fighting wars. Ten weeks of military intervention often need
to be followed by ten years of peacebuilding, to avoid a return to bloodshed. 
In many capitals, one can admire statues of generals who have won a war.
Statesman and diplomats who avoided wars by caution and compromise are
less frequently immortalized.
Countries that provide troops for peacekeeping or enforcement actions are 
generally inclined to withdraw them as soon as possible to reduce casualties
among their own troops and limit domestic criticism and high expenses, but
international forces often remain crucial to stabilising the country. Their pres-
ence is usually required for several years to allow peacebuilding to proceed. 
These stabilising forces should be strong enough to deter resumption of hostili-
ties. Experience in Afghanistan and Iraq shows that frequent terrorist acts can
seriously undermine peacebuilding. Organising, training and supporting a new
police structure helps shifting domestic security tasks from military to civilian
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control. It is important to encourage visible, domestic ownership of the security
sphere and weaken the criticism that foreign troops are an occupying force.
One can categorise these manifold activities in eight elements:
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Task
1. Ending violence
2. Emergency 
assistance
3. Disarmament, 
demobilisation, 
reintegration and 
de-mining
4. Economic 
reconstruction
5. Transitional justice;
reconciliation
6. Legal Order
7. New (democratic)
government
8. Refugee return
Activities
Political and diplomatic actions
to arrange a cease-fire and facilitate
a peace agreement.
Deterrence of war, civil war and 
terrorism by military security.
Food, medicine, water, shelter.
Reduction of weapons and troops; 
collection and destruction of munitions;
charting mine fields; demining of roads.
Restarting the economy; encouraging
employment; reducing poverty;
Reconstruction of infrastructure
Return of investors.
Trials of local war criminals;
reconciliation programmes and
‘truth commissions’; trauma assistance,
especially for women, children, 
wounded soldiers.
Monitoring, advising and training of 
police and prosecutors; training of judges;
renewal of laws; renewal of prison 
system; renewal of courts; trials of war
crimes suspects.
New constitutional order; elections for
new leadership at local, regional and
national level; political party formation.
Return and resettlement of refugees and
displaced persons.
Table 2.1 Overview of peacebuilding activities
Main Organisations
un, nato, regional organisations or
ad hoc coalitions
Red Cross, ngos, un-agencies,
regional organisations
un, nato, regional security 
organisations
World Bank, imf, Specialised 
un organisations, eu, bilateral 
donors 
Legal assistance organisations; 
social and religious organisations;
educational institutions; 
local govt. and media
un, regional organisations, ngos, 
bilateral donors, war crimes 
tribunals, International Criminal 
Court
un, regional organisations, osce, 
idea, various ngos and bilateral aid
unhcr, World Bank, ocha, 
bilateral donors, ngos
It goes without saying that reality is more complex than this overview. The
pattern of required steps differs from country to country. The eight tasks of table
2 are not equally urgent, and overlap each other. In order to succeed, each task is
often dependent on the effective execution of the others.
In the chaos after political violence, many essential steps need to be taken by
local, national and international leaders at the same time. Many forms of interna-
tional assistance are urgent. It is hard to prioritise: more troops to ensure secu-
rity, more medical aid, repair of drinking water systems, rebuilding bridges and
houses, electricity, and the list goes on. Everything needs to be there at once,
which is of course not possible. Priorities have to be set and proper sequencing
has to be managed. How all activities could be sequenced will be indicated in
chapter 8. Needless to say, this ‘optimal sequencing’ is only a general indication,
as the best time to start, the duration of the activities and their relative priorities
differ from case to case.
2.4 international organizations
Since the early 1990’s, several international organizations have entered the fields
of peacebuilding inside their member states. At the global level, the United
Nations and many of its special agencies and programmes have developed poli-
cies and programmes to help secure peace after a conflict. Related efforts have
been made for conflict prevention. Many of their activities will be mentioned 
in the following chapters, but this exploration does not contain a complete
summary of what each is doing.
At the turn of the century, the un took new initiatives to bring more coherence
to the still fragmented and ineffective system of international organisations
working in the field of peacebuilding. The un decided in 2005 to establish a
permanent Peacebuilding Commission. It began work in 2006 as a subsidiary
body of the un Security Council. Hopes that this would become a strong new
institution have not as yet been fulfilled. At the un summit of September 2005,
the Peacebuilding Commission was defined as an advisory body. The un General
Assembly also proposed in September 2005 to establish a ‘Peacebuilding Fund’
from voluntary contributions. In 2006, a Central Emergency Response Fund was
indeed set up with contributions totalling $250 million.
The Peacebuilding Commission should provide recommendations and informa-
tion to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the
United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for
early recovery and extend the period of attention paid by the international
community to post-conflict recovery. The Commission is to give its advice in
consensus. This advisory character and the required consensus will reduce its
power, effectiveness and ability to reach agreement swiftly, as countries with
contrary views can delay or prevent decisions. The recommended participation
and size of its meetings is very large, if not unwieldy. It might have been better to
25
an overview of peacebuilding
establish a smaller commission of Security Council members and major countries
and organisations involved in large assistance programmes.
The Peacebuilding Commission intends to form subcommittees for individual
countries in need of assistance. In the fall of 2006, two country cases were
started: Burundi and Sierra Leone. At the time of writing, no evaluation was
possible of the effectiveness of the Commission. The first task was to design 
with like-minded countries effective subcommittees that will enhance coordina-
tion of donor countries, international organisations and ngos in specific cases
and avoid vagueness and slowness that could threaten the Peacebuilding
Commission.
The un General Assembly of September 2005 also supported the establishment
of a Democracy Fund at the United Nations. In 2006, it made its first round of
funding decisions. Its projects support reform of constitutions, advice to political
parties, electoral laws, election preparation, election oversight and other activi-
ties for democratisation.
Of increasing importance for peacebuilding are the policies and programmes of
the European Union. That is why a separate chapter 7 is devoted to an analysis of
eu policies in this field.
After this indicative overview, we will attempt, in the next chapter, to distin-
guish types of countries in trouble, and try to formulate a general approach to
effective peacebuilding.
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sierra leone
Sierra Leone is a relatively small
West African country of about 6 million inhabi-
tants who have an average life expectancy of
barely 40 years. The country became interna-
tionally known for its ‘blood’ diamonds that
helped finance the gruesome civil war lasting
from 1991 to 2002. Independence from Britain in
1961 was followed by political instability and
economic trouble. Corrupt leaders and military
coups succeeded each other.
Stevens became prime minister after the 1968
elections and the first president after having
declared the Republic in 1971. He was succeeded
by Momoh 1986 who paved the way for a more
democratic constitution in 1991.
That same year, civil war broke out. The combi-
nation of a weak state, poverty and corruption
enabled Sankoh’s Revolutionary United Front
(ruf) to recruit unemployed youth. In 1992, the
government was overthrown by Strasser’s
Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
(rslmf). During the following years the ruf
waged war against the rslmf and seized signifi-
cant areas by using terror tactics. In 1995 the ruf
captured Freetown. Anarchy broke out and
thousands were killed, mutilated, or raped.
Strasser used a private army to destroy impor-
tant ruf headquarters and recapture Freetown.
In the midst of war, presidential elections
brought Kabbah to power. Subsequent
peace talks resulted in the Abidjan Accord
that officially ended the war for the first
time. The following year, Koromha’s
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(afrc) took power and continued
the war. Nigeria’s initial inter-
vention failed, though it
returned under the flag of the
Economic Community of West
African States (ecowas) with its mili-
tary wing ecomog. The intervention
reinstated Kabbah in 1998, but could not
prevent a new ruf and afrc invasion of Free-
town in 1999. In 1998 the un sent an observer
mission to Sierra Leone, which was replaced 
by unamsil that received a broader mandate 
to protect citizens.
The 1999 Lomé peace agreement called for an
immediate cease fire and set up a power-sharing
government of national unity. The year 2000
witnessed the outbreak of large scale fights
between rebels, the government and un peace
forces. British troops intervened to protect the
un-peace forces and bring some stability. The
second Abuja Agreement, signed in May 2001,
started disarmament, demobilization and rein-
tegration of former rebels. The president
declared peace in 2002. unamsil left the coun-
try in 2005.
Since then, Sierra Leone’s authorities have car-
ried full responsibility for interior security with
the help of the un Integrated Office (uniosil)
and an International Military Advisory and
Training Team (imatt). Sierra Leone has strug-
gled to combat the causes of the war: extreme
poverty, unemployment, corruption, and a weak
state. The Special Court for Sierra Leone put 
on trial suspects of war crimes. The country’s
future now appears brighter; democratic institu-
tions are being built under guidance of the inter-
national community.
S i e r r a  L e o n e
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3 towards t ypology and theory
It would be a mistake to generalise quickly about peacebuilding operations. All
countries and wars are different. There are at present 192 member states of the
United Nations and a number of autonomous but not fully sovereign nations and
territories. These countries all have their distinct characteristics. The same
applies to wars, civil wars, and other forms of contemporary armed conflict and
political violence. No manifestation can be said to be the same as another.
Comparative analysis of various cases offers insight, but the number of variables
that differ between countries is so large that modesty is necessary when search-
ing for general theory. The large number of variables and the immeasurability of
many of them make generalisations about international politics, comparative
politics and violent conflicts very complex. In some areas of research, useful
generalisations are nearly impossible, or remain so abstract that they are almost
meaningless. As is the case with human beings, generalisations about states, too,
need to be supplemented by a precise analysis of the separate features of each
individual case and its unique combinations.
3.1 a deductive t ypology
Nonetheless, for the sake of overview, some classification is needed of states in
various kinds of trouble. Let us start with deduction, without reference to possi-
ble statistical measurement, which will be discussed later. To begin with, the
majority of states are in a state of peace only in the minimal sense of an absence of
war (negative peace). Usually, in a state which is not experiencing internal war,
most of the means of violence are in the hands of the governments’ military and
police forces. In between these ‘states in peace’ and ‘states in or at war’ are states
which seem at peace, but their peace is brittle, threatened by looming external or
civil war, terrorism, widespread crime, drugs lords and armed gangs.
Next to this, one can distinguish among states according to quality of govern-
ment system. It is clear that some countries in peace are governed well and others
very badly. Good government is effective and legitimate. (For a definition of good
governance, see section 3.2). As legitimacy and effectiveness are related but sepa-
rate dimensions, let us first look at legitimacy.
Legitimacy in a broad, sociological sense means that the majority of the popula-
tion accepts the authority of the government on the basis of laws, traditional
rules and norms, and cultural values, instead of ‘acceptance’ of the rulers due to a
fear of the government’s oppressive and coercive power.
Authoritarian regimes which uphold their laws generally rule by law, but this is
not the same as the rule of law. The rule of law requires legitimacy in a stricter,
legal sense, meaning that all authority is wielded only under laws which have
been approved voluntarily by freely elected representatives of the population.
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Acceptance by the population reflects various types of approval. Is the govern-
ment widely accepted because it rests on democratic structures of representation
and the rule of law, or because of traditional authority patterns seen by most of
the population as ‘normal’, even if there is no rule of law? Or would the govern-
ment and state institutions be rejected if people were given a chance to express
themselves? Degrees of internal acceptance and legitimacy in a broad sense could
be used as the second ‘dimension’ of a categorisation of states.
A third aspect, effectiveness, means that a government and its apparatus are able
to carry out government decisions and make citizens and institutions behave
accordingly. A precondition for effectiveness is that the government’s authority
is at least passively accepted by the population, and that the state has a monopoly
over the means of physical coercion (often abbreviated by the loose and wider
notion of ‘power’). This coercive monopoly can ensure domestic peace between
opposing interests inclined to use force against each other or the state itself. This
monopoly can also safeguard national security from external threats. Coercive
monopoly maintains the domestic legal order against the use and threat of
violence by others than the state. This monopoly also indirectly enforces the
main laws and institutions for the economic system.
An effective government provides all necessary public services and collective
goods such as safety for the population, an effective justice system, education,
basic health care, physical infrastructure and protection of the natural environ-
ment. Government effectiveness means that the state’s main aims are met and
that the government’s main policies and institutions are accepted and carried out
by the population. The effectiveness of government is, for instance, low in many
African states, as the government does not provide many useful services, while
different tribes feel little solidarity with a ‘post-colonial’ state structure imposed
on them, often dividing the tribe among different governments.
The two aspects just mentioned, effectiveness and acceptance, would by
themselves lead to a fourfold classification. Examples of ineffective and 
illegitimate governments abound; they form a motley collection of states run
by groups which grabbed the means of suppression to advance their political
agenda and ideology or personal interests. Portugal is a good example of a
country which moved with international assistance in two decades from tradi-
tional, well integrated but rather ineffective and not very legitimate, to being
effective and very legitimate. An opposite example, moving from relatively
effective/legitimate (at least in African terms) to ineffective/illegitimate is
Zimbabwe in the last ten years of Mugabe’s rule. A number of communist
countries in the post-ww2 era had relatively effective but illegitimate govern-
ments. And an example of a legitimate but ineffective government was India in
the first decades after independence. It has become increasingly effective since.
This simple typology can of course be developed into greater precision by
specifying more variables.
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In addition to the three aspects dealt with up to this point – security, effec-
tiveness and acceptance – we should consider the reach of the government
domain.
Domain refers to the functional areas and sectors of society over which the
government exerts control. The us government (federal and states), for instance,
has a limited domain relative to society. It leaves many sectors relatively free. The
us tax revenue or government expenses divided by national income are very low
compared to other oecd member states. The domain of the Northwest European
governments, which try to maintain a social welfare state, is much bigger.
Government domain is, however, not to be seen as the opposite of freedom:
some human rights, particularly socio-economic and cultural rights, are guaran-
teed better in states with a large domain than in those with a limited scope of
regulation.
This typology based on security, acceptance, effectiveness and domain, yields in
theory at least 36 different pigeon holes, if domain is divided in large or small;
effectiveness in effective or ineffective, acceptance in illegitimate, traditional, or
democratic, and if security is divided in high, medium or low.
One should add a fifth, economic factor for consideration, like income per capita,
or a composite indicator for the prevalence of prosperity or its opposite, poverty.
How to combine absolute poverty figures with income inequality and other indi-
cators of economic ill health of a country is left aside for the moment. Let us
assume such an indicator can be made carefully, and just call this dimension
poverty. This fifth dimension has a complex relationship with peace. Poverty in
the sense of a very low income per capita could exist in history along with politi-
cal stability and low frequency of war and civil war, in traditional societies which
underwent little or very slow change.
The frequency of political violence tends to rise when economic modernization
and social change pick up speed. Civil strife correlates with change and with
rising expectations. During the transition from a stable, traditional society to a
highly developed, modern society, political violence occurs much more
frequently. This rising unrest tends to decline after the transition is more or less
completed and prosperity is enjoyed by a high proportion of the population. This
phenomenon contradicts the hope that economic development, by satisfying
consumer needs and providing more employment, directly reduces wars and civil
wars. As most less-developed nations are in transition, a relatively low level of
income per capita correlates since the Second World War with a high frequency
of violence. This depends also heavily on related, other economic factors, like a
very unequal distribution of income which is seen as highly unjust by the popu-
lation. The complex relation between poverty and violence also works the other
way round: oppression, civil wars and international wars strongly reduce the
capacity of a country to create more wealth and reach a state of steady economic
progress. Frequent violence undermines confidence in the near future and
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reduces the propensity of the population, the business elite and foreign compa-
nies to save and invest in that country.
The five aspects of the nature of the state mentioned above – security, acceptance,
effectiveness, domain and poverty – are not independent from each other. It is
clear that national security influences acceptance, domain and effectiveness,
while acceptance, effectiveness and domain also influence each other. Insecurity
and ineffectiveness correlate highly with poverty. For brief, descriptive purposes
or comparisons, however, this typology may be a handy scheme to indicate the
different contexts in which peacebuilding and rule-of-law assistance
programmes operate. Low effectiveness, low legitimacy, high insecurity, small
domain and widespread poverty signal ‘red alert’. High effectiveness, high legiti-
macy, high security, large domain and little poverty indicate a solid state. For
example, we can see that the government of Afghanistan is ineffective, people are
insecure and poor, and the government has a small domain, but has increased in
legitimacy due to recent internationally organised elections. Yet its acceptance by
regional leaders and various ethnic groupings is not secure. China on the other
hand is effective, secure, has a large domain, and its acceptance is relatively high
(not democratic but not considered illegitimate). Though the People’s Republic
of China has been very successful since the early 1980s in eliminating much
poverty in Eastern coastal regions, a major source of inner tension is rising
economic inequality, regionally and socially, due to remaining poverty in the
areas which are far away from its bustling cities.
A weakness of the typology just outlined is that most states are not internally
homogeneous. Some governments may represent a small part of the population
rather well but suppress and exploit the rest. Examples are states whose govern-
ments are dominated by one out of many tribes, or by a closed political elite bent
on increasing their benefits from state positions. Such governments are often 
supported by systems of patronage and clientelism, which may appear to be ‘
democratic’, as those who benefit from ruling others and have much influence
over the media can be able to channel voting behaviour in favour of electoral 
victories. But the system breeds corruption. Resentment, and a lack of trust among
those who do not profit or are suppressed, will weaken the state in the long run.
Here, a policy remark comes to mind. In situations as those just mentioned, it is
risky to give assistance to an unrepresentative government without strict condi-
tions. Preaching reform to oppressive elite is likely to remain without results. 
No diplomat or aid minister should entertain the illusion that a cleptocratic
power circle is eager to cut its revenue. Those in power try to increase it and will
say ‘yes’ to the donors’ conditions, but fail to act upon them in a bonafide fashion
once foreign funds have been secured.
Fortunately, many corrupt governments are not monolithic. It is not impossible
to find institutions which are run by people of good intent who can use foreign
training and expert advice while their government is of a rather evil nature.
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Foreign donors may have to walk a tight-rope assisting these persons, without
drawing too much attention from distrustful government leaders. Such invest-
ments run the risk of failure once the top officials clamp down, but they also can
sow some seeds of change. This needs to be determined case-by-case, weighing
the risks and opportunities.
In such instances, it may still be possible to help improve the professional civil
service officers at the middle and lower level, especially of offices that appear able
to shield themselves to some extent from corruptive influences from the top, like
parts of the court system, which may benefit from professional training.
A donor may also choose to strengthen non-governmental institutions. Helping
civil society to organize itself better and increase awareness of human rights may
encourage social change from below in due course. This, too, is not without risk,
as authoritarian leaders may take harsh counter measures.
3.2 good governance and human rights
Good governance can be defined as the fair and efficient management of a coun-
try’s public resources in a sustainable fashion, as well as the upholding of laws and
institutions that encourage optimal private management of people’s lives and pri-
vate resources, without trespassing basic human rights and freedoms. The general
purpose is to optimise conditions for sustainable enjoyment of human rights.
Perhaps good governance could be codified in a set of internationally accepted
norms, if possible in treaty form, by organs of the United Nations.1 Many elements
of such a code are already available from international human rights treaties, un
documents, the eu Handbook on Good Government, and from individual coun-
try statements and academic sources.2
Officially, there is an international consensus on human rights as defined in
treaties which have been signed by almost all governments and representatives of
major philosophies and religions. Differences in emphasis and interpretation will
always exist but do not reduce the general validity of the aspiration of human
rights. It is sometimes argued that human rights as formulated in the relevant
international treaties are too individualistic and not taking into account ‘Islamic
culture’, ‘collectivist Asian values’, or ‘African culture’. The universal human
rights treaties fit a cosmopolitan view and equal rights philosophy, which
assumes that all human beings deserve fair chances to a happy life. This differs
from ways of thinking which emphasise not the ethical rights of all human
beings, but supposed privileges of nations, peoples, (small) communities, certain
people with a particular set of characteristics (such as religious, cultural, linguis-
tic, racial or ethnic features) and their membership of privileged groupings.
As many of the human rights of the international treaties are not equally
respected and upheld in most states, one might distinguish, of course, among
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human rights of a first order, particularly the rights needed to enjoy physical
security, and a second or third group of rights which are essential for freedom of
expression and freedom from want. The obvious distinction between political
rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic and cultural rights on the other, has
been made in the un conventions. Communal or group rights and other particu-
lar identities are notions that are not easy to square ethically with equal human
rights. Moreover, rights of particular groups are difficult to define.
Why may certain people not belong to the group, and on what ethical ground can
they be excluded from equal rights? Group rights which do not relate to objective
criteria such as the rights of children or the rights of women run into tricky ques-
tions. It is beyond the area of this study on reconstruction assistance to further
discuss these differences in the notions of human rights and their impact,
however important they are. We simply proceed on the basis of the two most
important un treaties which are also the foundations for several other protocols
and conventions that are binding for all nations and people.3
In general, improving respect for human rights has become a widely agreed aim
for national and international assistance, which has been reconfirmed many
times by the international community over the past few decades. One can remain
sceptical about the gap between words and deeds, but should not be relativist as
to the general ideal, which is supported by the world’s main religions and
philosophies. We return to this in section 5.13.
3.3 warning signals
Which practical indicators exist to get a quick overview of the war risks different
peoples are exposed to? The Fund for Peace4 has designed a system to assess if a
state risks state failure and civil war. This conflict assessment methodology cast
(Conflict Assessment Tool) uses twelve indicators of a social, economic or politi-
cal nature:
A Social Indicators
1. mounting demographic pressures
2. massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons creating
complex humanitarian emergencies
3. legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
4. chronic and sustained human flight (educated, middle class)
B Economic Indicators
5. uneven economic development along group lines
6. sharp and/or severe economic decline
C Political Indicators
7. criminalisation and/or de-legitimization of the state
8. progressive deterioration of public services
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9. suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation
of human rights
10. the state’s security apparatus operates as a ‘state within a state’
11. rise of factionalised elites
12. intervention of other states or other external political actors
The cast methodology enumerates five qualities which reflect the capacity of a
state to cope with the risks of state failure:
1. a competent police force and corrections system
2. an efficient, professional civil service
3. an independent judicial system that works under the rule of law
4. a professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian
government
5. a strong executive/legislative leadership capable of national governance.
The cast analysis supports the view that the rule of law has a strong impact on
the risk that a state falls (again) into civil war. The cast analysis is used to make
an index of states which are most at risk of falling into civil war, as shown in the
text box and on the map.
3.4 an attempt at theory
Pondering the practical challenges posed by peacebuilding begs the question if
theoretical generalisation is possible as a way to gain an overview, notwithstand-
ing the observation at the outset that all countries and wars are different. The
purposes of a peacebuilding theory might be: 1. to help diagnose the political
pathology of countries; 2. to help determine feasible goals, optimal treatment,
and suitable sequencing of actions; 3. to select countries in need for assistance
programs; 4. to better allocate limited resources; 5. to find the best ‘agents of
change’ (improvement) in countries in need; and also 6. to develop crisis preven-
tion strategies. Such theory may exist, but we have not yet identified it. This new
field of study might not yet be ready for such achievements, but the need is great
and new studies may help to make progress in the next few years.
In the present explorative study, the purpose is more modest: to find elements of
a possible theory that might help to improve assistance to building the rule of law
in post-conflict societies.
There are different approaches and frameworks used in the peacebuilding litera-
ture, such as a liberal/universalistic strand which focuses on human rights, and
more constructivist strands that focus on local culture. The subject area of assis-
tance for building the rule of law in foreign countries is relatively new as an
academic and policy field. On the other hand, history offers endless cases of
building and reforming states and their various legal systems, sometimes with
outside assistance, or under strong external pressures.
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Failed States index
Foreign Policy Magazine has published with the
assistance of the Fund for Peace an index that
gives an indication of the weakest states in the
world.5 State structures can fail ‘by explosion,
implosion, erosion or invasion.’ A state that is
failing loses control over territory and its
monopoly over the means of force. Next comes
the inability to provide basic services. 
The indicators cover a wide range, such as 
corruption, criminal behaviour, large-scale
displacement of the population, rapid eco-
nomic decline, sharp inequality, persecution 
or discrimination, and environmental decay.
The index depicts the world’s weakest states.
Its 12 social, economic, political and military
indicators are used to rank 177 states in order
of vulnerability to violent internal conflict and
deterioration of the society.
The ranking in the right column shows the
60 most vulnerable states as published in 2007.
The left column shows a recent, more compre-
hensive index (which is not necessarily better)
which measures both the internal and external
peacefulness of countries. This Global Peace
Index is discussed in the gpi textbox hereafter.
For brevity, we have omitted the indices
attributed to separate countries and show the
rank of countries according to both indices in
reverse. The table starts with the worst cases:
numbers 1 and 2 are the most inclined to state
failure, etc. The lower the number, the higher
the risks.
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Global Peace Index and Failed States Index
Worst Ranking  Ranking 
Rank Global Peace Index Failed States Index
1 Iraq Sudan
2 Sudan Iraq
3 Israel Somalia
4 Russia Zimbabwe
5 Nigeria Chad
6 Colombia Ivory Coast
7 Pakistan Congo
8 Lebanon Afghanistan
9 Ivory Coast Guinea
10 Angola Central African Republic
11 Sri Lanka Haiti
12 Uzbekistan Pakistan
13 India North Korea
14 Myanmar Burma/Myanmar
15 Algeria Uganda
16 Zimbabwe Bangladesh
17 Thailand Nigeria
18 Uganda Ethiopia
19 Ethiopia Burundi
20 Venezuela East Timor
21 Azerbaijan Nepal
The Striking differences between both indexes are discussed in the following textbox on the Global
Peace Index, after the Failing State Map. 
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Worst Ranking  Ranking 
Rank Global Peace Index Failed States Index
22 Philippines Uzbekistan
23 South Africa Sierra Leone
24 Honduras Yemen
25 Iran Sri Lanka
26 United States Rep Congo
27 Yemen Liberia
28 Trinidad Tobago Lebanon
29 Guatemala Malawi
30 Turkey Solomon Islands
31 Kenya Kenya
32 Saudi Arabia Niger
33 El Salvador Colombia
34 Papua New Guinea Burkina Faso
35 Bangladesh Cameroon
36 Ecuador Egypt
37 Cambodia Rwanda
38 Serbia Guinea Bissau
39 Brazil Tajikistan
40 Macedonia Syria
41 Jamaica Equatorial Guinea
42 Ukraine Kyrgyzstan
43 Mexico Turkmenistan
44 Indonesia Laos
45 Syria Mauritania
46 Cameroon Togo
47 Bosnia Herzegovina Bhutan
48 Dominican Republic Cambodia
49 Egypt Moldova
50 Equatorial Guinea Eritrea
51 Moldova Belarus
52 Peru Papua New Guinea
53 Bolivia Angola
54 Malawi Bosnia 
55 Croatia Indonesia
56 Nicaragua Philippines
57 Senegal Iran
58 Namibia Georgia
59 Jordan Bolivia
60 Kazakhstan Guatemala
The Failing State Map
The ranking on the failing state index is based on the score on the 12 indicators of
the cast system mentioned in section 3.3. Each rating is from 0 to 10, with 0
being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least
stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators, and is on a scale of 0-120.
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Critical In DanSTATES OF FAILURE
The 60 most vulnerable countries are critical (red), in danger (orange), and
borderline (yellow). Stable states are light green and most stable is dark green.
These ratings and colours are no predictions but indicate vulnerability to collapse
or violent conflict.
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The Global Peace Index
In 2007, a Global Peace Index was designed.
This gpi ranks 121 nations on their ‘state of
peace’.6 The index consists of 24 indicators,
ranging from domestic peace, violent crimes, 
military expenditure, and relations with
neighbouring states, to respect for human
rights. It was made by a team of scholars,
brought together by S. Killelea, and calculated
by the Economist Intelligence Unit. We have
reversed the numbering and left out the coun-
try index scores, to make an easy comparison
with the Failed States Index in the previous
textbox, showing worst cases first.
The gpi reflects the state of peace in nations
based on three sets of indicators: aspects of
violent conflicts, aspects of societal security
and measures of militarization.
A. Violent conflict
• Number of external and internal violent
conflicts in 2000-05
• Number of deaths from organised external
conflict
• Number of deaths from organised internal
conflict
• Indicators of organised internal conflict
• Relations with neighbouring countries
B. Societal security
• Level of distrust in other citizens
• Displaced persons as percentage of the
population
• Political instability
• Disrespect for human rights (Political
Terror Scale)
• Potential for terrorist acts
• Homicides per 100,000 people
• Other violent crime statistics
• Violent demonstrations
• Prisoners per 100,000 people
• Internal security officers and police per
100,000 people
C. Militarization
• Military expenditures as a percentage of
gdp
• Armed services per 100,000 inhabitants
• Imports of major conventional weapons
per 100,000 inhabitants
• Exports of major conventional weapons
per 100,000
• un deployments 2006-07 (percentage of
armed forces)
• Heavy weapons per 100,000 inhabitants
• Access to small arms
• Other indicators of military capabilities
Two weighted indices were calculated: a
measure of how a country is at peace domes-
tically, and a measure of to what extent it is 
at peace with other countries. The overall
index consists for 60 percent of the measure
of internal peace and 40 percent for external
peace. Different weights, e.g. 50-50 or 25-75,
would attribute more peacefulness to states
which are not so much at peace within them-
selves but are not engaged in international
conflicts. The assumption of 60-40 is arbi-
trary but defensible; it is not a weakness of
the index, but its effect on the ranking should
be noted.
The index encompasses 95 percent of the
world’s population. Lack of data resulted in
the exclusion of a number of less-developed
countries. It is likely that most of these coun-
tries would be in the group of worst cases.
According to this index, small, stable and
democratic countries are relatively most
peaceful. Most of those are European democ-
racies and members of the European Union.
Island nations also tend to be more at peace,
probably due to fewer external sources of
tension.
Most regions other than Western Europe
show a wide variation in rankings. Asia is
the next most peaceful region but with wide 
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variation. Most sub-Saharan African states
are in the serious trouble zone. Three of the
world’s major states score badly. The United
States has high levels of military expenditure
and involvement outside its borders as a (self-
appointed) ‘global policeman’. The United
States does not show up well due to a very
high percent of jailed population and high
levels of homicides, as well as high defence
expenditure and involvement in the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan. Large states which
score much better on gpi are Japan (5),
Germany (12) and France (33).
Of special interest are the worst cases on the
list: countries which are most under the stress
of violence, according to gpi: Iraq and Sudan.
Russia’s lack of peacefulness seems surpris-
ing, but is the result of much domestic
violence, the war in Chechnya and relatively
high military expenditure. Israel is a special
case. Its democratic nature would give a better
showing, if it were not for high defence
expenditure, internal counter-insurgency
measures and frequent violent tensions with
its neighbours.
The gpi arrives at a ranking of 121 countries.
The 60 worst cases are shown in the previous
text box comparing the gpi and the Failing
States Index. Of course, this gpi ranking
reflects the statistical basis, and is neither a
value judgment on actual peacefulness at
present, nor on peaceful intent. The indica-
tors reflect statistical data between 2000 and
2006. Of interest is that most developing
countries are in the worst ranks.
Next to the 24 main statistical indicators, the
authors of the gpi used 33 other indicators of
the competence and quality of governments,
strength of institutions, political process,
international openness, demography, integra-
tion in the region, religion, culture, education
and well-being.
Comment:
The resulting scores may appear somewhat
arbitrary if one looks at differences between
similar countries or unexpected high or low
rankings. Many features of being at peace
internally and externally cannot be measured
statistically. Many statistics are not entirely
reliable. Important qualities of a social system
can often not be measured. The bon mot
attributed to Albert Einstein, “What can be
counted does not count, and what counts
cannot be counted” applies here to some
extent too. But of equal value is the opposite
remark, attributed to Maynard Keynes, when
questioned about the figures underlying his
general theory of employment: “Do you have
better ones?”
The value of this new index is still to be
proven. One way is to check how it correlates
with various factors. These were calculated
by the authors and show some interesting
results. The more corruption in a country, the
less it is at peace. There is a significant corre-
lation between democracy and internal peace,
but the external peace measure is not signifi-
cantly correlated with democracy. Democra-
cies tend not to make war against each other,
but they are involved in military operations
against non-democratic states.
gpi may be a step forward in measurement,
categorisation and analysis of the state of
peace of various countries. It is a first go, and
clearly not as refined as e.g. the democracy
index of Freedom House, which is the result
of a long process of sophistication. As long as
there are no longitudinal gpi figures and as
long as it consists of some arbitrary measures
and not always reliable data, the index is to be
used as an indication only, not as a scientific
fact.
41
towards typology and theory
Comparison of Global Peace Index and
Failed States Index
Both systems of measurement agree that
Sudan and Iraq were the worst cases in 
2005-6. Both measurements also agree that
sub-Sahara Africa is the world’s region with
the largest number of troubled states. Differ-
ences between both systems are first of all
due to different purposes. The Failing States
Index measures vulnerability to collapse and
violence. The Global Peace Index measures
the internal and external state of peace of a
country and combines these in one measure.
Other differences are due to other methods
and data. Some countries are not included in
one index because of lack of data, but are
included in the other. This leads already to
incomparability of rank orders. Fourth, the
gpi includes measures of being involved in
external tensions, wars and peace opera-
tions, while the failed states index focuses
on internal aspects.
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Very low
No data
Internal conflict
Involved in an external conflict
Low
Medium
High
Very high
State of peace
Global Peace Index
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
The gpi gives countries with a high defence
spending and high involvement in external
military activities a lower score on ‘peace-
fulness’, but this may distort the picture of
the position and policies of various coun-
tries in two directions. A superpower like
the us has high defence spending, which is
related, to some degree, to much lower
defence spending by many of its allies, in so
far as they feel covered by the us defence
umbrella. Those which feel protected score
as ‘more peaceful’ than the protector itself,
which is odd, if not unjust. For instance, the
defence expenditures of European nato
allies and Japan and South Korea should not
be considered in isolation from their rela-
tions with the us.
Further analysis is needed of the underlying
data to come to more meaningful compar-
isons and conclusions and contribute to
refinement. 
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To formulate a ‘proto-theory’ that might be applicable to many contemporary
cases of external rule-of-law assistance, one should ideally find a theory which
can be verified, improved or falsified by testing its underlying hypotheses in case
studies. This requires a very complex scholarly study, and can be expected to arise
in the course of the years out of a growing body of academic research and policy
debates.
Many general works and case studies seem, however, to be based on more or
less implicit theoretical thoughts. For the purpose of the present exploration, 
it may be useful to attempt a formulation of a more explicit ‘proto-theory’,
however simple at first sight. The following thinking, in brief notions, might
be of some use:
The chances of (in the sense of opportunities for) the establishment of the rule 
of law, as measured by actually implemented respect for human rights, depend
mainly on:
– The stability of the state’s main institutions, in particular the maintenance of
the state’s monopoly on armed forces and police. This ‘monopoly factor’ is a
prerequisite for the absence of civil war and frequent large-scale political inter-
group violence. This monopoly does not at all by itself guarantee the rule of
law, as it may also serve a totalitarian ruler or an oligarchic state which does
not uphold human rights.
– At least as important is the degree to which the rule of law is engrained in
the population’s demand for legal order. This endogenous demand flows
from the values, norms and expectations of the population as shaped by their
belief systems, morality, broader culture and other roots of the notion of
justice.
– This demand for legal order has led to a supply of legal and judicial institutions
and professionals. The institutions, which are domestic sources of legal order,
comprise the courts, the offices of public prosecutors, the police, human 
rights institutions and advocacy groups, and academic or professional training 
institutes, as well as the Ministries of Justice and Interior, and the legislative
system. This ‘supply’ is a broad category which should, of course, be subdi-
vided further. The quality (values, experience, and other personal characteris-
tics) of leadership is of crucial importance within this ‘supply’ factor. (A case 
in point is the leadership of Nelson Mandela in South Africa during a period
which had a high propensity to social violence. A negative example is the lack
of effectiveness of the first elected leaders of Haiti after the un peace opera-
tion. Ineffectiveness contributed to a return of domestic violence after the first
peace operation.)
– As noted above, there is a complex correlation between the rule of law and
various aspects of economic development. For the sake of peacebuilding
theory, we might abbreviate these various economic phenomena (income per
capita, income inequality, unemployment, percentage of the work force
employed in the service sector, etc.) as ‘prevalence of prosperity’. We refer to
the discussion about the poverty factor in section 3.1.We presume that, within
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this factor ‘prevalence of prosperity’, one of the most potent determinants of
success in building post-conflict rule of law is employment opportunities for
males in the age groups that are most inclined to violent behaviour, either for
political or economic reasons, or other forms of social violence.
– Even though we can observe that the domestic demand and supply of the legal
order are crucial variables, it should also be noted that international pressure
and incentives for human rights and legal order are an important factor, as
nations respond to international influences and pressures in favour of human
rights and legal order, in particular to the strength of international human
rights regimes which apply to them, notably regional human rights treaties
and courts, like the European Convention on Human Rights, concluded
among members of the Council of Europe. 
The policies of the Allied Powers after 1945 towards Germany, Japan and Italy
encouraged these states to reform rapidly and become rule-of-law societies.
The policies of the European Community and the Council of Europe towards
Greece, Portugal and Spain influenced these countries to make reforms and
adapt to their regional environment. Similarly, several countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe have adopted rapid reform programs in the 1990’s to gain
access to the Council of Europe, the European Union and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisations. It is true that not all these reform programs have been
completed. Romania and Bulgaria, for instance, still have some distance to go,
but the reformist influence from the outside is clearly discernible. A similar
effect is exerted in the countries that arose out of the civil war in the Former
Yugoslavia, notably Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.
Such effects are expected in Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia in the future.
These can also be observed in Albania. There is little doubt that the reformist
mood in Turkey in the 1990’s and beginning of the 21-st century has to some
extent been encouraged by its wish to gain access to the European Union and
meet the Copenhagen criteria of democracy, human rights, modern effective
administration and a social market economy. 
This factor could be summarized as the external context, consisting of (1) the
exogenous demand for reform as experienced by the country in need of reform;
(2) the benefits expected by the country from adjustment to such external
demands, and (3) the international assistance which is offered for the
(re)construction of legal order and respect for human rights. The volume and
quality of external assistance for the rule of law can be an important contribu-
tion helping to build up rule of law in recipient countries.
– Finally and as a matter of course, time is of the essence, as matters improve or
decay over a period of time. Disruption and destruction can happen overnight,
but building and reconstruction takes many years, if not decades.
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Summarizing these remarks, one might say that:
The degree to which the basic human rights, related to personal security, are
respected in a country is a function of:
(a) the state’s monopoly over the legal use of armed force and police,
(b) the domestic supply of rule-of-law institutions and legal professionals, and
leaders of its main institutions in the police, legal and judicial sector.
(c) the political and religious leadership of the country, security sector leaders
and media leaders,
(d) the endogenous demand for the rule of law as felt by the population and opin-
ion leaders,
(e) the absence of poverty, in particular no high unemployment for males in the
age groups for soldiers, militia and young violent criminals,
(f) the strength of international human rights treaties and institutions,
(g) international economic and political benefits (including desired membership
of international organisations) which are expected to be gained from adapt-
ing to rule-of–law standards,
(h) international assistance for peacebuilding, in particular for the rule of law,
and
(i) time.
These summarized 9 main variables form complex sets of interrelationships
which are, of course, not described by this cursive section, but are still hidden
inside this ‘box’. These variables need to be specified further. For instance, the
state’s monopoly on legitimate coercive power rests on physical means (police
and security sector personnel in numbers, leadership, quality and equipment), as
well as on persuasive, ‘soft’ influence of the national political and normative
leadership. Leadership may be the strongest factor, as discussed above, but at the
same time, this factor is very qualitative, psychological and value-driven. It is the
least predictable and probably not measurable by any indicators as used in inter-
national statistics.
International peacekeeping presence and police assistance can strengthen or even
temporarily supplant the monopoly on legitimate coercive power. Whether their
temporary presence is adequate, depends, of course, on the nature and size of
domestic and foreign threats to peace and public order.
International assistance is offered by bilateral and multilateral donors. Donor
assistance varies greatly in quality and quantity. The World Bank Group, undp,
the eu and many bilateral donors can form a strong external factor for building
up legal order, if they have adequate resources, well-designed policies and if they
coordinate well. But in most peacebuilding operations their actions are relatively
small and not well-coordinated.
It is often assumed that more external assistance is better than less. But this
depends on many other factors. The wrong type of assistance can do more harm
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than good. There can also be counter-productive results. Good intentions can
have bad effects, particularly if no thorough social, political and anthropological
analysis is made before action is undertaken. External assistance can also have
seemingly counter-productive results in the short run, as it can weaken the
acceptance by the population of their plight under a traditional, authoritarian
regime. Rising expectations and rapidly changing power shares tend to make a
country less stable during its transition to modernity.
This observation means one should be careful not to encourage civil war by the
wrong kind of international assistance at the wrong time, but design this assis-
tance with the specific urgent problems of the country concerned in mind,
particularly the requests from civil society insofar as it represents the needs of
the population. Donors should, for instance, avoid giving only little assistance
during the first phase of transition, and then give up. This may weaken tradi-
tional justice mechanisms, or increase harsh counter measures by the govern-
ment. Once a demand for change has been encouraged, it is necessary to help 
the population and the state’s organs through the difficult transition before a
stable state is achieved. Short, little and wrong aid might be worse than no assis-
tance at all.
3.5 threats to the peace
The manifold threats to a peaceful legal order can be analyzed in five classes or
levels: (1) persons inclined to political violence (we do not discuss here non-
political criminal violence); (2) groups inclined to political violence, be they
ethnic, religious, economic or other; (3) the leadership of such groups, which
mobilize and apply this violent inclination; (4) the temptation or propensity of
state institutions and their leaders not to subdue, manage or channel away such
violence, but to mobilise the group hatred in an effort to ride the tiger to further
their personal goals of control over the state and its resources; (5) the actors in
the external international system, comprising particularly other states, inter-
national companies and international opinion leaders. These five levels (the
personal, the social, the political, the state and the international system) each
have their own propensity to violence as well as inhibitions against violent
conflict behaviour.
Peacebuilding aims at reducing the propensities to violence and increasing the
inhibitions at these five levels. Success at one level may be destroyed by failure at
another. Excellent national institutions for peaceful conflict settlement may be
undercut or destroyed by the weaknesses at the international level, as many
peaceful states have experienced in history. And reversely, a peaceful national or
regional international system can be upset by aggressive non-state entities at a
personal and small group level, like terrorist cells.
Peacebuilding needs to be balanced and comprehensive at all five levels to reach
an enduring peace. A daunting task indeed, with high risks at all levels.
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3.6 practical questions
The assistance countries need and the chances for (re)establishment of rule of law
depend mainly on the answers to three questions: What kind of peace has been
established; what kind of conflict raged; and what kind of government system
was in place before the violence?
To start with the last question, if before the war there was an effective, accepted
rule of law government, peacebuilding is more likely to be smooth and speedy
than if the government was ineffective and illegitimate.
The kind of conflict which raged before a peace agreement makes an enormous
difference to post-conflict peacebuilding activities. Was it an international war 
in which the country was defeated but the regime did not change afterwards? Or
was the regime changed or removed while much of the administrative capacity 
of the state was continued after a purge at the top? In the latter case, there may 
be better chances for a successful renewal of the state and the government, like
Germany, Italy and Japan in 1945. Was the war a civil war leading to division 
and secession (like the split between India and Pakistan in 1947), or was the
attempted secession suppressed (like Katanga from Congo in 1960, or Biafra 
from Nigeria in 1967-1970)? Was there multi-party fragmentation and religious
or ethnic separatism (like in Yugoslavia in 1991-95), or massive political killings
(politicide) (as in Cambodia in 1977), or inter-group genocide (like in Rwanda in
1994)? Was the conflict an expansion of a country or a (re)unification of a divided
state (like Vietnam)? Was it a war of liberation from a foreign ruler, like decoloni-
sation, as in so many countries in the period 1945-1990? Was the conflict a
combination of territorial, religious, cultural, ideological, ethnic and economic
factors (like Israel-Palestine)? Was the violence the result of long-lasting state
failure and collapse (like Haiti in 1994 and 2005)?
The third group of questions concerns the nature of the peace. Is there a victorious
group creating a new power order? Did the old regime re-establish its own order?
Was there (temporary) domination by a foreign power, and is this power moti-
vated to establish the rule of law? Was a civil war ‘settled’ by foreign intervention,
while no domestic power group established control over the country, and was 
the internal conflict only suppressed and frozen by international peacekeeping,
with a high risk that the conflict will erupt again? The answers to all these ques-
tions determine most of the obstacles and opportunities for peacebuilding and 
the establishment of the rule of law, as we will see in chapters 4 and 5.
3.7 further study
This chapter did not arrive at a comprehensive theory of peacebuilding, or a
sectoral theory of building the rule of law in post-conflict societies. But we could
identify many important factors influencing the chances of success of interna-
tional assistance.
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One deductive typology and two different, inductive statistical approaches were
discussed. These approaches might lead to a more general theory in the future.
Some of the underlying hypotheses should be tested in further studies. This
chapter did not offer a complete overview of the literature, but may have served
the present, limited purpose of an exploration.
49
towards typology and theory
notes
1 E. Hirsch Ballin, ‘Ontwikkelingsbeleid en Goed Bestuur’, The Hague, 2001, wrr
report 58, pp. 232-4.
2 See, e.g., Handbook Good Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague,
2004.
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966.
4 Fund for Peace www.fundforpeace.org.
5 www.fundforpeace.org/programs/.
6 www.visionofhumanity.com.
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croatia
Croatia In 1918, Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes
formed a kingdom known as Yugoslavia since
1929. Following World War ii, Yugoslavia
became a federal Communist state under Mar-
shal Tito. Although Croatia declared its inde-
pendence from Yugoslavia in 1991, it took four
years of bitter fighting before Serb military with-
drew. On 23 August 1996 Croatia and the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia signed the Agreement on
Normalisation. Under un supervision, the last
Serb-held enclave in eastern Slavonia was
returned to Croatia in 1998. The number of
refugees and internally displaced persons
reached 4,200-7,000 Croats and Serbs.
The 1996 un Mission (un Transitional Adminis-
tration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and West-
ern Sirmium untaes), which lasted until 1998,
was successful. The un supervised demilitariza-
tion and safe return of refugees and displaced
persons in cooperation with unhcr. The un
established a temporary police force; undertook
civil administration, and organized elections.
The success of untaes was a positive precedent
for peace throughout the former Yugoslavia.
untaes provided the necessary stability to
enable Croatia and the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia to normalize their rela-
tions and enter into bilateral agree-
ments, including a ‘soft border
regime’ and the re-establish-
ment of normal commer-
cial and traffic links,
essential to the eco-
nomic development
of the Danube border area. untaes has also
ensured that developments in its area did not
have a negative effect on the situation in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. Within untaes area, there
has been no large outflow of new refugees and
reintegration has been peaceful. Demilitariza-
tion was completed in 1996 and that year a Tran-
sitional Police Force was established. Local and
regional elections were conducted in 1997. The
same year, 6,000 Croats and 9,000 Serbs
returned to their homes.
Many other international organizations have
supported Croatia by monitoring commitments
and providing reassurance to the population.
The osce mission in Croatia continued to moni-
tor the return of refugees and civil rights viola-
tions till 2007. Croatian Serbs continue to have
problems with restitution of property and
acceptance into the assistance programmes.
C r o a t i a
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Split
Osijek
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4 (re) establishing order
“No amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project
credible force.”
Panel on un Peace Operations, un A/55/305-S/2000/809
As everything begins with physical safety and negative peace, i.e. the absence of
war or the threat of massive political violence, restoring and maintaining basic
public security is always the number one priority. People who have personally
only experienced peace and watch gross injustices in other countries via the
media often find this priority for safety difficult to appreciate. To many, justice
seems the most urgent concern. But those who have lost beloved ones in war and
are threatened by daily violence will put water, food, medical aid and a secure
public order on the top of their agenda.
The crucial question, how to end civil war, is not the focus of this study, but is the
subject of war and conflict management studies, diplomatic and mediation analy-
sis and parts of international public law. Our analysis starts with the assumption
that there is a cease-fire, that the war has ended, and that the country needs to be
rebuilt.
After a cease fire, peace and order have to be maintained with military and police
forces of national or international origin. Usually, violent criminals, looters and
parts of the former warring parties abuse the lack of government power to
commit heinous crimes in the lull after the war. A power vacuum invites a crime
wave. The population, tired of the war, expects peace but often gets serious
personal insecurity after major combat ends.
The measures for restoring stability and maintaining the peace are usually
outlined as part of the cease fire agreement, or in the mandate of a peacekeeping
mission, imposed by foreign powers with or without a un Security Council
mandate. Troops are then contributed by un members on the basis of the un
Stand-by Agreement, or peacekeeping is mandated to another international
organisation (nato, au, eu), or an ad hoc coalition of countries, usually with a
un mandate but sometimes without. Generally, it takes several weeks if not
months before peacekeepers arrive. In the meantime, violent economic, political
and other crimes rise rapidly.
Post-conflict peacebuilding may be compared to emergency medical care after a
life-threatening trauma. There is often a ‘golden hour’, when medical interven-
tion, or its absence, determines the chance of healthy survival. This may be the
case with countries too, after a war 1. This crucial time may last only a few weeks 
or months. Re-establishing basic public order and security in a collapsed social
organism is somewhat comparable to getting the heart of a patient pumping again.
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4.1 tr ansitional securit y
The first task of creating (imposing) peace, order and physical security is often
carried out without a complete legal basis and without a complete government.
This transitional security involves restoring public order after a war, and putting a
stop to political violence, widespread crime and looting. Transitional security
also tries to prevent citizens from resorting to mob justice and malfeasance.
Revenge actions by defeated parties have to be stopped.
The main purpose of transitional security is to provide physical security to allow
the rebuilding of the country’s institutions and the resumption of regular daily
life. The legal basis for transitional security is usually (assumed) emergency
powers. Transitional security imposed by foreign peacekeeping troops, with or
without strong participation of troops of the country concerned, is generally
based on mandates by the un Security Council. Transitional security enforced by
the military and police resembles military rule. It is desirable to bring this under
the legal authority of a legitimate government as soon as possible.
Solid transitional security fills the power vacuum after state or government col-
lapse. It is the key to a successful transition from war to lasting peace and the
development of a stable state.
Often, transitional security can be legally based on a combination of national
emergency law, a un Security Council Resolution, the right of self defence and
international treaties.
It may be unavoidable to integrate former warring parties into the new state’s
armed and police forces to maintain transitional security, as foreign forces are
scarce. Forming entirely new and ‘clean’ national forces takes too much time and
may be impossible anyway. For example, it is possible that the us and Britain have
made their purpose of reconstructing Iraq in 2003-2006 more difficult than neces-
sary by dissolving large sections of the Iraqi forces immediately after their defeat. 2
As soon as there is an armistice, establishing transitional security is the key to
effective delivery of humanitarian and emergency relief. Humanitarian relief
usually begins already during the war, relying on negotiated rights of passage
with armed factions, such as Operation Lifeline Sudan, or any of the icrc opera-
tions in war zones around the world.
As soon as there is a cease-fire, former warring parties have to be controlled,
limited to certain areas, and partially or entirely disarmed. Light and heavy
weapons need to be collected. Borders have to be secured and suspected war
criminals must be arrested. Such and other measures of transitional security,
when successful, start the road to the future rule of law.
In most international peace operations, the contribution of military forces is less
of a problem than policing capacity. The scarcity of international police capacity is
a pressing problem. Regular army units are not trained for maintaining public
order, countering looters and terrorists, or arresting suspects of war crimes. It is,
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therefore, necessary to have three systems of rapidly deployable police officers that
can monitor, give advice and train local police forces. These should be available at
the national donor level, the level of regional organisations like the eu, asean and
the au, and the global (un) level.
Once the situation is stabilised, former combatants need to be demobilised and
reintegrated; either as part of a new national military force, or retrained and rein-
tegrated into civilian society. This security sector reform comprises not only the
armed forces but also the old police, security and intelligence services. A number
of bilateral and ngo donors and international organisations have set up expertise
centres for security sector reform with experts who can be rapidly deployed
abroad to advise countries which have an expressed need. For example, some
capacity for this exists in the uk Foreign Office Global Conflict Prevention Pool,
which has a Security Sector Reform Centre. undp has also set up an ssr section.
Private military and security companies are employed by many governments and
donor governments in various war and peace operations, for protection of
national or international authorities, training of military, police or intelligence
services, management or operation of detention facilities, clearing of mine fields,
and various other security activities. Not only governments in danger use private
military and security services. Oil, gas or other mining companies hire such
security services. Sometimes governments or armed opposition groups employ
individual private military as advisors, or mercenary soldiers for protection or
even civil war fighting.
The use of private security firms for reconstruction efforts, protection, training
and other, non-war fighting tasks by a number of legitimate governments is a fact
of life which cannot be outlawed internationally. Often, however, the legal basis
of their activities, legal responsibility and liability remains unclear. It is advisable
for governments employing such firms to define their legal basis, rules of engage-
ment, responsibility and liability under national and international law.
4.2 foreign peacekeepers and public order
A vexing question is the imposition of transitional security by mostly foreign
troops. In peace operations in the 1990’s, the contributing states and interna-
tional organisations limited the mandate of their troops to light military tasks
and the protection of humanitarian convoys. The Security Council and the
governments of the intervening soldiers and their military commanders were
afraid of ‘mission creep’, i.e. the expansion of strict peacekeeping tasks to more
and more tasks approaching military rule. But many field commanders, confron-
ted with the insecurity of the population, were inclined to interpret their tasks
more broadly, and often moved to expand duties out of sheer necessity. The
notion of ‘mission creep’ can also be used in the different meaning of extension of
the mission in time without a clearly defined end state that would allow exiting
from the country in trouble.
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Types of  un Peacekeeping
Traditional or ‘first generation’ un peace-
keeping operations require the consent of the
conflicting parties. The mandate is based on
Chapter 6 of the un Charter. Acting under
this part of the Charter, the un is not allowed
to impose the will of the un Security Council
on the parties. un troops with blue helmets
and white vehicles are present to monitor a
cease-fire and facilitate emergency aid, but
not to fight the parties and enforce a political
solution. The un troops are impartial and are
therefore clearly visible to all. The troops are
sent by nations voluntarily. They are only
lightly armed and are allowed to use violence
for self-defence only. There are also unarmed
(military) observers. These troops are in the
conflict area under the leadership of the
Secretary General of the un and under the
political responsibility of the Security Coun-
cil. These ‘first generation’ peacekeepers
control buffer zones, monitor cease-fire lines
and observe violations of agreements
between the parties. A good example is the
small un Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus since
1964, which helped keep Greek and Turkish
Cypriots from returning to civil war.
This type of peacekeeping offers no solution
if the parties continue to fight, if humanitar-
ian aid to the population is obstructed by
warring parties, and if they continue to
suppress, kill, and violate the population.
A ‘second generation’ peacekeeping mission
has a broader mandate to include securing
delivery of humanitarian assistance, super-
vising the return of refugees, disarming mili-
tias, removing mines, monitoring police
treatment of citizens, providing security for
international interim administration and
helping to organise elections. A good example
is the un Transitional Authority in Cambodia
between 1991 and 1993. This kind of broader 
mandate is sometimes referred to as ‘Chapter
6 1/2’, i.e. in-between the chapters 6 and 7 of
the un Charter. Chapter 7 holds the possibil-
ity of enforcement action. But ‘6 1/2’ type of
peacekeeping can be made ineffective by
warring parties, as the mandate does not
allow enforcement against their will.
In ‘second generation’ peacekeeping the un
troops may, in principle, have the right to
secure the implementation of their mandate
and actively remove obstacles which the
warring parties put in the un’s way. But in
practice, the un Security Council and the un
Secretary General do not have the heavy mili-
tary means and firepower, or the necessary
tactical speed and surprise to prevail in war
fighting. Examples of partially or totally failed
peace operations are the ones in the former
Yugoslavia (unprofor), Somalia
(unosom) and Rwanda (unamir). The
Security Council and the un members failed
to provide the relatively small un forces with
adequate mandates, means, instructions and
command lines.
These three very serious failures led to a un
study named after its chairman Brahimi in
2000 which made many recommendations
for improvement.3 The report interpreted the
rule of ‘impartiality’ as neutrality between
the parties, but also allowing all necessary
means to ensure respect for the un Charter
and the objectives of the un’s mandate. The
use of arms against warring parties is justified
when necessary for these purposes, Brahimi
concluded.
Some of Brahimi’s recommendations have
been carried out, such as reorganisation of the
un Secretariat. But the core problem remains
that the un depends on military contribu-
tions from its member states, which are often
inadequate and arrive in the troubled area
after long delays.
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In a study of peace operations in Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, 
Dr. Brocades Zaalberg shows the rapid growth of military peacekeeping into
primary state building tasks in post-conflict countries.5 This widening of tasks
was driven by the needs of the local population on the ground, which saw inter-
national soldiers and expected them to provide security and to block serious
political and civilian crimes.
In Cambodia, the goal of the un blue helmet force shifted from demilitarisation
of warring factions to facilitating national elections. While the military mission
failed to disarm the Khmer Rouge, the political task of helping to prepare elec-
tions was completed with success.
In Somalia the goal shifted from protecting humanitarian aid convoys to impro-
vised, temporary security for population groups in certain areas. In the end, both
tasks failed.
After the failure of unprofor in Bosnia in 1995, in 1996 the goal shifted first to
keeping former warring parties apart, and later on to assisting civilian adminis-
tration, improving police, supporting elections, and helping to reintegrate the
various enemies into one state. These tasks were carried out with some success,
at least more than in many previous operations. In Kosovo, the task of protecting
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In 2000, the un Security Council decided,
for the first time, in successive resolutions
that un peacekeeping troops (blue helmets)
should have the right not only to defend
themselves as in previous mandates but also
to use force to implement their mandates,
protect citizens attacked by warring parties
and break blockades of humanitarian
convoys, as these could be defined as threats
to international peace and security.4
Since that year, the un can deploy not only
classic (blue helmet) un peacekeepers, but
also robust peacekeepers (with heavy deter-
rence capacity). The heaviest peacekeeping,
or rather peace enforcement with all-out war
fighting capacity, is likely to be left, however,
to multinational coalitions of the willing,
under the leadership of a large power, but
based on a un mandate.
The un has called on an alliance (nato) to
carry out military heavy peace operations,
ranging from implementation of a peace
treaty like the Dayton Peace Agreement
which ended most of the civil war in the
former Yugoslavia in 1995, to more danger-
ous peace operations, including enforcement
action in Afghanistan (2005). It has also
called upon coalitions of willing states to
carry out military missions to end a war, like
in East Timor (1999).
The un continues to run a varied array of
peace operations in different countries, rang-
ing from unarmed observation to robust
peacekeeping. The un has also mandated
other organisations to carry out light and
heavy peace missions, or ad hoc coalitions of
states willing to do so. In addition, peace
operations occur at the initiative of a group of
member states without explicit approval by
the Security Council, but under the leader-
ship of states which seem willing to run the
heavy political and other costs of acting with-
out the consent of the un.   
the Kosovar Albanians changed in part to protecting members of the Serb minor-
ity and helping international interim administration to take control. These tasks
were carried out with partial success. The future will reveal whether Kosovo and
Bosnia, both entities being products of international intervention, will grow into
stable and independently functioning political states that can live in peace within
themselves and with their neighbours. They will, however, most likely continue
to need various forms of external support, particularly from the European Union,
for a long time.
Although national authorities of troop contributing countries always try to avoid
‘mission creep’ (ever more responsibilities for their soldiers), in reality the
missions ‘creep’ very fast. A wide, practical interpretation of mandates has often
helped to attain a relatively successful outcome, or at least better than what
would have been achieved if the local commanders had not taken the liberty to
respond to circumstances.
The gap between restricted military mandates and actual security needs for the
population is caused, of course, by the differentiated thinking in capitals of West-
ern countries and secretariats of international organisations. In the mindsets of
politicians and civil servants, a separation of military and civilian powers is
imperative. They are used to ensure civilian control over military actions. But
their peacekeepers find themselves in the opposite situation, where serious
violence rules, and were governments and reliable police forces are nearly absent
in the beginning of the operation. The latter are brought in only once the security
situation allows for more civilian personnel.
Many assumptions underlying military plans soon prove incorrect during the
battle or peace operation. When plans fall to pieces, the commander has to
improvise. “Intervening forces (tend) to fall victim to the law of unintended
consequences which, during times of chaos, operates at exponential levels.”6
In headquarters and ministries of countries sending troops, it was thought in the
1990’s that the peacekeepers should confine themselves to pure military tasks,
like securing military peace, separating armed factions and disarming them.
Gradually, civil-military cooperation (cimic) entered, first in a technical sphere,
like heavy engineering tasks to rebuild infra-structure. This was first seen as a big
expansion of military tasks. But in the local circumstances, this expansion soon
proved inadequate. What use are new bridges if civilians are still killed on both
sides? cimic requires public security, that is: law and order, to function effec-
tively. And that is what local peacekeeping commanders, with inadequate police
efforts and absent local government, tried to do: protect the population from
criminals and warlords.
In addition, peacekeeping forces started humanitarian and emergency work:
providing drinking water, food, repairing schools and local power stations,
hospitals, etc. This was at first watched with a certain reservation by interna-
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tional relief agencies. Wasn’t this their work, and should the military not stay in
their tanks or compounds? The soldiers found this kind of work necessary for its
own sake, and also to fraternise with the population, reducing misconceptions
and providing useful intelligence about who were the local troublemakers, arms
dealers and gang leaders. Simple, quick impact assistance which helps to improve
daily life is a reward for cooperating with peacekeeping forces and may undercut
spoilers of the peace.
Where the re-establishment of public safety, basic law and order are the most
urgent concerns, the cooperation of the military peacekeepers with national and
international police officers, civilian or military, is of the utmost importance. In
most peace operations, there is a relative lack of professional police capacity, to
help fill the public security gap. Often, peacekeeping troops have to run an
improvised police and judiciary system, as well as a detention system, to curb
rampant crime, in the absence of an official system.
In the 1990’s, the troop contributing nations regarded such martial-law-like
powers as undesirable as they are contrary to the doctrine at home of a separation
of powers. But this misconception failed to recognise a simple truth: there can be
no legal order, security and justice in a power vacuum, which gives criminals and
warmongers a free hand. Separation of powers is an excellent principle for a well-
ordered society in which the population is secure.
The adaptability of foreign forces to functioning in this vacuum differs from
country to country. Military forces of nations which emphasise heavy and fast
military action are inclined to limit the role of their military to fighting. They
prefer to act in a heavy handed fashion and rather leave law and order to others.
Military forces of nations that have considerable experience in blue-helmet
peacekeeping tend to adjust faster to the needs of the local population and try to
improvise to help fill the gap of absent government. These differences can be
useful. They may lead to a practical division of labour: a big power with much
deterrence capacity having the lead in enforcing peace, and the other, smaller
powers having the lead in the civil military interface of transitional security and
public order. This division, however, can also lead to confusion and resistance
among the population, if the heavy and the light operations are not clearly distin-
guishable, not coordinated, and if the heavy operations cause many civilian
victims, which make the population turn also against the lighter, less aggressive
military forces from other nations.
Once enemy forces are defeated, the primary purpose of peace operations is
stabilisation, public security and order. The daily needs of the population are
crucial. Now, emergency assistance can reach the people in need. This martial law
phase follows the war phase, and is in turn followed by a transitional or provi-
sional civilian administration, which prepares the way for a new civil govern-
ment.
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Cambodia’s 14 million inhabitants are pre-
dominantly Khmer Theravada Buddhist with
Muslim Cham and other minorities. Cambodia is
the remnant of the Angkor Empire. In 1887 it
became part of French Indochina and was occu-
pied by Japan during the Second World War.
Cambodia became a constitutional monarchy
after gaining independence from France in 1953.
In 1960, Prince Sihanouk became head of state.
He publicly announced Cambodia’s neutrality in
the Vietnam War, but permitted North Vietnam-
ese troops and Vietcong to maintain military
bases in Cambodia and to use the harbors for
weapon shipments. Prime Minister Lon Nol
used Sihanouk’s temporary absence to depose
him. Supported by the us, Lon Nol struggled 
to remove the Vietnamese army bases and stop
shipments of arms through Cambodian harbors.
Sihanouk had meanwhile become the primary
spokesman for the united communist parties,
the Khmer Rouge.
The Khmer Rouge captured Phnom Pen in 1975
and changed the country’s name to Democratic
Kampuchea. Pol Pot ordered deportations and
executions which took over 1.5 million lives. 
Many more died of starvation
due to an oppressive agrarian
communist ideology.
The Vietnamese invasion in 1978 initi-
ated a war that would last 13 years. The Khmer
Rouge fled into the hills of Western Cambodia
while Vietnam occupied the country until the
early nineties.
In 1989, un-administered peace negotiations in
Paris commenced. The 1992 Paris Peace Accords
called for democratic elections and provided the
un with the authority to guard the ceasefire. 
The 1993 elections were sabotaged by the Khmer
Rouge, which controlled up to 15 percent of the
country. The new government voted for a consti-
tution that established a multiparty democracy
within the constitutional monarchy. Sihanouk
became king.
In 1997, differences between faction members of
governing parties funcinpec and cpp turned
violent. Hun Sen (cpp) staged a coup and killed
dozens funcipec party members. funcipec
members initially fled, but returned after the
1998 elections to form a new government with
the cpp. Elections four years later led to a stale-
mate between the funipec and cpp. It took a
year of negotiations to form a coalition govern-
ment.
Since then, coalition governments have been
formed and a new constitution has been
adopted. Corruption and suppression of the
opposition through defamation laws frustrate
the process of democratization. Extreme poverty
and income inequality may be a source of future
conflicts. 
C a m b o d i a
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4.3 emergency relief
Peacebuilding can only be successful if the most pressing needs for people’s
survival are met. Those who stayed in country during the conflict will usually
have suffered severely as food is often difficult to come by and most health 
facilities will not have functioned. Refugees who return may have been suscep-
tible to disease and death from the rigours of the flight or the living conditions 
in camps. It will take time and effort for government facilities to become fully
operational.
Most of those dying in emergency situations from disease and hunger are chil-
dren and women, as they are most vulnerable. Many diseases can be prevented by
hygiene and use of clean water; or easily treated like malaria or respiratory infec-
tions. Fast relief can save many lives.
Mental health needs are to be addressed, too, due to post traumatic stress or prior
mental illness. Specific programs need to deal with brainwashed child soldiers.
Mines have often maimed countless adults and children, which requires exten-
sive orthopaedic programs. Social welfare is urgent for female headed households
or care for orphans.
In most conflict and post-conflict situations, there is an increased risk for
hiv/aids. Women and children are more exposed to exploitation or having to
exchange sex for resources. Armed forces, including peace keepers, often also
play a role in increasing the transmission of hiv. Health facilities frequently lack
supplies for safe sex. Prevention of hiv/aids in emergency situations is there-
fore critical.7
Food is often lacking in post conflict situations as harvests may have failed or
people are afraid to go into the fields because of land mines. Food rations may
need to be distributed while de-mining is to occur and the provision of seeds and
tools is necessary in order to rework the land. Usually children and pregnant
women are malnourished and require specialised care and supplementary feed-
ing. Safe water and adequate sanitation require that power plants are restarted.
Wells have to be checked to ensure the quality of water. In (post-)conflict situa-
tions, dead bodies contaminate wells and rivers.
Adequate shelter is important to protect people from the weather and provide
some privacy. In some situations people can return to their existing houses but
often these are damaged or need to be checked for booby traps. People may then
need to stay in community halls until return is feasible, or they resettle else-
where.
Coordination between the different actors is vital as the needs are large and well-
intentioned actors fall over each other. Guidance is officially the role of the
United Nations Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, but can
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prove to be difficult as relief organisations, donor agencies and military actors
have different mandates, motives and identities.
Assistance should be provided impartially and based on needs rather than
anything else. The military are interested in winning ‘hearts and minds’ to get
stability, while other donors are interested in social and economic benefits. It is
essential for the peacekeepers and the humanitarian and development officials
working separately also to work in unison for the benefit of the population. The
quality of the assistance needs to be ensured whereby the minimum standards of
humanitarian relief in emergencies, as described by Sphere, can play a valuable
role.8
From the start, long term development needs should be considered, to ensure
sustainability. Often, many resources are offered by actors keen to be involved in
the reconstruction of a country. This provides opportunities but also risks as
donors and ngos working independently can undermine the government or set
up facilities which may not be appropriate. An example is the reconstruction of
new health facilities without considering the population’s anticipated priority
needs and the required reforms of the health structure and recurrent costs to
maintain investments.
Determining a national health plan facilitates a successful reconstruction of the
health sector. The need for local ownership of this policy is evident. Ensuring the
inclusion of women as well as different ethnic and vulnerable groups provides
opportunities for the development of a health sector that will be culturally 
ensitive and accessible to all. The World Health Organisation who emphasizes 
a primary health care approach of prevention and early treatment. Such services
should be affordable, close to the people, and based on community participation.
The rapid provision of basic services can help to legitimise the government and
foreign organisations in the eyes of the people. If people see no real improve-
ments, this creates tensions as were seen in East Timor and Afghanistan. The
delivery of services related to health and education are particularly important as
they affect every citizen and are a precondition for further peacebuilding and
development.
All peacebuilding activities described hereafter can only win the hearts and
minds of the population if their most pressing needs for survival are met. Food,
drinking water, medicine, medical relief, shelter, heating, electricity and other
emergency supplies, including building materials before winter falls, have to be
distributed equitably. National and international donor organisations have to act
as quickly as possible to address these needs. The first actor on the scene with the
biggest transportation capacity is usually the military. Their role should be taken
over as soon as possible by national authorities and domestic and international
civilian relief bodies. The military are not always adequately trained to undertake
relief work. Their first task is providing security, which requires military and
police measures against those who break the peace.
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Civilian relief workers generally do not like to work within or alongside military
structures, as this may compromise their neutrality. Neutrality is most important
when the war is still ongoing, as neutrality between opposing sides is what
allows humanitarian agencies to negotiate access to areas still under control of
opposing forces.
Donor governments and organisations which did not participate in the original
military intervention, or even disagreed at the outset with this action, will not
feel as responsible for emergency aid as those who took the original military
action. The critics and watchers-on will be inclined to blame much of the suffer-
ing on those who undertook the military intervention. But apportioning blame
does not stop bleeding or fill empty stomachs. The question is now: who can do
what to help a population in need? The excuse for not supporting the relief and
development effort because ‘the military of country X, Y or Z are in charge’ does
not stand up to ethical scrutiny. At this stage the needs of the people should be
the main priority, not ‘who was right in the Security Council.’ Experienced
humanitarian relief institutions, like the International Committee of the Red
Cross, have learned that only the needs of those who suffer should be taken into
account.
4.4 foreign aid workers and the military
In peace operations, foreign aid workers find themselves working side-by-side 
with foreign military. Humanitarian organisations often find this uncomfortable, 
fearing it may undermine the image and effectiveness of their work. A study by 
the Dutch development aid organisation Cordaid distinguishes three attitudes:
the neutral humanitarian position, the pragmatic, and the supporting attitude.
“Donor governments and military actors generally have welcomed and encour-
aged closer collaboration in the framework of their integrated policies. Impor-
tant humanitarian and development actors, however, have raised concerns
about compromising the humanitarian imperative and the associated humani-
tarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. They also fear
that aid will become subordinate to political and military objectives and logic.
Finally, it has been argued that integrating military, humanitarian and devel-
opment work will lead to a blurring of distinctions and thus endanger the
safety of aid workers. Though the study critically reflects on these concerns, 
we observe that special caution is required when peacekeepers have no un
mandate, try to enforce a victor’s peace or face significant resistance from local
communities.”9
Many non-governmental organisations, particularly their executives and boards,
try to keep a distance from the military of international peace operations, to
emphasise their humanitarian goals and political impartiality (neutrality). In
practice in the field, aid workers of such organisations seem to establish quite
easily good informal working relations. Both recognise that they need each
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other’s work to succeed in their own tasks, improve their own working condi-
tions, and serve the interests of the population.
The security of foreign aid workers is a major concern, particularly in countries
where resistance to ‘infidels’, and ‘western’ political influence is high, or crime 
is rampant, especially where aid workers may be taken hostage. This is also a
problem in places where aid workers are simply a source of ransom revenue, e.g.
Colombia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
In case of ill-advised policies or a pattern of misdemeanour of the military, the aid
organisations should decide, of course, on the need and desirability of continued
cooperation. In such cases, it may be advisable to keep a visible distance.
The approach of the British Military Provincial Reconstruction Teams in North-
ern Afghanistan is seen as ideal in the Cordaid study. The military play a small
but important role in the background by focussing on security and stability. The
military do not carry out reconstruction tasks but leave those to aid workers, who
profit from the safety provided by the military. This study sees the us approach
as less effective, however. The us military carry out quick impact projects to
improve relations with the local population. At the same time, the us military
approach is deemed ‘heavy handed’. Such projects are a ‘present’ to the popula-
tion or their leaders. But some gifts, however generous, may not encourage inde-
pendent self-help by the local population.
Recently, it has become standard practice to add specialists in aid work to mili-
tary teams to improve understanding of the work of the aid agencies. Closer
interaction between military and civil actors (donors, international organisa-
tions, non-governmental organisations) is a logical consequence of current devel-
opments in the international arena. The reform of the United Nations (un), the
emergence of integrated approaches (which combine security, political and devel-
opment instruments), the changing nature of warfare and peacekeeping, and the
‘war on terror’ all point in this direction of close coordination. Finally, the
Cordaid report reflects some of the recent evolution in humanitarian and devel-
opment intervention, such as the proliferation of multi-mandate organisations
and ‘conflict-sensitive’ approaches.10
The Cordaid study observed that for the local population, it matters little who 
provides assistance. Strikingly, the peacekeepers are generally more popular 
than ngos. People thank the soldiers for establishing security and disarming the
combatants, and are grateful for the highly visible aid they deliver. Many ngos,
on the other hand, are censured for being uncommitted, untrustworthy and 
ineffective.11
“Given that many local communities are supportive of the military and quite crit-
ical of ngos”, the report notes, “aid agencies need to make more efforts to under-
stand local perspectives and discourses.” It concludes: “In a general sense, the
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dictum ‘as civilian as possible, as military as necessary’ is sound. Maximum use
should be made of the abilities of each side.”
4.5 tr ansitional politics
While emergency needs have to be satisfied, political decisions are also urgent, in
order to lay the foundation for a future legal order. This is one of the critical tasks
of ‘transitional politics’.
Transitional politics involve the selection of suitable leaders who can negotiate
continued peace, assume emergency powers for transitional security, and oversee
the drafting of a new constitution, or improvement of an existing one.
The aim of transitional politics is to allow a new, stable and legitimate political
order to crystallise, and kick-start the (re) building the rule of law. Transitional
politics and transitional security are of course inseparable and cannot be consid-
ered or pursued in isolation.
Transitional politics need to focus on stabilisation and security rather than rapid
elections. Politicians cannot run for democratic elections in a hailstorm of bullets.
Democratic donor countries and media in many peaceful and highly developed
countries are inclined to see elections as the only true hallmark of a new democ-
racy. But if elections are not well-prepared by new democratic leadership of polit-
ical parties, if the media are not yet free, and the electorate lacks basic security
and daily needs, there is a grave risk that former war leaders and those supporting
them, who fanned the flames of group hatred that incited the previous war, will
again pop up, now legitimised by elections, only to block further democratisation
should they be victorious in the elections. An example is the election of Charles
Taylor as president of Liberia in 1997, who was arrested on international war
crimes charges in 2006.
During the transitional political period, the temporary administration needs to
first organise a population census and enable voter registration. A solid legal
framework for political rights, elections, and an interim constitution are needed.
International agencies like the un’s Office for Electoral Assistance, the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce), the Institute for Democracy
and Electoral Assistance (idea), and various other global and regional organisa-
tions and human rights institutions need to be involved to oversee proper proce-
dures.
Foreign countries involved in ending a war generally push for rapid elections to
allow them to bring their troops home under a banner of ‘mission accomplished,
democracy installed’. But haste makes waste; democracy needs a long time and
great care to grow into a self supporting system.
The rule of law should ideally begin with restoring and maintaining public order
based on a new or interim constitution. Writing a new or improved constitution
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depends first of all on the political forces in the country. An interim agreement is
a compromise document which regulates government power. In most cases the
interests of those wrestling for power matters more than constitutional theory.
Still, expert advice by constitutional specialists can help main leaders avoid
mistakes and lay the basis for the rule of law and human rights..
Expertise centres for constitutional reform can be set up by a number of interna-
tional organisations, which borrow at short notice from different academic and
governmental institutions advisors with foreign assistance experience to assist
the negotiators in their efforts.12 A related recommendation is to formulate
within the framework of the un a number of constitutional models for pluralistic
states with basic human rights, to be available for adaptation to national circum-
stances.
4.6 international administr ation
When the political leaders in a war-torn country are not in a position to agree on
a new constitution, and when the self-governing capacity of a country is still
much too weak, the international community should give a mandate for interna-
tional interim administration and state-building to assist the country to assume
gradually the responsibilities of government and rule of law. The basis in interna-
tional law can be laid through a resolution by the un Security Council. This
should be seen as temporary international guardianship to avoid anarchy and
renewed violence. Several experiences since the 1960’s have shown that this may
be the best interim solution.
Sometimes, a country is so ill-prepared for sovereign self-government, self-
administration and the rule of law, that international administration has to be
continued for a considerable period. The Congo crisis since 1960 is a case in point.
The un withdrew due to political controversy and the death of the un Secretary
General. The Congo fell into the hands of a corrupt regime. The interim adminis-
tration of Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge genocide is an example of a some-
what better experience. The Kosovo crisis since 1998 is a third example of the
need for an interim administration, and East Timor a fourth. Haiti would have
profited from prolonged international administration after the un peace opera-
tion which started in 1995. But the us-led international community thought that
a democratically elected president was the most important condition for reform.
President Aristide was ineffective, however, and international support for peace-
building dwindled after the peacekeeping phase. Increasing discontent led to
renewed violence. The un had to start all over again.
The old and by now dysfunctional mindset of decolonisation has made un
member states and political opinion leaders slow to recognise that in some coun-
tries there are simply not even the beginnings of effective government. In such
cases, the only hope for the population is prolonged and intensive care by the
international community. Many seriously ailing states, which become failed
states in due course, and then fall into decades-long multi-party civil war, could
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greatly benefit from un mandated international administration until they are
ready for self-government as a sovereign independent country, or a state in a
federation or confederation. The un could prepare a standard schedule for
interim administration which can be adapted to specific circumstances when the
need arises. Such interim administration need not be implemented in all cases by
the un itself. It can also be delegated by the un to regional organisations or coali-
tions on the basis of a un mandate. These groups of states should, however,
report regularly to the Security Council.
4.7 international coordination
Ideally, the first phase of peacebuilding will be managed by an un-based peace
implementation council (or a similar arrangement under a different name), with
representatives of the main post-conflict political actors and international aid
donors. In cases where the un Security Council is unable because of internal
disagreement to manage this effectively, a peace implementation council has to
be set up by a coalition of like-minded states under the leadership of at least one
permanent member of the Security Council or a regionally leading power. Exam-
ples are the contact groups put together for Liberia and Sudan, where donor states
engaged in the peace process try to push the agenda forward and remind the
parties of their commitments.
The task of the peace implementation council is to bring political leaders,
foreign donors and international organisations together and encourage fair
burden sharing among participants. Most peacebuilding programmes suffer
from very unequal burden sharing. It is not difficult for states to find reasons 
for not participating: ‘our national interest does not include the situation in 
this foreign country’; the work had ‘better be left to other, bigger countries’; 
the original peace operation or intervention was judged ‘erroneous’; or: ‘we
have our own pressing, internal needs.’ This last excuse is always valid, but 
of only relative value.
Most peacebuilding programmes are carried out by a small portion of the un
membership, aided by a large number of sometimes very small ngos. Resources
could be greatly increased by wider participation of states with the capacity to do
so, as is shown in chapter 6 on mobilising resources.
In 2005, the un established a Peacebuilding Commission (pbc) for improved
peacebuilding in its most troubled states. This Peacebuilding Commission will
have an overall Organizational Committee, which is tasked with setting the
agenda and plotting general courses of action. Country specific committees are
tailor-made and include relevant bilateral and multilateral partners for the coun-
try in question.
The Organizational Committee is made up of 31 member countries:
– seven members selected by the un’s Security Council;
– seven elected by the Economic and Social Council;
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– five top providers of contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary
contributions to the United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, includ-
ing a standing peacebuilding fund;
– five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations
missions;
– seven additional states elected by the General Assembly.
This Commission should fill a huge gap in the un system. It will bring together
all the major actors in a given situation to discuss and decide on a long-term
peacebuilding strategy. As a result, money should be better spent. There will be 
a clear link between immediate post-conflict efforts and long-term recovery and
development efforts.
The Peacebuilding Commission has little power, however, as it is an advisory
body. Its recommendations will carry weight because of the diversity and rele-
vance of all those participating. But what if the members are divided or not really
interested?
While there is no specific mechanism to enforce/implement decisions, the
Commission will be looked at as the primary body for disseminating advice on
reconstruction. Its diverse composition of membership lends legitimacy to carry
out this work.
The pbc has no mandate for conflict prevention measures. It can only act once a
conflict has already broken out. The actual impact it may have will depend heav-
ily on the five permanent members of the Security Council.
4.8 transitional ‘justice’  and reconciliation
It is difficult to complete the establishment of a peaceful order and make a good
start on the road to the rule of law without taking measures against major war
criminals.
The prosecution, arrest and trial of war criminals should begin as soon as possible
after an end to hostilities, as their trial is a precondition for public trust in a new
beginning and hope for national reconciliation. Most post-conflict states lack
capacity to indict, arrest and put on trial suspects of war crimes. Since 1945,
special international tribunals have been organized, starting with the Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals. The un Security Council established an international tribu-
nal for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1992 and a compara-
ble tribunal for war crimes in Rwanda since 1993. For war crimes committed in
Cambodia, a mixed national / international tribunal was established after several
years of negotiations. The main suspect, Pol Pot, had died in the meantime. The
International Criminal Court is presently investigating several war crimes
committed in African countries, notably Sudan, Uganda and Congo.
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burundi
Burundi The 8.4 million inhabitants are pre-
dominantly Hutu with significant Tutsi and
smaller Twa and Baganwa minorities. This very
poor country underwent several coups and
changes of government since its independence
in 1962. Rwagasore, leader of the multi-ethnic
uprona movement, was assassinated after
winning the 1961 elections. A coalition of mono-
ethnic opposition parties came to power.
Ethnic violence became entrenched. In 1965,
several thousand Hutus were slaughtered,
including politicians and army members. Mass
killings during the 1972 Hutu insurrection left
thousands of Tutsis dead. In reprisal, Tutsis
killed approximately 200,000 Hutus while
many others fled.
During the late eighties, moderate Tutsi Buyoya
released political prisoners and promised to
bring Hutu elites into government. His initial
hesitation led disappointed Hutus to assassinate
several thousand Tutsis in 1988. The Tutsi ruled
army responded with massacres, killing 20,000 
Hutus. Approximately 60,000 citizens fled. 
Buyoya eventually introduced state reforms 
safeguarding an equal distribution of power
between Hutus and Tutsis. He freed the way to
democratic elections.
Hutu parties won the 1993 elections. Fearful
of a Hutu ordered genocide, Tutsis retained
control over the army. Tensions exploded when
Ndadaye was murdered four months after he had
become president. During the subsequent years
many Tutsis were slaughtered, which led to the
genocide of Hutus. Over 150,000 people lost
their lives.
In 1995, the un Security Council investigated
events leading to widespread killing. un dele-
gate Nyerere fled when Buyoya came to power
through a military coup. International sanctions
forced Buyoya to attend Nyerere’s peace 
negotiations. Hutus and Tutsis jointly reached
the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement
in 2000, followed by the installation of a 
transitional government. Disarmament 
negotiations resulted in the Pretoria Protocol 
on Political Defence and Security Power Sharing
in Burundi, improving national security 
significantly. In 2005, an elected government
came to power.
The Arusha agreement tried to replace an
emphasis on ethnic differences in politics by an
attitude of inclusiveness and fair representation.
Significant threats to political stability remain:
ethnic divisions, civic distrust, corruption,
extremism, regional instability, and local war-
fare. Perpetrators and victims are present in all
layers of society, political parties and the state
apparatus. Burundi mixes conventional and tra-
ditional mediation like Bashingantahe councils
in justice and reconciliation. The peace can be
easily disturbed. In 2006 Burundi was put on the
agenda of the new un Peace Building Committee
to coordinate international assistance.
Cibitoke
Bujumbura
Kirundo
Gitega
Makamba
Cankuzo
Kayanza
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All war crimes tribunals which follow international legal standards have rela-
tively high costs, large backlogs and a lack of resources. It is important to main-
tain credibility in the eyes of the affected populations, particularly when national
or local tribunals are manipulated by political actors, as happened in Sierra Leone,
where the selection of indicted persons was very controversial and was inter-
preted as an attempt by President Kabbah to corner political opposition. Of great
importance to the future effectiveness of these courts is that the International
Tribunal for war crimes committed in the Former Yugoslavia (icty) will be
allowed to sentence the Serb suspects Mladic and Karadzic, before it is disbanded
by the un Security Council.
As international courts are only able to handle a limited number of indictments,
while national courts are, for various reasons, generally very inadequate, many
war crimes are left unpunished. To bridge the large gap between what should be
done and can be achieved practically, the notion of transitional justice has gained
attention.
Transitional justice denotes temporary justice mechanisms that are specific to the
post-conflict setting inside a country. It is needed to deal, in the short term, with
war criminals and their many collaborators. Transitional justice has become a
common term but seems an internally contradictory notion. Is the goal lower or
less just than non-transitional justice? Probably so, for practical reasons. The
political will, legal basis, institutional arrangements, and human and financial
resources in a war-torn country are often inadequate to really meet the interna-
tional standards of justice. Transitional justice is a makeshift, provisional and
inadequate effort to attain at least some degree of justice and begin the steps
required to address the crimes of the past in a way that help achieve future recon-
ciliation. The unsatisfactory qualities of transitional justice need to be improved
by increasing international resources and qualified legal personnel.
The international expertise centre Transitional Justice, supported by private and
public funds, is available to advise and assist national transitional justice
programmes to deal with the large numbers of ‘lesser’ criminals. If suspects of
war crimes are not properly tried, reconciliation falters too.
Reconciliation among former warring parties, population groups, victims of war
crimes and suppression is an extremely complex socio-psychological task that
generally takes more than a generation to complete. A failure is likely to lead to
renewed bloodshed and oppression. Reconciliation is only possible if major
political leaders, influential intellectuals, religious leaders, teachers and opinion
leaders in the media actively pursue overcoming old hatreds and prejudices. 
Various civil society organisations need to encourage this patiently for decades.
International, non-governmental organisations related to and supported by the
world’s religions and philosophies could provide additional services in this field,
based on the experience which has been gained in a number of cases.
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One should not assume, however, that religious leaders and their followers will
always contribute to peacebuilding and reconciliation. Peace is preached, of
course, but what is really meant? Peace for fellow believers, the own ethnic
group, their own politicians? Everybody is in favour of peace, even the warmon-
gers who want their enemies to stop resisting, in order that they can impose their
view of peace, on their terms. There are many examples of religious leaders incit-
ing group clashes or condoning violence. The question is not, who is for peace,
but whose peace, and what kind of peace?
4.9 crimes against women and gender issues
In most post-conflict countries serious maltreatment and suppression of women
and girls is endemic. In many contemporary conflicts, mass-rape, forced prostitu-
tion and other violent crimes have taken place. In recent years, the methods of
warfare seem to have worsened and increasingly place women and girls at risk, as
the conflicts in e.g. Liberia, Rwanda, and Congo have shown. Rape is used more
and more systematically; as part of ethnic cleansing, to undermine communities
and families, or to frighten adversaries. The fact that many of the fighting forces,
especially in Africa, have a high hiv prevalence makes the consequences for
women even greater. Yet, the true extent of women’s ordeals in conflict situa-
tions will never be known, as many are too afraid to report such abuses. The
gruesome nature and magnitude is often downplayed by military and political
forces in the conflict.
Even if women try to flee the violence, they will not be out of harm’s way as they
may be required to exchange sex for safe passage or to obtain essential items like
food. Or they can be targeted by traffickers, as recent Eastern European conflicts
brought to the fore. Even when they arrive in camps they will be vulnerable if
there is limited protection and if health services or psycho-social support are not
available. Security is therefore at the essence and a proper camp lay-out and
administration can assist in this. Reproductive health services are to be offered to
ensure appropriate care for women, prevent and treat sexually transmitted infec-
tions and hiv and allow legal abortions, at least in the case of rape and serious
health risks. Counselling for women who have experienced violence and rape is
essential as is the assurance of their confidentiality. Women also need to be safe
from abuse by those humanitarian actors whose role it is to protect and assist
them; peacekeepers and humanitarian workers alike. In recent years, many of
such incidents have come to light and continued tightening of procedures and
zero-tolerance is required to prevent this.
Awareness needs to be raised of all actors involved in peacebuilding so they will
better understand the way women are affected by conflict, different from men,
and how women can contribute to peace. Increased deployment of female peace-
keepers and police and judges is needed. International standards, such as un
Security Council Resolution 1325, already ask for more attention to protect
women, assist survivors of sexual violence and to hold those who committed
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crimes against women accountable. To ensure this becomes reality, much more
attention and resources are required. Reconciliation is generally not possible
without trying the offenders. Providing free legal counselling and representation
for women is important. Monitoring legal processes and training of those
involved, can ensure that the rights of both the victim and the defendant are guar-
anteed. Training police and military forces how to deal with gender based
violence to ensure women will feel better protected, can make a great difference.
Legal reforms and the strengthening of the justice and security sector in post-
conflict as well as refugee situations have to increase the protection of women by
addressing issues like gender inequalities and abuse, not only in times of conflict
but also during peace.
Actually, the transition from war to peace provides opportunities for change.
Ensuring women are included in peace negotiations from the start, allows them
to bring their perspectives to the fore and can provide means for continued
inclusion in future decision making. Gender relations have often changed at
times of conflict since women are left in charge of communities when their men
and sons leave to fight, as shown by research undertaken by unifem, the United
Nations Development Fund for Women. Similarly, women and women’s organi-
sations were often found to play a significant role in peacebuilding at the grass
root level. Their formal participation in peacebuilding can help to reduce the risk
that inequalities are re-established in the post-conflict situation. Women’s token
presence in committees is not enough, since barriers to participation need to be
broken down. Male mindsets need to be changed. This requires support, espe-
cially from ngo’s, for empowerment, and personal security to be guaranteed by
police and other security services, to allow women to raise their voice. Organisa-
tions like unifem and oxfam International, as well as governments and peace-
keepers have an important role to play in this. This can lead the way for future
political involvement and sustainable and equitable development to address the
general problem of gender inequalities. These inequalities contribute to the fact
that 70 percent of those who live below the poverty line are women and girls,
while domestic violence is the main cause of injury and death to women globally,
as emphasised by oxfam. Ensuring that men and women will benefit equally
from political, social and economic developments requires those who under-
stand the gender relations in their specific context to be involved in its decision
making.
Women need to be involved in peace negotiations not only because they are
survivors and caretakers, but also because women will often have played a role in
the pursuit of war by supporting or maintaining combatants, whether willingly
or not. About 40 percent of the child soldiers are reported to be girls; most of
them forced. Only focusing on the male combatant who hands in a gun is not
doing justice to this reality. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
processes therefore need to pay attention to the different roles men, women and
children have played during the conflict.13
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Even when the active conflict is over, women resettling or returning to their com-
munity will need continued counselling and support to deal with the violence
they experienced or sometimes participated in. Community education programs
are necessary to reduce the potential stigma of these women, who may otherwise
be rejected by their community. Similarly, specific attention needs to be given to
prevent discrimination of female ex-combatants and women with disabilities.
Support may need to be provided to those women who became the single head of 
a household because they lost their husband during the conflict. Women who are
left to fend for their own in hopeless circumstances may see prostitution as the
only means of survival for themselves and their children. Attention also needs 
to be given to the men returning from the war. Psycho-social care of male ex-
combatants is needed as their traumas and inability to resolve conflicts in a non-
violent matter usually results in increased violence to women.
Preventing gender-based violence in post-conflict situations requires the changing
of power imbalances between men and women, to strengthen the inferior status
of women. This means starting in schools to teach boys and girls how to behave,
going into communities to particularly work with powerful male leaders aiming 
to change the beliefs and attitudes of especially men so they see the value of eco-
nomic and social development of women. More research is needed of causes and
possible solutions. Supporting and empowering women and female leaders, often
through women organisations, will help to reduce subjugation and abuse. Safe
houses to go to and other essential facilities where confidentiality is assured help
them to stand up for themselves. It requires reform of police, to react on domestic
violence, investigate rape, bring perpetrators to trial and reform discriminatory
laws. Such changes are essential for peacebuilding that lasts.
4.10 refugee issues
Political violence leads people to vote with their feet: they seek refuge in less
endangered areas, inside or outside their country. Often, refugees are driven
together into areas that are far from safe, where they may be at the mercy of
warring parties. Refugee camps can become fertile recruitment grounds or safe
havens for warring parties. One example is the camps in eastern Congo and
Tanzania in 1995-2005 where Rwandan Interahamwe fighters regrouped after the
genocide. Another example is camps in Guinea where rebels and militia from
Sierra Leone and Liberia recruited and trained fighters to join the insurgencies in
both countries. After a war, peacebuilding activities may be especially difficult in
or around refugee areas, because of strong group hatred and conflicts over
personal and communal properties.
Refugees and internally displaced persons do not only flee out of fear of political
violence, but also for fear of violent and other serious abuses by domestic, family,
tribal, ethnic, cultural, criminal and religious persons. They are often subject 
to ‘semi-political’ violence, for instance where police gangs or security services
abuse their mandate and terrorise groups for purposes of enrichment, group 
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Colombia. The nearly 45 million
inhabitants are a colorful mix. The majority
are mestizo, while whites and mulatto’s form
significant minorities. The original Amerindians
form the smallest population.
The 1948 assassination of Liberal Party leader
Gaitan resulted in a civil war between the Liberal
and the Conservative Party. During 10 years of
La Violenca, 200,000 citizens lost their lives.
Formation of the National Front was the solution
to the conflict. The political influence of both
parties was equally distributed with alternating
four year presidencies.
Most guerrillas disarmed after La Violenca. In
1964, remaining leftist guerrillas assembled in 
the National Liberation
Army (eln). In 1966,
other leftist and
communist fighters
gathered in the Rev-
olutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia
(farc). Both groups
adopted the ‘foco’
strategy involving
small scale guerilla attacks to feed public discon-
tent that would trigger insurrection. The gov-
ernment responded with us supported hunter-
killer operations and civic action programs to
improve living conditions.
During the 70’s, the urban April 19th guerilla
movement (M-19) gained public support. The
government initiated counterinsurgencies
against the M-19 and eln activities.
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hatred, sex or power. Often refugees suffering such abuse cannot prove the origin
of the threat to themselves or their families. In some instances it stems from a
lack of state monopoly on the use of force, and in others the state uses gangs or
tribal militia as proxies for its own political ends (for example the Janjaweed in
the Darfur region of Sudan).
Refugees and groups of internally displaced persons often live in insecure anar-
chy as gangs of criminals and (former) warring parties rule their lives. Interna-
tional aid agencies are quite powerless to stop this and curb misuse of aid materi-
als. When international peacekeeping forces are present, they may be able to act
against such abuse, depending on their mandate and their military capability. In
many situations, refugee camps are left without any form of protection.
Host countries should be assisted with the organisation of police forces,
temporary courts and detention facilities to curb crime in refugee camps in
accordance with international law and the law of the country concerned, even
though these legal systems may clash. Monitors, advisors and training experts
could be made available from un member states. A special international polic-
ing arrangement, to be implemented by unhcr, could be made possible with a
mandate from the un Security Council. Improvement of police, temporary or
mobile courts, and detention facilities in or near refugee camps would also 
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Elections brought Betancur in 1982 to power to
end the conflict. Negotiations resulted in a truce
with the farc and M-19. eln refused to attend.
Meanwhile, interests in cocaine trade had come
to play a leading role. The government tried to
fight the drug lords with assistance of us forces.
Mutual distrust between the M-19 and the 
government abruptly ended the peace-process 
in 1985. Continued negotiations with the farc
resulted in a new political party, the Patriotic
Union (up).
In 1987, the cease-fire between the farc and 
the government had fallen to pieces. The M-19
and smaller guerilla movements entered new
peace negotiations. Elections followed and 
the Constituent Assembly of Colombia drafted 
a new constitution, adopted in 1991.
The farc and eln stepped up guerilla activities
during the 90’s. Larger parts of the rural popula-
tion had grown to support the farc against the
government’s war on drugs. Drug crops had
become a major source of income for many
Colombians. In response to brutal attacks, the
government retreated from several areas. 
Paramilitary groups gathered in the United 
Self-defense Forces of Colombia (auc) became 
a party to the conflict.
Peace talks were given up when president
Uribe became president in 2002. His attempt
to crush eln, farc and auc improved 
security, but left many underlying causes
unsolved. Corruption, drug cultivation,
poverty, high unemployment, social inequal-
ity, absence of the government army in rural
areas, guerilla attacks by the eln and farc, 
as well as attacks by the uac continue this
multifarious conflict. By proportion, Colom-
bia counts an extremely high number of
Internally Displaced Persons. It is one of the
most complicated multiple civil wars which
has been left unsolved.
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Sudan (South)
The population is esti-
mated 39 million. It
became independent in 1956
and was since then ruled by mili-
tary regimes, some of them affiliated
with political Islam. Sudan’s rural population 
is mostly dependent on agriculture. Large oil
exports, particularly to China, finance the
regime and the booming capital.
Two civil wars between the North and the South
have raged over Sudan in 1955-72 and 1983-2005.
Ethnic and religious tensions between the 
Muslim Arab population of the North and the
non-Muslim African population of the South
date back to the colonial period. British rule
administrated them as separate regions, but 
they merged when Sudan became independent. 
This may have been a
serious mistake of state
design with grievous
consequences. The
South feared northern
dominance and
strived for more
regional
autonomy.
Fights
between the South and
the North (supported by the
government) killed 500,000 people. The Addis
Ababa Agreement of March 1972 ended the first
civil war. The South got a single administrative
region with various defined powers. 
In 1983, President Nimeiry intended to trans-
form Sudan into a Muslim Arab state and
imposed Sharia law. The non-Muslim South
refused to obey. Under John Garang of the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (spla) the fight for  
an independent South continued between 1983
and 2005. The war caused 2 million deaths and
4 million displacements. Peace negotiations
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greatly facilitate the provision of effective relief and aid by non-governmental
organisations.
At the end of a war, most governments want the refugees and idp’s to return
rapidly to their home communities. But they return only if it seems safe, offers a
better future, or if they are forced to return because they have no legal right or
practical possibility to stay where they found shelter. Host governments often
prompt refugees to return by reducing national and international assistance.
In refugee camps, crime often rules, as even the beginnings of law and order are
absent. Camps are controlled by brute force, often exercised by gangs of young
males. Women, children, elderly and members of tribes and families different
from those exercising power suffer daily abuse. Many refugee camps remain in
place for a long time even after the end of armed conflict. Its people live in limbo
for half a generation or more. Law and order are formally the task of the host
state, but this state is often not a rule-of-law state either. The most fundamental
human rights, those to life, security of person, freedom from torture and free-
dom from arbitrary arrest and detention, are often not upheld.
Refugees fall under the jurisdiction of the host state, but the hosts often lack the
interest and resources to implement this responsibility, leaving the refugees in a
vacuum. unhcr has stated that its officers should discourage the use of customs
and traditional practices that violate basic human rights, but it has not been given
the means, or the mandate to enforce these goals.
unhcr did negotiate in Kenya for additional police presence in a refugee camp
and paid incentives on top of Kenyan police salaries. In Kenya, mobile courts
have sessions in refugee camps to make the state’s justice system available for
refugees.
77
(re) establishing order
between the government of Sudan and the spla
started in 1993, led by the Intergovernmental
Authority on Development (igad) and sup-
ported by senior un officials. Between 2002 and
2004, the parties agreed to various protocols that
included arrangements about security, wealth
sharing, and power sharing. In January 2005, 
the spla and the government signed the final
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (cpa). 
It granted the South autonomy for six years, 
followed by a referendum on secession.
In March 2005, the Security Council established
the un mission (umnis) to support the imple-
mentation of the cpa, to provide humanitarian
assistance, monitor protection of human rights
and to support the African Union Mission in
Sudan (amis) operating in Darfur. The author-
ized strength of unmis is 27,300 military per-
sonnel and 4,015 police.
The implementation of the cpa has been lim-
ited. Armed groups in the South that are not
party of the agreement continue to use violence.
The crisis in Darfur is complicating the 
situation. It remains uncertain if South Sudan  
will develop autonomously and overcome its
serious poverty.
See box on Darfur in Chapter 8.
The national, religious and customary law and practices of refugees often clash
with the laws and practices of the host country. In general, neither of the two
systems conform to international human rights standards. Often, the rights of
women are particularly violated. There is usually no legal aid and representation
of the accused. Quality and availability of translation services leave much to be
desired. The lack of competent magistrates is widespread. Most prison conditions
are life-threatening. Police and detention personnel are usually brutal and
corrupt.
In most conflict areas, the capacity to re-integrate returning refugees is equally
poor. The war has destroyed state structures and increased hatred between popu-
lation groups. Homes, farms and other properties have often been seized by
opponents or criminals. Lack of police, or the power of prejudiced police and local
leaders, can encourage the rejection of returnees by the population. It may be
very difficult for the returnees to prove their property rights when land and real
estate registration is absent or faulty. Re-establishing rights can take many years
of an uphill legal battle in poorly functioning courts.
Refugees who should but cannot return to their homes often become permanent
refugees. For these people, new solutions have to be found. Resettlement in a
different area of their country of origin, or migration to a third country, may be a
more viable long-term solution. Many poor neighbouring countries receive large
numbers of refugees and migrants who are difficult to absorb permanently and
do not always meet the formal criteria for asylum as defined in international
treaties and domestic legislation.
It is necessary to search for new solutions to the question of what to do for
refugees who cannot return and also cannot be accepted permanently due to the
legislation or the situation in the host country. A part of the solution may lie in
resettlement programmes in a number of relatively under-populated areas in
third countries in which perhaps new communities could be created with the
agreement of the government in the area and aided by resettlement funds from
other countries and international agencies. In the past, many refugees from
Europe found a new future in North and South America, Australia and New
Zealand. There are still undeveloped and under-populated areas in the world
which could be developed into attractive resettlement territories if they were
under good government, and if adequate international resources were made
available to enable the refugees to build a new future there. Donor and recipient
countries could negotiate with unhcr such resettlement programmes and solve
mutual problems together. This is, of course, not an easy solution, and will work
only if conditions are right. Often, refugees and idp’s are reluctant to resettle far
from their country. Moreover, tensions might arise between the resettlers and the
original population in the area of resettlement. The natural environment may not
allow additional settlers (e.g. for lack of water). There should be benefits to both
to make it work. Such benefits can be provided by development assistance from
the un, eu, bilateral donors and ngos.
from war to t he rule of l aw
78
4.11 prepar ations for elector al democr ac y
Elections are generally regarded as the ultimate way to settle the threat of new vio-
lent conflicts and lay the foundation for democratic government based on the rule
of law. But one-time general elections are no miracle cure and do not suffice as a
start of democracy. Elections need to be prepared carefully and have to be held not
only at the national level for the chief executive and the legislative, but also at the
regional, provincial or state level, as well as for municipalities. A whole series of
successful elections, construction of stable electoral institutions and a free press
are needed to make formal democracy function and survive nasty power struggles.
Laws, attitudes and ethics have to be reformed to make democracy last.
After a violent conflict, domestic peace and basic security for the population are
the most urgent. Before elections can be held, warring parties have to be demobi-
lized, disarmed and re-integrated in society. Political parties need to be organized
and free media have to be established. Electoral laws need to be enacted. Impar-
tial technical international assistance is needed to newly emerging democracies.
Electoral assistance aims at capacity building of indigenous electoral institutions,
such as permanent independent electoral commissions. Ideally, elections are
transparent to all observers and do not cause new violent conflicts. This requires
constitutional reform in many states. Political parties themselves should be inter-
nally democratic and have enough administrative capacity to fight effectively 
for participatory democracy. Popular participation is the aim, especially of less
influential and advantaged groups, women, the poor, indigenous peoples and
suppressed minorities. To achieve this, parties have to be well-organized, 
well-funded with private and public funds, but not to make them dependent on
specific elites. Parties should have various bonds to civil society organisations, 
be open to the media, and apply strict rules against corruptive influences. This is
a daunting, never ending task even in established democracies.
In some countries, elections did not lead to lasting democratic government. 
An example is the election of Aristide as President of Haiti. His government did
not solve the country’s social, political and economic problems. International
support for elections needs to be linked to steady progress in other areas. It is
important to look beyond a single election and encourage a sustainable electoral
process. This may take a generation, and even then, there is a risk of decline, as
political parties can also hijack elections and establish less-democratic rule which
abolishes certain human rights, change the constitution, and impose authoritari-
anism. Various examples, like the seemingly democratic elections in a number 
of Central Asian countries after the dissolution of the ussr since the early 1990s,
leading to new but different authoritarian rule, are cases in point.
Since the 1980s, several providers of international technical assistance for elec-
toral development have become active. The un Secretariat established an Elec-
toral Assistance Division ead which has expanded its work to some 60 coun-
tries. Sweden started the International Institute for Electoral Assistance idea, 
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Haiti
Haiti declared its independence from France in
1804. The country has a history of instability and
political violence. In the early twentieth century,
the us invaded Haiti and occupied it between
1915 and 1934. The us centralized the govern-
ment and urged industries to leave the provinces
and settle in the capital. Nationalist rebels, the
Cacos, engaged in guerrilla warfare. The us hand-
ed over control in 1934 to a Haitian minority.
The 1957 elections brought François Duvalier to
power, nicknamed ‘Papa Doc’. He remained in
office till 1971. He controlled the population
through repressive police named the Volunteers
for National Security. His son Jean-Claude 
Duvalier, ‘Baby Doc’, succeeded him in 1971 and
continued the atrocities. In 1986 ‘Baby Doc’ was
deposed and exiled to France. In 1991 the priest
Aristide was elected president, but shortly after
the elections, Cedras deposed him and took over
control for three years. The second us interven-
tion, this time under a United Nations Security
Council mandate, put Aristide back in office.
Aristide was succeeded by Préval as president. 
Both were assisted by un peace operations 
which guided the development of a professional
police force between 1994 and 2000.
During local elections in 2000, the political 
opposition turned on Aristide and his party, 
accusing them of election fraud. Aristide’s con-
troversial re-election in 2000 was marred by 
suspicions that he had threatened his opponents.
In 2004, public upheaval and violent rebellion
prevailed once again. Aristide was pressured into
leaving the country. In 2004 about 8,000 peace-
keepers from the un Stabilization Mission 
arrived to maintain civil order. The 2006 elec-
tions brought Préval back to office. He promised
to restore peace and order, though recent history
tells us that the problems dividing Haitian 
society will probably resurface again after the un
leaves. Haiti remains extremely poor, civil socie-
ty is very weak, and the country suffers from 
unemployment and environmental degradation.
We can learn from Haiti’s experience that rapid
exit of foreign troops and assistance can destroy
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which is supported by many governments and ngos. The un Development
Program became actively involved in technical election assistance since the 
1990s. In 2006 the un Democracy Fund became an important source of funds,
providing support for civil society organizations.
The private International Foundation for Elections Systems (ifes) has worked
in over 120 countries in the areas of elections, rule of law, civil society, and
assistance to good governance. It is a leading ngo in the area of direct techni-
cal election assistance and works in tandem with other international organi-
zations.1 4
Regional international organizations such as the European Union, the Council 
of Europe, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
Organization for American States, the African Union, the Office of Democratic
Human Rights Initiatives (odhir), and the European Union also provide tech-
nical election assistance. Chapter 7 is devoted to the eu, as it is becoming the
largest source of finance for these purposes. Other regional election networks
also provide technical assistance, such as the Association of Central and Eastern
European Election Officials (aceeeo) in Budapest which represents elections
officials from 22 countries from the former ussr and Warsaw Pact. This 
organization has offered technical help in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia,
Kosovo, and Palestine. Various national election commissions offer assistance,
such as ‘Elections Canada’, the Indian Election Commission and the Federal
Electoral Institute of Mexico.
There is also assistance for political party development. The us offers this
through the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican
Institute, which are part of the National Endowment for Democracy. Other
examples are the German party assistance schemes of the Adenauer Foundation
(cdu), Friedrich Ebert Foundation of the spd, the Neumann Foundation of the
Free Democratic Party and the Hans Seidel Foundation of the csu. German party
assistance helped, for instance, to democratize Portugal after the Spinola coup
which abolished the Caetano government. Another example is the Netherlands
Institute for Multiparty Democracy (nimd) which carries out democratisation
projects in a host of countries.15
Some examples of the 1990’s show how not to provide electoral assistance:
Angola, Cambodia and Haiti. Peacekeeping operations and electoral assistance
were poorly coordinated. The un overlooked electoral institution building as 
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initial success. Elections as a way of legitimizing
the government, when there is no democratic
system, can lead to premature withdrawal of the
international community. Haiti has a long way to
go in terms of building democratic institutions.
Support of the international community is cru-
cial for future peace and security in this unfortu-
nate Caribbean half-island.
a strategy to build sustainable democratic systems. Elections can be used as a 
face-saving device by foreign countries which have sent peacekeepers, to get 
to the exit of difficult operations.
In fragile states the strength of electoral management bodies, and the respect
they have earned, can make a great difference. Will the results of an election be
respected, or will the opposing parties re-ignite hostilities? In Angola, the
warring parties agreed in 1992 on putting down arms and participate in an
election, but the parties were not yet demobilised and disarmed. Using its oil
revenues, the Angolan government rebuffed offers of assistance by the un and
the ifes and contracted instead a large private firm to organize the elections.
This undercut the Angolan Election Commission. When election disputes
erupted between unita and the mla, the contestants did not turn to the 
Election Commission to adjudicate their differences but took up arms again. 
The elections should have been postponed till demobilization had progressed
further. The civil war lasted another decade and devastated Angolan society.
The Cambodian model is another example of poor implementation of interna-
tional election support, even though the un operations helped to avoid a return
to civil war. From 1991 to 1993, the un spent nearly three billion dollars to
provide security, keep the country functioning and organize the country’s first
democratic elections. Cambodian citizens, ngos and politicians did not get 
heavily involved in the process of running elections. The un did not adequately
encourage the Cambodians to develop an indigenous election management body
that could continue for future elections. After the elections the un withdrew;
there was little local capacity to organize elections in the future.
At the outset of this paragraph, Haiti was mentioned as an example of how not 
to render international aid. Haiti may be a small part of the world, but its complex
problems are a microcosm of what is wrong in many other, larger countries. 
After two hundred years of brutal, suppressive, and ineffective governments, 
the Haitian people badly need the kind of sustained international support that can
build a lasting, functioning democracy. A serious weakness is the near-absence 
of civil society and domestic ngos and the small size of the educated group of
potential mid-level leaders.
The elections of 1990, which brought a promising priest to power, Aristide, were 
onducted by a Provisional Electoral Council, which received technical assis-
tance from the United Nations, the oas and ifes. These elections were successful
largely because the provisional President of Haiti in 1990 appointed an electoral 
council composed of respected Haitians from across the political spectrum.
President Aristide and the Haitian Parliament that was elected in 1990 never
completed the task of making the cep permanent as was provided for in the
Haitian Constitution. Corrupt, incapable government and instability has
continued to plague Haiti, notwithstanding repeated and prolonged inter-
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angola
Angola   counts 12 million people and is one of
the poorest countries in the world: 70 percent of
the population lives below the poverty line, and
the life expectancy is only 38 years. Different
ethnicities live in relative harmony with each
other, including Ovimbundu (37%), Kimbundu
(25%) and Bakongo minorities (13%). Increased
oil production has caused a high economic
growth rate in recent years.
After a long struggle for independence, the colo-
nial power Portugal granted statehood in 1975.
The Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (mpla) and the National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola (unita) then
fought for control over the country and its rich
oil and diamonds resources. The country became
a cold war battleground: the Soviet Union and
Cuba supported the Marxist mpla, and the
United States and South Africa supported the
anti-communist unita. During the civil war, up
to 1.5 million lives may have been lost and 4 mil-
lion people were displaced.
In 1989, the un initiated peace
agreements and sent troops to
monitor these: unavem i, ii, iii
and monua. In 1991, the mpla
and unita agreed to the Bicesse
Accords which were intended
to convert Angola
from a one-party
authoritarian gov-
ernment led by
mpla into a multi-
party state with
democratic elections in 1992.
After claims of fraud in initial
elections, a final run-off elec-
tion did not take place and the
civil war resumed.
There were four years
of relative peace
between 1994 and 1998,
when the un oversaw a new peace accord of
Lusaka. In 1997 it was agreed that a coalition gov-
ernment with unita would be implemented.
But unita violated the peace agreement by
refusing to give up strongholds, by failing to
demobilize and by retaking territory. As a result,
the government suspended coalition rule in
1998, and the country plunged into civil war
once more. The un Security Council tried to
stop the flow of diamond revenues to unita and
oil to the mpla. The un retreated in 1999 for a
variety of reasons, including absence of ‘peace’
to monitor, the shooting down of an un-char-
tered aircraft and a general lack of confidence in
the un among Angolans.
In 2002, government troops killed unita leader
Jonas Savimbi, and six weeks later, rebel leaders
signed a cease-fire with the government. In this
deal unita agreed to demobilize its soldiers and
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national electoral assistance. In 2004 and onwards, a new peacekeeping mission
was needed to stop a groundswell of violence. International election assistance
by the un, oas and ifes was not well coordinated and the elections held in the
spring of 2006 were chaotic.
The organization of elections in Haiti since the 1990’s has proven to be costly,
difficult and chaotic due in large part to the highly ineffective way that the oas
and the un provided technical assistance. The two organizations frequently 
left the Haitian cep feeling confused and abandoned.
Fortunately, there are encouraging examples where the international donor
community was effective, like in Nicaragua, where Presidential and Parliamen-
tary Elections were held. Non-partisan assistance was provided by ifes, the oas
and the European Union to the Supreme Electoral Council.
In Iraq, the population went to the polls to vote in three elections in 2005,
notwithstanding the threat of terrorist attacks. In 2003-5, the electoral process
proved one of the few successes of post-war assistance. In 2005, the Independent
Election Commission of Iraq conducted a parliamentary election for the interim
government, a constitutional referendum, and a general election for the new
government. The un Election Assistance Division and ifes provided assistance
under very threatening circumstances. As Iraq has fallen into civil war at the time
of writing, this successful assistance to election preparation risks being lost in the
internecine violence that is engulfing the country.
Bosnia-Herzegovina can be mentioned as a relative success story with better 
prospects. After the Dayton peace agreement, the osceand ifeshelped organizing
local, state and federal elections. A permanent and independent Central Election 
Commission was prepared by an Association for Free Elections of Bosnia-Herze-
govina. This gained wide membership and became a multi-ethnic organization. 
Elections in Bosnia Herzegovina showed that international assistance can encour-
age former opponents to negotiate technical electoral and political party issues.
International donors should, of course, help designing or renewing the electoral
systems in a transparent fashion that fits the political landscape of the recipient.
Complex electoral systems as developed historically in some stable older democ-
racies will often not be ready for export to another country. Foreign systems can
exacerbate tensions.
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the mpla pledged to provide food and shelter for
the unita forces and relatives, who were cut off
from basic supplies due to government action
and un sanctions. Some 5,000 unita forces
were to be absorbed into the national military
and approximately 40 into the national police.
After the end of a 27-year civil war, Angola is
rebuilding its country since 2002. It is riddled
by anti-personnel mines. Peace remains fragile,
as separatist forces continue to fight over the
control of natural resources
The key choice is between majority-based or ‘first past the post’ systems such as
used by the United Kingdom, India and the United States, or proportional repre-
sentation systems, as in the Netherlands and Sweden, where candidates compete
for seats in assemblies advocating party lists, led by major politicians, on the basis
of different policy platforms. The advantage of majority systems is a clear result
leading to a government majority, even though this may not precisely reflect
popular majority in the country as a whole. The advantage of proportional repre-
sentation is a higher democratic reflection of the views of the population, but a
multi-party split may hamper clear majority formation which is needed for a
stable executive. Mixed systems, such as the German since 1949, are a useful
guidance in different situations. Representation with a part of the legislature
elected nationally by proportion, and a part at the local level from single-member
districts, can combine the advantages.
The nature of an electoral system and the preparation of parties for elections can
not only reduce, but also increase ethnic and other tensions in a country. Electoral
competition can encourage outbidding and populism with extremist rhetoric
fostering polarisation rather than peaceful conflict settlement. Newly emerging
democracies can benefit from impartial international expertise when they design
new electoral systems.16 Expert organisations offer advice based on comparative
analysis of election laws, poll worker training, vote counting, adjudication of
election disputes, voter education, use of election technology, and improving the
role of free media for elections.
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Mozambique has 19 million inhabi-
tants of which 20-30 percent is Chris-
tian and 15-20 percent Muslim. The
socialist liberation front frelimo
started a war of liberation in the
middle 1960s against Portuguese
colonial rule and gained inde-
pendence in 1975. A civil war
between the frelimo gov-
ernment and the national
resistance movement 
renamo, first supported by
Rhodesia and South Africa dur-
ing the apartheid regime, rav-
aged the country in the 1980s.
The first president Samora
Machel died in a suspicious
plane crash in 1986. His successor Chissano
allowed multiparty democracy in 1990. 
renamo changed into a political party. With 
the end of the Cold War and the abolishment of
apartheid in South Africa, foreign intervention
ceased, which contributed to the end of hostili-
ties. The Roman Catholic Egidio order and the
un mediated a peace in 1992.
The war devastated the country and flooded
Mozambique with land mines and small arms.
The un sent onumoz to monitor the peace
agreement. Five million internal and external 
refugees had to be resettled. onumoz reached a
strength of 7000 peacekeepers that protected 
humanitarian aid and assisted demo-
bilizing 64,000 government troops
and 23,000 renamo fighters. A new
national army was formed. The un
sent 1100 international police
officers but this force was not very
qualified and remained ineffective in 
ending human rights violations. The un
trained 1600 people to prepare for elections in
1994, which were a victory for frelimo. Several
elections have been held since.
Peace, political stability and economic aid have
brought consistent growth since 1992. Crucial
was the end of outside interference by countries
which had fuelled the civil war, but now sup-
ported peace implementation. renamo’s suc-
cessful transformation to a political party was
essential for peace. The un postponed elections
until demobilization was well under way (as
opposed to Angola, were elections were held too
early). Large development assistance from eu
members helped to turn Mozambique in a suc-
cessful peacebuilding operation. There is a fair
degree of media freedom, but the justice and
police systems need improvement.
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Bosnia
Bosnia-Herzegovina formed a part of the former
Yugoslavia between 1942 and 1992, together
with Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo, 
Montenegro and Croatia. Separatist sentiments
increased after the death of President Tito, lead-
ing to independence of Slovenia and Croatia in
1991. The split-up affected Bosnia-Herzegovina
(hereafter: Bosnia) the harshest. In 1990, 
Bosnia had included approximately 43 percent
Bosnian Muslims, 31 percent Serbs, and 17 per-
cent Croats. Bosnia declared itself independent
from Yugoslavia (Serbia) in March 1992 after a
referendum that was boycotted by Bosnian
Serbs. They rejected the outcome.
In May 1992 the Bosnian Serbs had occupied
70 percent of the country. Serb leaders aimed at
creating a larger Serbia, which would incorporate
Serbian areas in northern and eastern Bosnia,
including the city of Sarajevo. The Serb leader
Karadzic and General Mladic, supported by
Yugoslavia (Serbia), followed a policy of ethnic
cleansing to expel Muslim and Croat minorities
from what they considered Serb land. War 
raged over the country between 1992 and 1995.
As a result, 200.000 people died and 1.8 million
(almost half of the total population) fled.
The Bosnian Croats started in 1993 a
campaign to establish a Croat terri-
tory in areas bordering Croatia. In
March 1994, the Washington Peace
agreement established a cease-
fire between the Bosnian Croats
and Muslims. This did not end 
the war with the Serbs, which 
continued until the end of 1995.
The un Security Council had imposed an
arms embargo in 1991. This favoured the Bosni-
ans Serbs who were well-armed and supported
by the former federal Yugoslav army. The un
also imposed a no-fly zone. The un protection
force unprofor, already present in Croatia, 
was expanded to Bosnia in 1992. Its mandate
included monitoring the no-fly zone, 
supporting unhcr to deliver humanitarian aid,
and upholding ‘safe areas’ (including Sarajevo,
Tuzla, Zepa, Goraz˘de and Srebrenica).
unprofor was neither mandated nor equipped
to impose peace and engage in fighting enemy
forces. Force was authorized by the un only for
self-defence of un blue helmet soldiers. This
mandate, which assumed impartiality and con-
sent of the warring parties – which were still in
full-swing civil war – seriously hindered the
un’s effectiveness. The most disastrous failure
of this mission was the conquest by Serb forces
of the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia
on July 11, 1995. Srebrenica counted about
40,000 Bosnian inhabitants and refugees, while
400 un blue helmet soldiers from The Nether-
lands were stationed in the enclave. After their
conquest, Serb military and militia killed about
7500 Bosnian men inside and outside the enclave
and bulldozered the corpses into mass graves,
which were revealed by us intelligence to the
Security Council in August 1995.
Bosnia & Herzegovina
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Investigations by the un, the Netherlands Insti-
tute for War Documentation (niod, 2002) 
and the Dutch Parliament later concluded, i.a.,
that although the blue-helmet un mission was
intended to uphold the enclave, located deep
into enemy territory, it was militarily unable 
to defend it, which was mainly due to the small
size and light arms of the un force ‘Dutchbat’,
while Serb artillery occupied the hills around 
the enclave. There was misplaced confidence in
the readiness of unprofor to timely deploy
effective close air support if Serbs would attack.
Earlier Dutch proposals for an air bridge to sup-
port the enclave had been rejected by key un
members. Previous proposals to evacuate the
enclave preventively and resettle the refugees
near Sarajevo had been rejected by the Bosnian
government.
The fate of Srebrenica led to the end of the us
policy not to support peacekeeping with ground
troops in Bosnia. The us Congress forced the us
government to take the lead in peace operations.
This changed the Serb policy.
Directly after the fall of Srebrenica, the enclave
Zepa had also been overrun by Serb forces,
killing several thousand people. When another
massacre threatened Goraz˘de, nato members
issued on July 21, 1995 a deterrent warning that
Serb targets would be attacked by air. This saved
Goraz˘de. When Serb attacks continued on Sara-
jevo, uk, French and Dutch military responded
with air strikes and artillery against Serb military
targets in September 1995. Meanwhile, the Croa-
tian army had attacked Serb areas in the Krajina
in August and expelled the population to Serbia.
The war ended with the Dayton Peace Agree-
ment, mediated by the us, and signed in Decem-
ber 1995. It divided Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
Republica Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak Federa-
tion. The blue-helmet unprofor was replaced
by 60.000 green-helmet troops of the nato-led
ifor (later sfor and eufor), which was
responsible for enforcing the military aspects of
the peace agreement.
Various international organizations were
involved in the peacebuilding afterwards. 
The un set up an International Police Task Force
(iptf) to oversee local police. unhcr led the
return of refugees; osce provided electoral 
support and monitored human rights. A High
Representative received authority to monitor
implementation of the peace agreement and
coordinate the activities of foreign civilian agen-
cies in Bosnia.
The Croat and Serb parts within Bosnia contin-
ued to act like independent states; both had
police forces based on ethnic identities. Trans-
forming the police into a neutral force was one 
of the most difficult parts of peacebuilding. 
The un pulled out of police reform in 2003.
A European Union Police Mission (eupm) and
peacekeeping forces of the eu (eufor) were still
necessary to provide stability at the time of 
writing in 2007. No real reconciliation took place
among the three populations. Ethnic violence
might erupt again in Bosnia if these missions
would leave.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (icty) in The Hague issued
indictments against 161 individuals accused 
of committing war crimes. In mid 2007, 51 war
criminals had received sentences for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law, but
not yet the major suspects Mladic and Karadzic.
In 2007, the International Court of Justice ruled
that Serbia had been negligent in preventing
genocide in Srebrenica.
The failing un peacekeeping mission in the 
former Yugoslavia taught that it is impossible 
to have blue-helmet un soldiers keep peace dur-
ing an ongoing war without strong enforcement
means, while the us, several nato allies and
other participants are deeply divided. The double
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key procedure for air support did not work.
Refugee populations in enclaves should be pro-
tected with adequate green-helmet military
forces or be moved preventively by unhcr to
safer areas, with military protection. The un
Security Council should determine clear man-
dates for its peacekeeping forces and provide for
unified command.
Peacebuilding after cease-fire requires strong
coordination, large resources, and international
authority to break deadlocks caused by obstruc-
tion of former warring parties. The lessons of
the un’s weak involvement in the civil war in
the former Yugoslavia in 1991-5, while the veto-
holding Great Powers of the Security Council
were deeply divided, were that peace operations
fail if there is no determined leadership by at
least one of these Powers. nato’s role in enforc-
ing the peace after the peace agreement showed
the importance of deterrent power. Another
historical lesson, learned once again, was that
the break-up of a state containing many group
identities usually leads to war, from which all
parties heavily suffer, during many years, if not
decades.
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5 (re) building the rule of l aw
“We will spare no effort to (…) strengthen the rule of law”
un Millennium Declaration, September 2000
The foundation for future rule of law is to be laid in the transitional phase, which
was surveyed in the previous chapter. Transitional politics may have led to a
provisional constitution or a basic agreement which will later on lead to a new
constitution. Transitional ‘justice’ may have started purging the country of war
criminals, war profiteers and serious collaborators with criminal political behav-
iour during the previous regime. Emergency laws may have facilitated the return
of physical security. A beginning may have been made with disarmament, demo-
bilisation and reform of the armed forces, the police and the intelligence services.
A gradual return of public order may now enable efforts to lay the foundation for
future rule of law. In the present chapter, the (re)building and reform of the legal
and judicial sector will be briefly discussed.
5.1 the role and rule of l aw
The ‘role’ of law is to settle conflicts equitably, to protect people’s security and
property, to restrain the use of political power by subjugating it to the law, and to
guarantee basic human freedoms, in order to enable individuals and society to
thrive.. The first task of public law is to help provide basic human security and
replace arbitrary rule, that is: achieve rule by law, which should in turn, develop
further into the rule of law, in which the ‘rulers’, the administration and judicial
and police system, are subject to the laws of the land as well as international law.
We do not discuss here the role of private law, however important for peaceful
life, reconstruction and development, as this study focuses on public policy in
post-conflict peacebuilding.
The main elements of a complete rule-of-law system are:
– An independent judiciary;
– independent human rights institutions;
– government powers that are determined by laws;
– free and fair elections;
– transparent and accountable access to political power;
– police and detention systems whose powers are defined precisely by laws;
– military and security systems that function under the law;
– access to justice through competent and affordable lawyers, and no prohibitive
levies or delays which discourage seeking justice.
The ultimate purpose of rule of law is to implement basic human rights as
enshrined in advanced constitutions, which in turn reflect the international
human rights treaties.
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What exactly do we mean by ‘the rule of law’? Next to the above-mentioned
seven elements, one can also distinguish eight different functional requirements
which have to be met:
– all laws are applied equally to all citizens, without discrimination based on
legally irrelevant personal or group differences among the citizens;
– the right to fair trail is guaranteed to all;
– there is no arbitrary detention, no torture and cruel, inhumane treatment of
detainees/prisoners;
– all laws are openly promulgated and can be scrutinised by the citizens and
their legal aids;
– there is no retrospective application of penal laws;
– the judiciary is professional, intellectually independent and impartial;
– authorities derive their powers from laws; their decisions, policies and imple-
mentation are also under the law;
– all law enforcement agencies are given adequate means to perform their tasks.
These eight requirements form a broad set. The last element is, strictly speaking,
more an element of good governance than rule-of-law, but the rule of law cannot
function without it.
The standard of necessary elements and requirements for a complete rule of law
system, as formulated above, is not met in more than one quarter of the un
member states. These standards are formulated, however, in many lofty un
declarations and policy memoranda. As ideals to be aspired to, they receive wide
support. But reality is very different. It is impossible to attain all of these
elements and requirements fully in the short time frame of international peace-
building operations. The cultural, political, institutional and other conditions in
most poor and middle income countries ravaged by war are not conducive to full
human rights standards.
It is crucial to listen to the population: how they see their most pressing needs.
Donor policies should follow these priorities. In countries that went through
armed conflicts, the population sees basic needs for physical survival and some
measure of law and order as their dominating priorities, often before the abstract
notion of justice. Surviving the next weeks is the prime concern. This ‘safety
first’ should be applied to international statecraft, too. That is why peacebuilding
programmes should not be judged only by the high ideals and standards of oedc
type states, but by the desire of the population to be more secure than during the
war period.
Establishing a functioning rule of law system takes many decades in most states.
This is why peacebuilding operations should aim practically for a feasible
improvement of the rule of law as it existed in the country concerned before the
war. A government that keeps domestic peace and administers justice in a way
which the population deems reasonably equitable and accessible is already a great
improvement. This means that a complete overhaul of the judicial system is often
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beyond the realm of the possible in the period of international post-conflict
peacebuilding assistance. Success in police and judicial reform is simply: having
contributed to a more stable domestic order with greater personal security for the
population, a lower level of violence, and a higher level of legal conflict settle-
ment, meeting the basic rule of law standards of the population.
What is feasible? Recent studies by the Rand Corporation and the us Institute of
Peace reviewed several county programmes to construct law and order after war.1
These studies conclude that a new government and foreign supporters/peace-
keepers have to set limited, practical targets. They cannot import a new state and
deal with all obstacles to peace and development at once. For practical purposes it
is often impossible and imprudent to avoid involving traditional authority struc-
tures. The dilemma is that the ‘old’ can severely compromise the new state build-
ing by reliance on power holders who violated basic human rights. This is a
dilemma between short-term stability with limited resources, and international
standards of good governance and basic rights. Brushing aside all local chieftains,
or dismantling the state, leads to anarchy and renewed violence, particularly of a
criminal nature. The choice of the donors is not between the bad old and the good
new, but between different levels of what might be feasible and meets minimum
standards of the population. What can be attained depends, of course, on the
starting position, the desire of the population and its leaders, the time and the
available resources. In the practical short run, there are choices and trade-offs
between stability and justice, between stability and democracy, between local
authority and good government, between leaving the country soon with ‘unfin-
ished business’, or long term involvement leading to an unsustainable task for the
donors.
The rule of law that has been attained in most Western societies is the result of a
long historical development with ups and downs. It is assumed by many theorists
and historians that the rule of law is related to a strong middle class, to a well
developed civil society, and to the existence of a ‘democratic’ political system
with elaborate power sharing arrangements and counter weights against abuse of
political power. The rule of law is also often seen as strongly related to economic
freedom and liberal market economics with free access. Such freedoms prevent
long term material domination by a ruling class over a poor citizenry, while
economic collectivism, dominated by a state which owns crucial sectors or even
the entire productive apparatus, generally leads to authoritarian rule. In such
authoritarian economic systems, the law is not above the rulers, but the rulers
use the law to control the population and national resources in the interests and
ideology of the ruling ‘elite’.
The rule of law is sometimes seen by Western observers as closely linked to the
values which prevail in Western society. Individualism, liberalism, personal
responsibility and ambition (achievement orientation) are seen as crucial for an
oecd type of country and high economic development. If such values and condi-
tions would be necessary preconditions for establishing the rule of law, efforts to
93
(re) building the rule of law
import rule of law in non-Western societies, or impose a ‘Western’ rule of law
system, would be short-lived and fail after external actors leave. In this view, it
might not be possible to start rule of law systems in non-Western authoritarian,
religiously and ethnically divided countries with weak institutions, dominated
by political patronage and clientelism. This view is not supported by evidence of
rule of law systems in non-Western societies with different cultures, values and
beliefs, such as Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore, Taiwan, and South Africa,
which have to varying degrees relatively independent judiciaries. The same 
may hold true for a number of Islamic societies, as there are reformist Muslim
countries with relatively impartial judiciaries, such as Kuwait, Tunisia, Turkey,
Indonesia, and Jordan. The aspiration of almost all governments to improve
human rights standards and their subscribing to the international treaties on
human rights indicate that the wide gap between words and deeds is not first 
of all a gap of principle but foremost of implementation. We return to this in
section 5.13.
5.2 rule- of- l aw assistance and development
cooper ation
Traditional development assistance, which has been provided to poor countries
since the 1960’s, was originally aimed at economic growth and poverty reduc-
tion. This economic assistance has remained partially unsuccessful, especially in
parts of Africa and the Middle East where many recipient countries have seen not
just a lack of economic improvement but also a decline in the quality of human
life of the urban and rural masses, for various internal and external reasons.
Traditionally, many development assistance donors steered clear of questions of
poor or bad government in recipient countries. Where aid was given on the
condition that the recipient government should make economic policy improve-
ments, this conditionality was sometimes ineffective or even counterproductive.
Often recipient governments found easy ways to circumvent conditions after
paying lip service to the international advice and demands.
Only in the last fifteen years have donor countries and institutions introduced
legal reform and assistance programmes to their development cooperation. Many
recipient countries have remained less than enthusiastic about such contributions
to their legal sector.
The political will inside a country to reform and develop the rule of law can be
encouraged, but it cannot be imposed from outside. If there is a clear will in a
country to improve the rule of law, but a lack of resources and expertise slows
down progress, the country will be a grateful object of assistance. In such a case,
the choices a donor has to make are relatively easy.
If the bottleneck is not resource scarcity but the lack of will to reform the legal
and judicial sector, donors have little leverage. They will meet open resistance
from the leadership, or softer, diplomatic and bureaucratic tactics against
improvements. In such cases, it may be better to focus on persons and segments
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of institutions which appear receptive to assistance for professionalisation, as
well as non-governmental programmes for rights awareness and education,
training of defence lawyers, setting up legal-aid shops in local communities,
encouraging a free press, advising civil society, encouraging women’s and human
rights organisations, and so on. Encouraging the rule of law and reduction of arbi-
trary decisions and corruption may also benefit from projects to improve the
professionalism of the state’s administrative organs, but this can also be counter-
productive. A more professional civil service which serves not the population but
the needs of a criminal regime, can be worse for the people than an ineffective
civil service.
In countries that are in ruins due to (civil) war or dictatorship, the question is, of
course, what measures can encourage (new) rulers to accept limits to their rule?
They are inclined to strengthen, not weaken, their grip. If the ruler needs tax
income from wealthy citizens who demand a say in the ruler’s policies, he will
have to give in to some of their demands. Strange as it may sound, this is the way
the preparation for a number of wars in Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth
century helped to bring monarchs under laws enacted by beginning parliaments.
But this doesn’t work in Africa, if the ruler gets his pay from a foreign diamond or
oil company.
If there are neither strong civil society organisations nor an influential entrepre-
neurial class, who will force the ruler to behave? Can foreign aid donors achieve
this? They can to some extent, but only if the ruling elite is really dependent on
these donors and if they impose precise conditions with performance bench-
marks on aid, if performance is monitored and if donors apply effective sanctions.
If the ruling elite are not dependent and if various donors follow very different
policies that undercut each other’s efforts to encourage good government, sanc-
tions and aid conditionality will not change the government much for the better.
In such situations, it may still be possible to identify hopeful agents of future
change in the government and encourage and strengthen these.
It is certainly in the interest of developed democracies that are rule-of-law states,
to encourage the rule of law and democracy in states with serious shortcomings
in maintaining the domestic rule of law. Juridical cooperation, development
cooperation and general foreign policy of advanced countries can and should
contribute to the growth of rule of law elsewhere.2
High-income rule-of-law states are, however, small in number. Most of the 192
un members are not rule-of-law states. Aid donors of legal development aid have
to set priorities. They cannot help all needy countries equally at the same time.
Difficult choices have to be made as to whom to help, with which programs and
to what level of achievement. This question, how to allocate limited aid means
most effectively, will be discussed in chapter 6.
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In countries that are not rule-of-law states, the legal and judicial system, security
services, armed services, police and both the local and the highest courts do not
serve justice in the abstract. They serve the dominant order and the interests of
the power elite. The power elite define what the national interest is, and that is
usually not the same as the interest of the population; it may at times be the
opposite. The security and armed services purport to defend the country against
threats to national security from foreign aggressors or domestic rebels, but in
reality these military, police and intelligence organisations mainly serve regime
security, that is, the security of the regime against threats that might arise from
the population itself. This explains the often high defence and police costs in
poor countries, even in those against which external aggression seems very
unlikely.
International assistance for legal sector reform started to grow only in the 1990s.
The urgency of legal reform in communist countries that had changed overnight
to liberal politics highlighted the pressing need to develop effective mechanisms
for reform. Abolishing communist regimes did not instantly create functioning
social market economies, but in many cases led instead to a plundering form of
privatisation, to abuse of unregulated market power, and to a surge in crime. A
new awareness arose – or rather, an old truth was rediscovered – about the impor-
tance of good governance, strong institutions and clear, well-administered laws.
This awareness increased further after the poor results became clear of military
interventions for humanitarian reasons in states that had collapsed due to war or
other forms of political violence.
The United Nations Development Programme (undp) was among the first to call
‘Justice and Security Sector Reform’ a condition for human development, and
rightly so. This admission, that it is not economic policy that alone pushes devel-
opment forward, was a big step forward in un thinking, away from the focus of
un organisations and international financial institutions on economic growth.
The un and the Bretton Woods institutions had steered a wide berth around key
political questions such as gross suppression of human rights or aggression
towards neighbouring countries.
Nevertheless, reform of the legal and justice system proved to be no miracle cure
transforming an appalling lawless state into a neat, rich, rule-of-law country.
Legal reform can only contribute to real respect for human rights after the secu-
rity system has been reformed, which will happen only once the main political
forces have agreed on power sharing and the building of a rule-of-law state.
International assistance for judicial reform or, more generally, legal sector reform,
aims at improving the fairness and efficiency of a national legal system. The legal
system is the constitution, laws, other regulations, customary law, international
obligations, and all institutions and persons charged with creating and maintain-
ing the law: the legislature, courts, public prosecutors, defenders, police and
prison systems, paralegal institutions, alternative dispute resolution bodies, war
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crimes tribunals and ombudsmen. The legal sector also includes legal education,
legal aid and advice and information. This system comprises public institutions
and non-governmental organisations, and both officials and private individuals.
All rule-of-law assistance to reform has to start with the prevailing legal systems
of the country concerned. Their legal system may consist of:.
– Common law (generally seen as of British origin or type, predominant in the
us and Commonwealth countries. For a list of Commonwealth countries, see
the chart in chapter 6);
– civil law countries with continental European legal systems, also found in
Latin America and individual developing countries that do not belong to the
Commonwealth;
– religious law (Christian, Islamic, Jewish, etc.);
– socialist law from the communist period in Eastern Europe, China, Vietnam
and Cuba;
– international law with its various components.
Often, elements of several legal systems apply at the same time in a country, in a
rather unique mix. The mix is often different depending on the legal sub-sector;
that is, public law or civil law.3 Often, some legal elements and areas in a national
legal system are modernised, while others are absent, old-fashioned or ill-devel-
oped.
5.3 aspects of legal reform
The justice and legal system in need of reform in the framework of peacebuilding
comprise both the police, local and higher courts, all penitentiary and other
corrections institutions, the ministry of justice and its services, the legislative
systems, and the legal education, training and research institutions.
A first question is, of course, which legal system prevails in the country at hand.
The elements of law in need of reform are often grouped according to their 
application to a particular sector: trade law, property law, financial (institutions)
law, environmental law, educational law, health sector law, etc. Commercial 
law often receives priority from the government and business due to interest in
economic growth and foreign investment. Transition from communism to a
market economy also leads to priority for commercial law. Assistance and advice
from different donors can cause an illogical mix of legal systems, such as 
us-inspired commercial law next to other civil law derived from the Roman
system, or elements of religious and customary local law.
Ideally, legal reform should start with constitutional reform, as this determines
the state structure and forms the framework for the legal and judicial order. It
improves the delineation of government power, settles power conflicts among
groups and regions, improves the courts’ mandates, creates or strengthens judi-
cial independence and enshrines citizens’ basic rights. But in practice, govern-
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ments tend to focus on limited modernisations which do not undermine their
power base. Most governments are more interested in commercial law reform, as
they want to attract foreign and domestic investment and improve export earn-
ings, rather than improving power-sharing and political reform.
The failing of a state and its collapse into violence and anarchy is usually due to a
failing government in a wrongly designed state structure. In such a case both the
capability and policies of the government (political leaders and/or the organs of
the state) were not up to the challenges of good governance. The state was a
creation by domestic, coercive force and international power configurations
which did not really, or not at all, reflect the solidarity of the peoples involved.
The causes of such ill-design of states are varied: in some cases the original estab-
lishment of the state (through military events, monarchic inheritance, rebellion,
secession, international diplomacy or other origins), its frontiers and constitution
(often made during decolonisation) did not fit the social, tribal, and economic
fabric of society. In others, the state apparatus may have been captured by indi-
viduals who used it for private gain, tribal rule over other ethnic entities, or polit-
ical leaders who tried to impose an oppressive ideology.
As far as state failure is due to original, structural flaws in the make-up of the
state, failed states are really in need of careful restructuring in order to achieve
effective, stable, good and possibly democratic governance, in accordance with
internationally accepted norms and treaties. In several failed states, this restruc-
turing may require federalisation and regional autonomy to reflect the variety of
the populations in the state and their desire for self-government. The restructur-
ing of an ill-designed state is usually a very painful, bloody process which may
lead to civil war. There is also a risk that the outcome of the struggle is worse 
than the original situation. There are only a few situations of states which were
redesigned or divided peacefully after elections and negotiation, like the split-up
of Czechoslovakia. An encouraging example of the opposite, free reunification of
a population divided by outside forces, is the unification of Germany in the early
1990’s. The spit-up of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the early 1990’s
is also a case in point which shows that redesigning is possible without prolonged
civil war. These examples are positive exceptions to what is probably a more
general rule in political history, that split-ups, secessions, the redesigning of
main power relations, and achievement of autonomy or near-independent state-
hood within a (federal) state frequently risks violent clashes if not civil war. This
seems to be the case particularly in regions whose state structures were imposed
by foreign powers, like in the periods of colonisation and decolonisation by West
European powers, and expansion and contraction of other foreign empires, like
tsarist Russia and the ussr.
As constitutional redesign is a touchy, if not an explosive subject; it is often
impossible for foreign aid donors to bring real improvements. Outside advisors
generally have to work within the existing power system. Not being able to help
correct the structural faults in the system, does not mean that all assistance is
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doomed to failure. Improvement of civil and penal law and procedural as well as
administrative law may in due course lead to improvements in more sensitive,
constitutional areas. Assistance in these less politicised subjects may not be
recognized as a threat to those in power, at least not in the short run, but offer the
power elite some economic and reputation advantages of modernisation.
When constitutional reform is not possible or not urgent, improvement of the
courts system is usually needed urgently. This is discussed in section 5.6.
5.4 (re) building police and prison systems
We saw in the previous chapter, that rapid establishment of some basic law and
order, if necessary as temporary martial law, and a speedy transition to civilian
policing, as well as a fair beginning of the public prosecution and court system, is
crucial to the success of the first phase of post-conflict reconstruction, when the
population expects personal security. Once this beginning is made, the police
system should start with thorough reforms.4
With the word police, we also refer to related institutions like the ministries of
Justice, Police, or the Interior, i.e. whatever department is responsible for police.
We also include different police services like federal, national, state, provincial,
municipal and country-police, gendarmerie-type police services, border police
and special police forces against drugs, as well as police intelligence services.
There is not one prototype for an ideal, new police organisation. The best system
depends on the constitutional structure of the country, its history, culture, soci-
ology and legal system. It may be wise to start reconstruction and reform on the
basis of available domestic structures. This is not recommended, however, if the
police is seen by the population as very brutal and suppressive and one of the
causes of the war to begin with. Then, new names and faces, new structures and
uniforms help to engender hope and trust.
Police reform tries to establish civilian, professional, accountable, non-partisan
police under the law, respecting basic human rights. Police should be purged soon
after the war, in order to gain trust of the population. International monitors,
advisers and trainers are needed. A major step is employing many women and
members of suppressed ethnic and religious groups in the new police. Merit 
criteria should govern hiring and promotion.
Inclusion of formerly opposing people in an entirely new police might be easier
than making former enemy police organisations work together. In the Bosnian
federation, integration became a façade, as Croats continued to report to Croat
superiors, etc.
In the beginning after a cease-fire, and for a longer time if spoilers remain in posi-
tions of power, the police task of maintaining public order can only be carried out
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with military backing. Ideally, this should take place under international surveil-
lance, such as un observers and peacekeeping personnel.
The Rand Corporation made an analysis of many police operations in post-
conflict countries and concluded in 2007 that, by an large, at least 10,000 interna-
tional soldiers are needed per 10 million inhabitants in light peace operations with
the consent of the parties to guarantee success in establishing post-war security,
and about 1000 international police officers.5 The domestic police should be built
up to at least 20,000 per 10 million inhabitants within 5 years. Furthermore, inter-
national financial assistance should be at least $ 125 per inhabitant per year in the
first two years to pay for peacekeeping and police forces, training domestic police,
(re)building their infrastructure and providing equipment.
The assistance should not last less than 5 years, as rebuilding improved police and
security services cannot be done instantly. (Re)building the justice system even
takes much longer. Such requirements have been overlooked in the design of
many peacebuilding operations in the 1990’s and early twenty-first century.
Usually, combat operations are well-planned, while post-combat establishment
of public order is neglected. Post conflict (re)establishment of internal security
takes as much planning, preparation and intelligence operations as planning a
military intervention.
There is often a very serious public order gap and police deployment delay after
military interventions. The ‘shock and awe’ of successful us military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan were followed by paralysing deployment delays in police
and justice reform measures.
The domestic security gap between a cease-fire and post war (re)construction of a
stable state requires immediate application of international constabulary forces
(well armed police trained to work in a hostile environment). Donor countries
and international organisations would do well to set up arrangements that enable
them to rapidly mobilise such police and justice assistance to countries in need.
This requires prior selection and training of personnel, and making arrangements
for fast dispatching from other (regular career) positions to send these people on
foreign missions.
For success, police assistance programs also require detailed police intelligence
information on the country concerned. It is sometimes overlooked that police
operations need even more detailed intelligence than military operations. It is
prudent to make arrangements for such intelligence gathering and analysis, prior
to an intervention.
Joint exercises are also needed to train military, military police, constabulary
forces, civilian police, justice reform advisors, and emergency aid specialist to
think, communicate and act with greater mutual understanding of each other’s
professions, views and attitudes during peacebuilding operations.
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guatemala
Guatemala
Mayan civilization flourished between the
fourth and eleventh century. Guatemala became
a colony of Spain between 1523 and 1821, and
gained independence in 1840. A mixture of 
civilian and military governments ruled during
the 21st century. In 1954 the us supported local
actors in their overthrow of President Jacobo 
Arbenz Guzmán. The decades that followed were
marked by military coups and fraudulent elec-
tions. This triggered the rise of various left-wing
revolutionary movements. The Guatemalan
regime responded with a brutal counter-insur-
gency and worked with right-wing militias 
including the White Hand (Mano Blanca) and 
the Anticommunist Secret Army (esa) to repress
opposition. Gross income inequality, poverty,
and political inequality continued to fuel the 
rebellion, and a 36-year war raged from 1960
until 1996,taking the lives of 100,000 people and
causing 1 million refugees.
The violence reached its highest levels in the
early 80s when General Efraín Rios Montt came
to power. Although the Guatemalan National 
Revolutionary Unity (urng) was the official
target of counter-insurgency, thousands of civil-
ians were also killed. Official reports show that 
government forces militias were responsible for
over 93 percent of the violence between 1960 
and 1996.
The un mediated efforts between urng and 
the government. The un verified the Compre-
hensive Agreement on Human Rights of 1994
(minugua). 250 Human rights monitors, legal
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In many failed and post-conflict states, police actions are not restricted to
upholding the law, as police are rarely impartial in the political conflicts that
require attention. As a result the police can acquire a reputation for brutality and
excessive violence amongst the public. It is important to attach international
monitors, advisors and trainers to police forces. In most post-conflict situations,
there is a great lack of such international personnel. It is even scarcer than mili-
tary peacekeeping forces. A new code of conduct for the (new) police will help,
particularly if new laws are required while no legislature is yet in place. This code
of conduct can be formulated by new police authorities with the assistance of
international police monitors or advisors.
To check against human rights abuses committed by the police, priority in inter-
national oversight should be given to prevention of physical abuse, arbitrary
detention and gross corruption. The un High Commissioner for Human Rights
has produced manuals that can be used for training and to guide monitors.6
Figure 5.1  Main factors improving basic security
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International military peace forces
International observers
Emergency assistance (food, water, health, housing)
Basic services (energy, water, sanitation)
Public works absorbing unemployed ex-combatants
Effective police services
International constabulary forces
International police monitors, trainers, advisors
Care of refugees and idp’s, protection and resettlement; return of property
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experts, indigenous specialists and police offi-
cers were employed. Following the Agreement
on the Ceasefire of 1996, the un extended its
mission in January 1997 to include verification 
of cessation of hostilities, the separation and
concentration of the forces, and disarmament
and demobilization of urng combatants. 
In May 1997, 155 military observers completed
this mission.
Although democratic elections have taken place,
major politicians are accused of corruption. 
Governments suppress opposition. Since 2001,
the number of assassinations, lynchings, kidnap-
pings, theft, drug trafficking, and prison 
uprisings have all increased. Income inequality
remains very high and 56 percent of the popula-
tion lives below the poverty line. In part, this is
caused by extreme land inequality. In 2001, 
only 1.5 percent of the population owned nearly
two-thirds of the land.
Police reform should not just be a part of general security sector reform, along
with reform of the military and other security organisations.7 The focus of police
in post-conflict societies is often only on regime security, and not on the safety of
individuals. During the war, the police have often been an instrument of oppres-
sion. The objective of police reform should be to create a force capable of uphold-
ing the law and help enforce basic human rights that can be recognised by the citi-
zens as a force for internal peace rather than regime security. The police are the
most visible manifestation of the rule of law in daily civilian life. In the un’s
peace operation in El Salvador, for instance, the reformed police became a source
of citizens’ confidence in the state’s ability to provide security, in part thanks to
reform programmes supported by external donors.
For donors, the behaviour of the police is a good measure for assessing the
government’s compliance with human rights standards. Foreign monitors of the
country’s police inhibit violations and instill some confidence among the popula-
tion. One might widen this observation and infer that international monitoring
of police brutality and corruption would give a good indication of how countries
develop into rule-of-law states, or revert to oppression. Such monitoring
restrains abuse and contributes to peacebuilding. Advisory, training and moni-
toring missions of international police officers encourage domestic police to
improve professional standards and to respect human rights.
Police are the most frequent interface between citizens and the state. A set of five
studies of policing in East African countries showed that there is a pattern of ille-
gitimate political interference and partiality, prompted by the government and by
personal preferences of policemen.8 Excessive use of force, brutality, torture,
corruption of police officers, impunity of misdeeds because of secrecy and lack of
accountability, are all hallmarks of oppressive systems.
Reform of the police and legal sector also requires penal reform. In many places,
squalid, overcrowded prisons keep many people behind bars without fair trials.
Most poor and middle-income countries do not meet basic standards. Unhygienic
conditions and poor medical help breed diseases. Most prisoners are young urban
males who leave prison in a much worse mental and physical condition than
when they were first incarcerated. Suspects are often detained for long periods
before their trials, together with convicted criminals. An inefficient and unjust
penal law system, large backlogs in the courts and overcrowded, squalid prisons
multiply the injustices committed by the organs of the state.
As prisons usually do not re-socialise detainees, but make them even less adapted
to society, alternative sanctions other than prison sentences are needed. This will
also serve to avoid overcrowding.
Monitoring, advice and training of prison guards and managers have to be
provided by donor agencies. Standard minimum rules for the treatment of pris-
oners have been formulated by the un.9 Organisations like Penal Reform Inter-
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El Salvador
El Salvador became independent in 1839. It has
7 million people. In the 21st century it went
through a wide range of military dictatorships.
The root causes of the civil war during 1980-1992
can be found in worsening social circumstances
in the 1970s, which increased opposition against
the governments of Colonel Molina and General
Romero. They retained power by manipulating
elections and brutally repressing opposition
forces.
A group of military officers, supported by the us,
overthrew the regime in 1979. José Napoleón
Duarte of the Christian Democratic Party (pdc)
headed a provisional right-wing government.
Harsh suppression of opposition groups contin-
ued, including frequent killings by death squads.
Infamous was the murder of a critic of the gov-
ernment, Archbishop Romero, in 1980. Follow-
ing this, a major military resistance organization,
fmln, was formed. Civil war erupted between
government forces and the fmln, causing at least
75,000 deaths between 1980 and 1992.
The un Secretary-General assisted in peace
negotiations. The parties reached their first
agreement in 1990 by deciding to ensure respect
for human rights. The Security Council author-
ized an un Observer Mission in El Salvador
(unosal) in 1991 to monitor this. The peace
agreement of Chapultepec (1992) included a
ceasefire, reform and reduction of the armed
forces, establishment of a new civilian police,
and reform of the judicial and electoral system.
unosal monitored and assisted in the imple-
mentation. The un also observed the presiden-
tial and legislative elections in 1994. When the
mandate was completed in 1995, a smaller civil-
ian mission (minusal) continued until 1997.
El Salvador could avoid renewed civil war since
1992. The ceasefire held and most reform plans
were implemented. The United Nations played a
central role. Of great importance was successful
police reform. With the help of the international
community, El Salvador seems to have suc-
ceeded in creating a relatively stable post-conflict
state.º
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national based in London can assist countries and donors with expert advice. The
need of such oversight and advice was once more clearly demonstrated by the
Abu Graib prison scandal in Iraq during us operations in 2004.
Prisoners of war are protected under the Geneva Conventions. International
oversight of pow’s by the Red Cross and human rights organisations (like
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International) is crucial. In the fight against
terrorist networks, which are non-state actors, a new type of ‘pow’ has emerged
that does not fit neatly into established international legal standards and, as a
result, could end up being denied basic human rights. This makes oversight by
human rights and humanitarian aid organisations all the more important.
Reform programs of the police, penitentiary institutions and the courts system
should be integrated in the wider Judicial and Security Sector reform (jssr).10
After an armistice or peace, the population expects immediate peace and security.
But instead, many people may experience an increase of insecurity. During the
war, violence may have been very brutal and intense, but after war, new forms of
violent insecurity arise. Post-war violence undermines reconstruction, state
institutions, political settlement, foreign investment and economic progress.
Personal insecurity seriously threatens refugees, women and children. The
violence of the war is now supplanted by criminal social, economic, ethnic, reli-
gious, political and other violence. Only in case a post-war government rapidly
imposes some reasonably just order which, under the circumstances, is consid-
ered acceptable by the population, with a monopoly of armed force for the state
(if necessary with temporary military rule), can a post-conflict crime wave be
curtailed or even avoided.
Crucial to an effective secure order after combat ceases, is also that the political
settlement underlying the cease-fire offers realistic hope to the defeated parties
that they will be able to participate in a new future of the country. Magnanimity
towards defeated parties, but from a position of strength, is the key to peace. If
former warring parties that have lost the war, now feel very insecure, they will
act as spoilers of the peace and try to win back political power through violence or
even terrorism. Such political violence now undermines (new) state institutions
and the government. Sometimes this political struggle is transformed into an
ethnic or religious struggle. Part of this post-conflict violence may also be
vengeance killings.
Next to continued political violence, economic violence threatens peace and state
building. Robbery, looting, kidnappings, trafficking in drugs, weapons and peo-
ple, and also white collar crime, robbing state institutions (enterprises) of their
capital, like in post-communist states, will seriously undermine public trust in
new authorities and foreign peacebuilders. This economic violence is often mixed
with political violence. In most cases studied by Call et al., homicides, kidnappings
and robberies surged in the first 2-3 years after an armistice or peace agreement and
then ‘stabilized’ at a high level for about two or three years before declining.
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In addition, social violence tends to rise, partly as attempts to strengthen or pro-
tect group identity, when a minority feels endangered by the new ‘order’. Another
form of social violence is common crime and youth gang violence. Unemployed,
young males, broken social networks and displacement foster this crime wave.
Family violence, especially against women and children, also increases after war
due to demobilised, home-coming soldiers, who are unemployed, frustrated,
traumatized and inclined to anti-social behaviour. Of particular concern are
brainwashed demobilized child soldiers.
The conclusion is: after war, tough police measures, with large-scale military back
up, are needed to halt the probable crime rise. If reliable police is not available, the
policing will have to be done by military ground forces. If there is no functioning
government in place, temporary military rule will be needed. International 
organisations and aid donors have to take into account that law and order is an
overwhelming top priority for the population and a condition for reconstruction.
5.5 wider securit y sector reform
Reform of the old security sector (police, armed forces, intelligence) is needed to
get effective maintenance of the law and basic security. Demobilizing warring
parties, disarming them, and reintegrating soldiers and military into a function-
ing economy, or recruiting them for reformed police and defence forces, is a huge
and urgent task. This ddr (demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration) has
become a standard component of peace building. Demobilized soldiers may join
irregular private armies or crime syndicates. A large part of the demobilized male
labour supply should be absorbed by reformed police forces, legally regulated
private security services, and the construction and transportation sectors.
The armed services, police, detention and intelligence services require a program
of professionalism, purges (vetting), and pluriformity (to lessen dominance by
certain ethnic or religious groups). Especially the police forces and the prison
guards need basic human rights training, as we saw in section 5.4.
Reform of intelligence services restricts their activities, puts them under strict
legal obligations and civilian/political/legal supervision, and makes them
professional, politically neutral and not involved in repression. They have to
obey the (new) constitution and human rights standards.
In small countries, and when there is relatively large donor assistance, it may be
feasible to create new armed services. In larger countries, and in case of little
donor support, it will be better to purge only the war criminals and reintegrate
the military by using as much as possible existing personnel. In all cases, the
forces should be made accountable.
Security Sector Reform clarifies the mission and changes the size, organisation
and civilian supervision of the services. Successful reform also requires a new
budget. The laws applying to the services need to be modernized. All services
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rwanda
Rwanda  The 9.9 million Rwandans are pre-
dominantly Hutu with a significant Tutsi and
small Twa minority. Ethnic tensions date back to
the colonial and pre-colonial era. Belgians had
appointed Tutsis in large numbers to influential
governmental positions. They resisted the 
Belgian policy shift towards enhancing the 
position of hitherto subordinated Hutus. 
Hutus responded to Tutsi opposition with 
massacres and forced mass departures.
The Hutu party parmenthu won the 1961 
elections and Kayibanda was voted president.
Rwanda gained independence from the Bel-
gium-administered un trusteeship in 1962.
Kabiyana executed several thousand Tutsis and
educated Hutus during his rule. In 1972, Kay-
ibanda initiated an exodus of Tutsis in response
to Burundi’s president Micombero’s Hutu sup-
pression.
In 1973, the Hutu Habyarimana overthrew
Kabiyana in a military coup and established the
Second Republic. The one-party state expulsed,
detained and tortured opponents without trial.
Uganda responded by forcing 600,000 refugees
back into Rwanda. Rwandan forces withstood
their return and exiles remained in Uganda.
Rapidly deteriorating living conditions resulted
in a call for political reform.
Reform negotiations commenced in 1990 with
the Franco-African summit. 
The Tutsi militia Rwanda Patriotic Front (rpf)
meanwhile invaded the country. Hutus,
united in le réseau zero, propagated civil vio-
lence against Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
The 1993 Arusha Peace Accords created a
formal ceasefire and required a transitional
government.
Inability to establish a government of
national unity, and the shooting of Habyari-
mana’s airplane unleashed the gruesome ‘100
days’ of Rwandan genocide. Ten percent of the
population, perhaps up to a million Tutsis and
moderate Hutus, were slaughtered by army
forces and civilians. The small un Assistance
Mission for Rwanda was unable to keep the
peace. Under Kagame’s leadership, the rpf took
over Rwanda and 2 million Hutus fled the coun-
try. He turned the country into a one-party state
and holds the presidency to date. Kagame’s fight
against Hutu militants led him to take a leading
part in the wars in Congo. Rwandan troops
retreated after the signing of a peace agreement
in 2002.
Peace negotiations resulted in agreements
emphasising inclusiveness and representation.
Justice and reconciliation is supported by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, tra-
ditional Gacaca ‘courts’, and the National Unity
and Reconciliation commission.
Peace and stability remain precarious. The inclu-
sion of Hutus is limited under Kagame’s rule.
The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation iden-
tifies several future challenges: a lingering geno-
cidal ideology, better reconstruction of institu-
tions, public security, and scarce resources.
Rwanda experiences high population pressure.
The genocide demonstrated that un interven-
tions are ineffective when improperly funded
and early warnings by experts on the ground are
not taken seriously.
R w a n d a
Ruhengeri
Kibuye
Gabiro
Kakitumba
Kigali
have to come under legitimate political superiors. Incorporating and merging
former enemies, downsizing the forces, purging the worst elements, and training
the remainder to behave more professionally takes much time and large
resources. In some small and externally safe states, it has even been possible to
entirely abolish military forces: Costa Rica, Panama and Haiti.
When a national army was able to entirely defeat opposing forces, military
reform is likely to be limited, as the forces start with a strong position in the new
era. Armies of rebel forces that have been victorious are likely to impose their
structure and political vision on the new emerging state. When a war is ended by
intervention by foreign peacekeeping forces, it is difficult to merge the standing
opposing forces into new services, as neither side was victorious. Both may
silently wait for the international peace forces to leave and keep their weapons
and adherents, even informally and secretly, to wait for a new chance to change
the map of the peace agreement, or start the war all over again.
When security, police and judiciary leaders representing the old system are very
recalcitrant, political leaders often choose to just reshuffle bureaucracies and
adopt new rules without practical consequences for abusive and corrupt
personnel. International training courses for the old, wrong persons have little
effect in such cases.
5.6 court reform
Court reform enhances the integrity, independence, impartiality, responsiveness
and efficiency of the courts, improves the professionalism of judges and clerks
through training, reduces bureaucracy, simplifies procedures, improves libraries,
information systems and court administrations, the budget process, buildings,
equipment, and so on. A wider but related notion is improvement of judicial
administration, which also includes public prosecutors, defence lawyers, legal aid
and pro-bono legal assistance for the poor. Court reform can also be seen as a
threat to the power elite, particularly if the elite have to fear independent verdicts
against corruption and oppression. In such a situation, assistance to improving
procedural law or other smaller steps may sow some seeds for future progress.
The independence and professionalism of legal officers, especially judges, is
increased not only by training, but particularly by financial autonomy; better
procedures for selection and appointment; strict rules on fixed terms, retirement
ages or ‘life’ tenure; discipline and impeachment rules and all other measures to
shield them from the pressure of corruption, politics, media and momentary
public emotions.
Improvement of the legal profession is also achieved through professional training
and the strengthening of law societies, bar associations and information systems.
Particularly important are human rights courses and training on gender issues
(especially the rights of women).
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Access to the law is improved by lowering the often very high mental, social,
political and financial barriers for the population. It is usually necessary to raise
the public’s awareness of individual rights, particularly after long periods of
oppression. Alternative dispute resolution procedures, ombudsmen and simple
local courts with easy access are important to raise confidence in the legal sector.
Training defence lawyers, encouraging basic, low-cost legal aid institutions (‘law
shops’) and training paralegals can be a meaningful beginning of legal reform. It
increases the demand from the population for better administration of justice,
and exerts a reformist pressure on ineffective, authoritarian systems.11
Fair trial requires independent professional courts, a mechanism to clearly advise
the defendant on the charges against him and the right to legal defence and
representation (if necessary, pro bono). The defendant’s other rights, such as an
interpreter, appeal to a higher court at least in penal cases, and public trial (with
certain exceptions), should also be upheld.12
Focussing only on the formal legal system to the exclusion of customary law 
and forms of dispute settlement embedded in the culture of the population
decreases the likelihood of success. Traditional forms of conflict resolution by
village elders, lay judges and arbiters should not be disregarded as not meeting
international standards. Due to the poverty and culture of a country, it may 
still take decades of development before there is professional justice comparable
to oecd standards.
The purpose of assisting other countries with building a legal order should, of
course, not be to ‘impose’ such oecd government standards, but to assist the
population in achieving its own aspirations of (legal) well-being (insofar as these
desires are not inconsistent with international law and human rights). The legal
system should not be imposed from the outside, but should aim to reflect the
consensus of the population on their most urgent needs: their most basic rights
to life and freedom of expression.
In most poor countries or countries in transition from authoritarianism to
modernity, not only the coercive forces but also the judiciary have been guilty 
of appalling human rights violations. International and national civilian
oversight encourages improvements and reform. Human rights ombudspersons
will help. Police oversight offices are needed. Just setting up separate human
rights advocacy institutions is not enough, as they may get little grip on corrupt
organisations. Very important is independent journalism with help of foreign
media and aid foundations, as the media stimulate investigations into police
misconduct and judicial corruption.
Gender equality and reduction of abusive practices have to be tackled via various
avenues. Not only politics and old laws prove difficult to change, but culture and
religion are especially stubborn. International pressure, advocacy, and domestic
women groups will help to change practices gradually. Muslim countries are most
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resistant to employing women as police and judicial officers. Female foreign legal
experts who act respectfully can help to change attitudes.
Most court systems are severely understaffed and many legal officers are poorly
educated, prone to corruption, and not impartial in the political and ethnic/
religious disputes. It takes a long time to reform and retrain sitting judges. It may 
be hard to discharge hopeless cases due to judiciary independence. Legal inde-
pendence can be a road block against legal impartiality. In that case, international
judges are needed in appellate courts to stop serious violations of human rights 
by lower courts. In Kosovo it was even necessary to allow the un head of
mission to revoke judicial decisions which discriminated the Serb minority. 
The ideal of separation of powers can work in practice against human rights and
peace, when crucial offices are abused. It is vital to prevent such clashes between
principles in practice by putting the judiciary system as soon as possible under
new oversight committees composed of reformist domestic functionaries 
and international judges. Very helpful for reform is training new female judges,
as many abuses relate to suppression of women and gender inequality.
Police, judicial and prison reforms are a ‘tripod’. If one leg remains very weak, the
system will not stand up. In his study, Call shows that most cases of post-conflict
judicial reform have been very inadequate, and even harder to do than police
reform. undp concluded in 2002 that justice reform was a blatantly missed
opportunity in Bosnia.13 “Excessive emphasis on constitutions, laws, and formal
authority is misplaced. Legal reforms are insufficient without institutions that
can guarantee rights, protect citizens, and enforce laws”1 4 Written guarantees
often do little to protect endangered groups in practice. Legal reforms can be
hampered by legal personnel trained in the old system, clinging to their own
political and ethnic or religious views, privileges and old habits.
Reforming police, other security organisations, and legal personnel is not just a
matter of pushing recruits through courses or inviting judges to a donor country
to see how things should be done Western style. Recruit training and retraining
of vetted personnel will not have lasting results if there is no continued mentor-
ing, supervision, and further training, at multiple levels, during several years.
Not just law books and knowledge, but skills, attitudes, mindsets and values have
to be improved.
5.7 major criminals and war crimes
After the war, the new authorities are likely to be challenged by political and
military war criminals, as well as various other adversaries which do not accept
the cease-fire, such as terrorists. There is also likely to be very virulent crime that
is not political in motivation. The ‘criminal sector’ has to be fought fiercely to
bring back normality, stability and order. Emergency powers are needed to stamp
it out. ‘Transitional justice’ and rehabilitation of the legal order can only develop
well after criminal profiteers of chaos under control.
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In civil wars, state order is not only attacked by warring parties for political rea-
sons. Non-political criminals use the chaos of war to loot, murder and rape, and to
grab high positions in the government or in state-run companies. In a number of
wars, political leaders have let criminal gangs free to murder, loot and rape, as the
leaders gambled that such destruction would serve their own purposes. These 
criminal gangs are not so much motivated by nationalism, ideology or religion,
but by the opportunities that the chaos of war and the destruction of the state 
(or tribal) order offer for criminal enrichment. Violent hooligans use war to
widen their repertoire of crimes, often posing as ‘militia’. An example is the
Arkan Tigers in the war in the former Yugoslavia. They portrayed themselves 
as a nationalist militia but avoided military combat against professional soldiers.
Their prime purpose was to loot, rape and kill weak civilians. Such groups are
also found in African wars and in the Middle East. So-called nationalism is then
replaced by extremist tribalism or violent religious fundamentalism to fool
observers into believing these ‘fighters’ have some sort of ideology to motivate
them. The mandate of professional military peace enforcers should include
protecting the population from such thugs and hunt them down without undue
respect for their ‘political’ or ‘religious’ ideology. Otherwise, they undercut the
entire peacebuilding program.
Most, but not all, of such criminals during war were already criminals before the
war. During the war they grabbed ample opportunities for violent crime.
But also regular, disciplined bureaucrats and military officers can turn into the
most serious war criminals, some of them ‘white collar’ or ‘clean hands’ mass
murderers who ‘only’ gave implicit instructions, or allowed ‘proxy killers’ to run
rampant, or followed and delegated orders from above.
It is particularly bitter to the population if war criminals are given amnesty as part
of a cease-fire agreement or peace deal. This is one of the harshest examples of the
trade-off between peace and justice. This is sometimes hard to avoid. Distant
theoreticians believe that peace and justice are basically the same. Making such
compromises is one of the hardest tasks of the diplomatic mediators, political
leaders and peacemakers, which often get them into trouble afterwards, once the
situation has stabilised.
In this respect it is worth noting that Call et al. did not find a clear relation
between, on the one hand, the degree to which war crimes and past human rights
abuses were dealt with by the courts after an armistice, and on the other, the
confidence of the population in the post war legal/judiciary system.15
In some cases, amnesty as part of a peace agreement did not block legal and judi-
cial reform. In others, lack of justice regarding past crimes undermined confi-
dence in the future, as could be expected. The eight cases analyzed by Call failed
to establish a clear connection between justice for past crimes and the quality of
the justice reform. This needs to be further investigated in other case studies.
111
(re) building the rule of law
5.8 terrorists
Terrorism can seriously disturb peacebuilding and rule-of-law assistance, 
particularly in the early phase, when the constitution, main institutions and
confidence of the population in a new future are still very vulnerable. Terrorism
is usually the small-scale use of indiscriminate violence against mostly civilian
targets, with the purpose of getting wide media attention to spread fear every-
where and create chaos. The circle of fear is many times larger than the actual
number of victims. Terrorism counts on world-wide media exposure to spread
the fear and demoralise domestic and foreign audiences.
The ideological motivation of terrorism varies from secular ethnicism and
nationalism to religious and ideological extremism. Terrorism can also thrive
without much ideological or religious motivation16 for non-political, non-reli-
gious, non-ethnic but economic gains that are expected by those who threaten
disaster to civilians if the authorities or other governments do not give in to
financial demands.
Even though terrorism is clearly recognised by the public and media, it is some-
times argued that it is difficult to define. It is said that one man’s terrorist is
another man’s freedom fighter. This is a common error of thought. Terrorism was
clearly defined by the un Security Council in 2004:
(Terrorism consists of)
“criminal acts (…) committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons
(…) intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or to
abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the
international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism …”17
Terrorism and transnational crime go hand in hand, as many terrorist networks
also engage in other criminal activities to finance their operations.
For the new interim authorities of a post-conflict country, fighting terrorism is a
major task that can easily compromise reconstruction. A comparison with a
medical approach to serious disease may clarify the point: heavy radiation treat-
ment or chemotherapy is used against metastasised aberrant cells in an organism
that is already extremely weak from other diseases. If the therapy is too strong
and broad, it damages healthy tissue and changes its dna in such a manner that
different cancers spread even more rapidly. The cure lies in precision, but the
quandary is how to pinpoint and remove the terrorist cells. As this survey is not a
study in counterterrorism, we have to leave this important question18 and move
on to other subjects.
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5.9 private securit y firms
States, private companies and other organisations often hire non-state forces, i.e.,
private security services, private soldiers, early retired military and soldiers from
other states who seek gainful employment on their own. This ‘outsourcing’ or
privatisation of police and military tasks is age-old. A newer form is represented
by private security companies, which are serving across the globe. Their tasks
range from logistic support, training personnel, running prisons, removing
mines, protection of officials, even advising combatant officers during hostilities,
to actively fighting terrorists and participating in war operations in Africa and the
Persian Gulf area on behalf of governments or oil and mining companies. In the
us-led operations in Iraq, private security organisations were given a major role,
engaging tens of thousands of personnel from a wide range of countries. These
companies act as contractors and subcontractors of governments, to help solve
the lack of government personnel.
The questions are: under whose legal powers do private security companies
work, and what is their status under national and international law? Who is
accountable for possible crimes? Who is responsible when personnel are taken
prisoner, wounded or killed? The legal status can be clear if the un, other official
organisations or governments enter into legal contracts (for instance, for de-
mining of roads, or guarding officials and offices). Then, official responsibility is
taken, and rules of engagement for legitimate use of arms are determined.
5.10 corruption
A prevalent threat against the rule of law, undermining many states, is corrup-
tion. Resources are channelled away from use for public well-being into private
pockets. It seriously distorts decisions which government officials have to make,
as well as the daily actions of police, the verdicts pronounced by courts, the main-
tenance of rules in prisons, etc. Corruption is a transnational, global phenome-
non. Illicit acquisition of personal wealth and other advantages damages demo-
cratic institutions, socio-economic progress, the rule of law, and human rights.
Corruption is often seen as an endemic problem in recipient countries. It is, of
course, also a serious weakness among many donor institutions. Sub-contracting
many peacebuilding activities to private bodies or governmental units without
strict oversight causes an unknown percentage of available peacebuilding funds
to be lost.
Prevention and eradication of corruption is a responsibility of all states, non-
governmental institutions, private companies and citizens. The un convention
against corruption of 2003 was signed by 140 states and entered info force in
2005, after ratification by at least 30.
The treaty introduces codes of conduct for civil servants, rules for public spend-
ing, auditing of the public and private sector, measures against money laundering
and rules for the finances of political parties.
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Sri Lanka became independent from the British
in 1948. Its 21 million inhabitants are 75 percent
Sinhalese Buddhist in the South and Centre, 
12 percent Tamil Hindu’s mostly in the North
and East, and 7 percent Muslim. The country 
has reached a high literacy. Yet poverty is wide-
spread and economic inequality is high. It is 
ravaged by an ethnic conflict since 1983 which
caused more than 70,000 deaths and at least
200,000 displaced.
Democratic elections after independence
resulted in a Sinhalese majority government
which ignored the demands of Tamil parties for
language rights and autonomy. Government
policies to reduce access for Tamils to universi-
ties and government jobs and colonisation of the
East with Sinhalese furthered Tamil radicalism,
striving for an independent Eelam homeland.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte)
became the main movement. In 1987, an Indian
Peace Keeping Force was brought into the North
East. The Sinhalese saw India, with its large
Tamil population in the South, as a threat and
forced India to depart, leaving the ltte in con-
trol, which created a ‘de facto’ state in the North.
Violent attacks on Sinhalese forces, killing hun-
dreds of policemen and using suicide bombers to
target political leaders, branded all Tamil resist-
ance as terrorism. The Sri Lankan government
also committed serious abuse with extra-judicial
killings and disappearances of many Tamils.
A 2002 ceasefire between the ltte and govern-
ment, facilitated by Norway, saw some relative
peace during four years, but was broken. A Sri
Lankan Monitoring Mission, of mainly Scan-
dinavians, records violations. Subsequent peace
talks failed as the demands by the ltte for an
Eelam would require a constitutional change
that the Sinhalese nationalists in parliament
refuse to approve. Excluding key Sinhalese 
political leaders weakens the peace process as
there are many internal divisions among the
Tamil and Sinhalese groups. The ltte withdrew
from the peace process in 2003. Tamil forces 
split in 2004 between Tamils in the North and
the East. The peace process also caused a crisis 
in the government.
A tsunami hit Sri Lanka in 2004, killing about
35,000 people. Hope that this disaster would
help to build peace faded as the government was
blamed for distributing more aid to the Sinhalese
than to the Tamils.
The 2005 presidential elections were won by
Sinhalese nationalists but were boycotted by the
ltte. Most Tamils may be satisfied with auton-
omy to give peace and stability. The current Sin-
halese government may be aiming for a military
victory on the ltte rather than a political solu-
tion. The ltte may not give in on its demands
for an independent Eelam. The international
community seems frustrated with the return to
violence. Economic incentives used by donors in 
the recent peace process remained without the
desired effect.
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The treaty is a big step forwards as it brings corrupt actions under international
penal law and regulates recovery from other countries and restitution of assets
which have been acquired by corruption. It works, of course, only to the extent
various states and their legal systems will apply the treaty vigorously in practice.
5.11 international organisations
The codes of conduct, manuals and policies for legal sector reform mentioned
above show how large the involvement is of various international organisations
in promotion of the rule of law. The un Secretariat and its related institutions,
however, lack adequate numbers of personnel and external experts to carry out
many necessary reforms. Judges, prosecutors, police experts, defence lawyers,
prison experts, constitutional lawyers, civil and criminal law advisors and
managers with international experience to organise these activities are in short
supply. They have to be recruited for their knowledge of different legal systems,
cultures, languages, attitudes towards other populations and social skills. (In the
state-building operation in Iraq, the us contracted many inexperienced young
professionals who followed us standards without understanding the country
they were working in.)
Experienced international experts are often needed at short notice but have to be
sent on rather long missions. It is difficult to meet all these criteria at once.
Rapidly deployable legal reform experts should ideally be made available by legal
and judicial institutions and academic and research institutes for various brief
and, if need be, reiterating missions abroad. Their missions can be organized by
national and international legal reform organisations. They can also employ suit-
able persons who have just entered (early) retirement, even though such experts
may lose effectiveness after a few years.
The un Secretary-General made some general proposals in 2004 to the Security
Council to strengthen the role of the un in peacebuilding and legal reform.19
Finland, Germany and Jordan tried to specify these proposals further, noting that
the un Secretariat’s work in this area was fragmented over eleven divisions and
agencies. The three countries aimed to concentrate capacity in one unit managed
by an Under-Secretary-General. The un Summit of 2005 established a Peace-
building Commission to strengthen the efforts of the un, major international
organisations, and the policies of many member states contributing to peace-
building (See section 2.4).
The main source of finance for development aid used for peacebuilding is,
however, not the un Secretariat, but the European Union and its members.
Chapter 7 deals with eu policies and programmes for these purposes. A small but
rising portion is devoted to improving respect for human rights and reforming
domestic legal systems in third countries. The eu has the means and policies to
grow into the main donor of legal reform aid.
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Since the second half of the 1990’s, several other international organisations have
added peacebuilding to their programmes. The un Development Programme, the
World Bank Group, and other important sources of development finance have
widened their lending policies to finance institutional development, which may
reduce the risks that countries fall back into violent conflict. Some of these peace-
building programmes also finance legal reform projects.
The European Commission published in 2003 its Handbook on Promoting Good
Governance,20 with tools to design rule of law assistance for specific cases. Many
ngos are also active in this area. The Vera Institute designed the Global Guide to
Performance Indicators across the Justice Sector, which helps to measure the
state of affairs in various countries.21
The International Centre for Transitional Justice22 in New York and Cape Town
can help countries where massive human rights abuses have taken place. It gives
training courses and publishes advice for various post-conflict situations. 
It assists countries to account for past atrocities and prosecute perpetrators by
documenting massive human rights abuses, establishing truth commissions and
advising on reform of corrupted institutions. This centre also facilitates reconcili-
ation. It is financed by official national and international as well as private donor
institutions. The Centre’s activities and budget are still very small in comparison
to the needs.
The un and the International Association of Prosecutors have produced hand-
books intended to guide the reconstruction of a public prosecution service after
hostilities have ended.23
An international Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement officers was already set
by the un in 1979.2 4 The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
and Human Rights in the Administration of Justice were formulated in 1985.25 In
1984, the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment was adopted.26
5.12 the chance of success of legal reform
The ultimate success of legal reform depends on the answers to several questions:
– Is legal reform encouraged by the government?
– Is it demanded and driven by leading persons within the legal system?
– To what extent does the reform reflect the wishes, norms and values of the
population?
– Do the reforms aim to gradually approach internationally accepted standards
of justice?
– Are international donors willing to continue adequate support in the long run?
The pattern of answers differs of course by country.
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Legal sector reform can be an analysed in terms of supply and demand as
discussed in section 3.4: Who comprises the demand side – the leaders, institu-
tions and population of the country under reform? Or is reform being pushed
(demanded) from the outside by influential donors who are also the suppliers? 
If domestic demand is low but foreign supply is high, legal reform is given little
value by the country concerned and does not take root. In Latin America, there is
considerable domestic demand for legal reform. In Africa, legal reform is urged
mainly by international donors. In many Asian countries which emphasize
economic growth, domestic demand is strongest for modernisation of commer-
cial law, but less so for other areas.
Fragmented, individual and short-term activities of donors lead to a lot of waste
and little lasting return on aid activities. It is important to arrange meetings of the
recipient institutions with all relevant bilateral donors, international organisa-
tions and ngo’s. Such coordination meetings should outline priorities, set the
agenda and divide the tasks among those present. The meetings should be chaired
by the un, the eu, a regional organisation like the African Union, the Organiza-
tion of American States or the Association of South East Asian Nations (asean),
or an important ngo, like a professional international legal organisation. Donor
coordination is often best designed in a practical manner by the countries most
involved in the particular case. An example is the joint effort of Danish, German
and Dutch embassies in Uganda, which rotated the chairing of such legal and
judicial reform assistance for several years in the early 21st century in agreement
with the Ugandan Justice, Law and Order Secretariat.
A well-functioning legal system might be depicted as a series of interconnected
barrels with liquids streaming from one to the other. The capacity of the system
is determined by the holes in the various barrels and the leaks in the pipes. Clever
reform starts with an analysis of the entire system and fixes the lowest cracks
first. Frequently, legal reform projects try with little effect to remove a very visi-
ble bottleneck, but the system leaks badly elsewhere. Improving police investiga-
tive capacity to the point where a very weak public prosecutor’s office is overbur-
dened with cases makes little sense. Enacting magnificent modern laws while the
judges are corrupt will not greatly improve the administration of justice. Effective
reform starts with a precise diagnosis of the most urgent leaks and bottlenecks.
Success or failure in establishing secure order and rule of law after violent conflict
can be estimated by measuring some indicators.27 The success of the military
tasks in securing order can be indicated by periodical reports on insurgency casu-
alties, domestic and foreign troop casualties, political violence incidents, and the
perception by the public of national interior security. Success of police tasks is
indicated by violent crime rates and estimates of trafficking in drugs, people,
weapons, and burglaries, as well as police casualties, and reporting by interna-
tional police monitors. Crucial is the perception by the public of a decrease of
street violence.
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Success of justice reforms is measurable in terms of increasing access to legal
advice and to local courts, larger numbers of verdicts, shorter pre-trial detention,
shorter waiting periods, larger numbers of prosecutors, judges and court clerks,
less corruption, and various improvements in the penal and corrective institu-
tions.
As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, there is an optimal time frame or
‘window of opportunity’ of several weeks to months to get a country on track.
The population is hopeful. Defeated war leaders and black marketers are in hiding
or on the run. Spoilers of the peace may need some time to lick their wounds and
regroup before they can disturb peacebuilding. If the forces of peacebuilding are
slow to arrive, this ‘golden hour’ to get the country on track may be lost. Later on,
it will be difficult to get the cooperation of all parties for a better re-start of the
country’s future.
5.13 human rights and state building
The ultimate purpose of building up rule of law is respect for human rights. The
universality of human rights has been reconfirmed many times by the un
member states. Five human rights conventions have been signed by most of the
192 un members since the world organisation was formed in 1945.
The un’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was not binding, but
declared human rights to be universal indeed. The later International Covenants
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, and the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of the same year, are based on the same conviction, which is elab-
orated in these treaties. Universality was reconfirmed at world-wide un confer-
ences in Tehran (1968) and Vienna (1993). In 2005, the un members reaffirmed:
“that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually rein-
forcing (…) While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, all states, regardless of their political,
economic and cultural systems, have the duty to promote and protect all human rights and funda-
mental freedoms.”28
So much is clear. But the institutions to enforce human rights on a global level are
a faint reflection of these ideals.
In 2005, the un abolished its Human Rights Commission because its work was
deemed ineffective. Membership of countries which were frequent abusers of
human rights made the Commission a political battleground where many
members tried to soften reports critical of their own actions.
The new un Human Rights Council, set up to replace and improve on the
Commission in 2006, is composed of 47 member states. Its work began in late
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east timor
East Timor Located in Southeast Asia, this
half-island was a colony of Portugal. In 1975, it
was invaded by the Indonesian army and incor-
porated as a province. Gross human rights 
violations took place. The number of deaths is
estimated between 100,000 and 250,000.
The United Nations condemned the occupation
by Indonesia as illegal, but took no action to free
the country.
In a referendum held in 1999, an overwhelming
majority of East Timor voted for independence.
The Indonesian army and militias did not accept
this and launched a violent campaign, causing
thousands of deaths, displacements of more
than three quarters of the population and
destruction of the infrastructure.
The un Mission in East Timor (unamet),
established to oversee the referendum, lacked
the mandate to stop this. An international 
military force led by Australia (interfet) was
authorized by the un Security Council in
September 1999 to provide security to the
population. Following this intervention, the 
un started a peacebuilding mission to encour-
age institutions for a viable state. The United
Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor (untaet) was empowered to exercise 
all legislative and executive authority between
1999 and 2002.
East Timor became an independent state. 
The un did not depart but continued to provide
assistance to core administrative structures, 
and sent extra civilian advisers, police advisers
and human rights officers to East Timor.
untaet was seen as one of the most far-reach-
ing peacebuilding missions in the history of the
United Nations. Its mandate included establish-
ment of law and order; setting up an effective
administration; assisting in the development 
of civil and social services; coordination and
delivery of humanitarian aid; rehabilitation and
development assistance; supporting capacity-
building for self-government; and encouraging
conditions for sustainable development. 
This mission ended in 2002.
East Timor was widely regarded as a very
successful peacebuilding operation. Interna-
tional assistance was large compared to
other cases. The absence of a judiciary
system hampered the un in the beginning.
After completion of the un peacebuilding
operation, violence erupted again in 2006
when disgruntled military revolted. After
37 casualties and after 155,000 people had
been driven from their homes, a second
intervention led by Australia (‘Operation
Astute’) was necessary to stabilize the
country and its democratically elected
government. New elections held in 2007 led
to a loss of the leading party Fretilin and
gave a majority to an alliance of opposition
parties. About 10 percent of the population
was still living in refugee conditions.
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2006. Members are elected by a majority vote from the un General Assembly.
Membership lasts 3 years. A country can serve two consecutive terms. Compared
to the previous Human Rights Commission, this council will meet more
frequently and will be able to discuss urgent questions sooner.
The General Assembly will take the track record of countries which are candi-
dates for membership into account. Candidates have to state their own agenda for
improvement. This will reduce the opportunities for notorious regimes that
serve on the Council to block meaningful action against their own violations.
Many such regimes served on the Human Rights Commission in the past, and
some even chaired it during periods of gross violations in their own states,
undermining the credibility of the un.
All new members will now undergo a periodical review of their own human
rights record during their period on the council. The un General Assembly can
remove a member with a 2/3 majority in case of serious, lasting violations of the
human rights treaties. On the downside, however, it should be noted that a
membership of 47 countries is too large to be very effective. There is no clear,
new sanctions mechanism which the Council can use against serious perpetra-
tors of mass suppression. Among the first members, there are again several noto-
rious violators of the un’s basic human rights treaties. Still, the new Council
offers a new chance to improve international respect for human rights. This
respect is essential for the future of peacebuilding and legal reform.
As there is no world state with an effective global legal order that is enforced by a
‘world police’ and effective global courts, human rights for all the world’s peoples
remain an abstract ideal, far removed from the daily life of many of the world’s
billions of poor and oppressed people.
Human rights can be enforced by national courts in developed nation-states and
by regional international systems that are part of strong international legal
regimes. The best example is the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
It has legal power over the member governments for as far as they have ratified
the applicable treaty provisions and have surrendered these sovereign powers to
this court.
It is often believed that human rights are a ‘natural right’, a condition that is owed to
people by virtue of their mere existence. It is a sobering thought that the level of re-
spect for human rights in most oecd member states is historically and geographi-
cally quite exceptional. Most of these rights are violated massively in other coun-
tries outside the oecd area by non-democratic or outright criminal governments.
Human rights do not descend from the heavens upon all human beings as ‘natu-
ral law’ or transcendental rights. Upholding human rights is the work of strong
institutions that are part of effective states. Historically, most peoples have not
enjoyed many rights. Citizens’ rights have grown only slowly, along with the
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growth of the legal order within modern, highly developed states. It is perhaps
arbitrary to point out historical developments that signify the birth of ‘the’
modern state, such as the often-mentioned peace of Westphalia (1648).
Supremacy of law to curtail arbitrariness of rulers was historically achieved by
strong middle classes (feudal and patrician) that demanded stability, property
rules and legal certainty, limited taxes and influence on the appointment of
rulers. The influence of commercial patricians led to the end of feudalism in a
number of countries and to a separation and balancing of different powers accord-
ing to the ‘trias politica’.
This was a West European development that has been followed in many but not
all oecd countries. The question remains whether this state model and the
‘universal’ human rights that follow from it, can find universal application in
very different societies.
States evolved historically under the influence of a multitude of physical and
immaterial factors. The idea that without the state there is a war of every man
against every man (Hobbes) is a thought that does not reflect reality, however.
Even in very violent civil wars, the large majority of the population is not
engaged in violence and tries to eke out a living while shielding itself as much as
possible from the war that it did not want at all. It is the younger males, recruited
by older leaders, who fight the war and do the killing.
Most humans in a ‘stateless state’ are not ‘wolves unto themselves,’ i.e. animals
living in small packs, constantly attacking each other; they evolved as social
beings in small societies that were usually rather peaceful within themselves, but
defensive if not aggressive against others.
Social contract theory (Rousseau, Rawls) which also leads to a strong state with
full human rights is a set of ideas which encourages rational thought about
justice, but it is not a reflection of historical reality, as humans do not freely
choose the society they live in (except, to a very limited extent, free migrants).
Humans are after all simply born into a society, which teaches and imposes its
existing rules, whether they are just or unjust from a philosophical point of 
view.
The rule of law is a highly developed legal order, and legal order is an aspect of
social order, which is based on a stable and legitimate power order. The origins of
social order can be found in the ways in which groups of animals live together
and maintain their internal and external security in order to survive. The rela-
tively simple state of nature, or natural state for humans with little education and
civilisation, evolved slowly, originally probably from groups of a few dozens to
hundreds of human beings living together.
In such small group societies, the institutions of social order were visible and
concrete: the chief, the group of elders, clan heads, patriarchs or matriarchs. There
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were clear unwritten rules about human relations and personal and communal
property rights. People can identify easily with this ‘state’, which is personified
by important people, ceremonial events and chiefs who uphold the political,
social and religious rules often at the same time.
Larger, more complex societies of several thousands of people developed from
the small tribal ones, and perhaps about 10,000 years ago the first societies devel-
oped with more complex institutions to maintain the agricultural and complex
irrigation systems, constructing large cities with urban civilisations, serving also
the rulers’ desires for cultural glory and political expansion.
The modern state with strong bureaucracies is by itself not an inherently good
achievement. Examples abound of strong modern states with extensive legal
systems, committing heinous (‘barbarian’) acts of aggression against other states
and suppressing or murdering millions of their own inhabitants.
State-building, therefore, should not be an aim in itself, as organs of states can
commit atrocious acts. Our interest is only in state institutions that can
contribute to a high quality of human life, as measured by peace, security, justice
and other aspects of human civilisation.
An oecd-quality legal system embracing the rule of law is a condition for achiev-
ing a high respect for all human rights, both the political freedoms and the rights
to fulfilment of a high level of social, economic and cultural well-being. By itself,
a modern legal system is not enough to turn this expected well-being into reality.
Examples are those wealthy oecd countries that still have relatively widespread
poverty, corruption and crime.
The modern oecd type of state is a complex set of institutions, rules and values
that are required to enable human beings to live well according to modern human
aspirations. The modern state is a highly technological, literally artificial (man-
made), ‘civilised’, very differentiated and structured society so complex and
abstract that the solidarity of inhabitants with the state and its institutions, and
the acceptance of the democratic political class, is increasingly called into ques-
tion by at least part of the non-voting electorate, as well as those who vote not
according to their policy preferences but who follow a gut feeling of general
opposition and malaise.
These reflections, at the end of this chapter on (re)constructing justice after war,
are not meant to diminish the impetus of democracies, legal and human rights
organisations to spread the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. There is the
strong persuasion that human rights are inherently good, needing no further
justification. Moreover, states in which human rights are highly respected are
much less frequently at war with each other than non-democratic states. Fully
grown human rights states appear not to experience civil war, although this
cannot be excluded entirely as a possibility. As human rights states also enjoy a
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much higher standard of citizen well-being, as indicated by the human develop-
ment index measured annually by undp, it is not difficult to make a plausible
argument that the encouragement of human rights in other states is not just an
idealistic task. It is a matter of enlightened self-interest, as other human rights
states around one’s own and the region will help to serve the national interest in
well-being and security. The more human-rights states, the better.
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Aceh This autonomous Indonesian province of
over 4 million Islamic people is located on the
northern tip of Sumatra. Aceh has rich natural
resources. It struggled for independence already
during the Dutch colonial rule. The Japanese
invasion of Indonesia in 1942 ended Dutch occu-
pation but continued the suppression. The Asso-
ciation of All Aceh Ulema’a (pusa) opposed the
Japanese occupation.
Indonesia gained independence in 1949. The
regimes by Sukarno and Suharto amalgamated
the provinces Aceh and North Sumatra. Ethnic
differences between the predominantly Christ-
ian North Sumatran population and Islamic Ach-
enese triggered rebellion. The Indonesian gov-
ernment initially defied the rebellion but finally
granted Aceh autonomy with ‘special territory’
status.
The Indonesian government commenced mass
exploitation of Aceh’s national resources in the
70’s. Presence of the military of Indonesia (tni)
reduced Aceh’s autonomy and increased social
strife. Deteriorated living conditions led Di Tiro
to unite Acehnese with a desire for an Islamic
state in the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation
Front (asnlf). Support for independence move-
ments grew vastly due to tni repression,
changed social circumstances and feelings of
economic injustice.
In 1989, under the name Free Aceh Movement
(gam), the asnlf intensified the struggle for
independence. The government responded by
declaring Aceh a Military Operation Zone
(dom). Nine years of violence and grave human
rights violations followed. Circumstances
improved temporarily when president Wahid
came to power. In august 1998, the government
lifted the dom status. The Joint Understanding
on a Humanitarian Pause officially ended the
battles for three months in 2000.
A referendum on independence never came
about. War criminals were not prosecuted and
humanitarian aid did not reach Aceh. 
The gam intensified its terror campaign and
the tni remained present. Aceh officially
gained more autonomy and adopted the Sharia
law in 2003. Government repression mean-
while increased.
In 2004, the tsunami cost over 45,000 lives
and left half a million homeless. The urgency
of emergency aid, reconstruction and changes
in leadership enabled peace talks between 
the government and gam. A memorandum 
of understanding brought an end to 29 years 
of fighting.
Peace has a chance of becoming sustainable
when Aceh is granted fair economic rights and
autonomy. Indonesia’s dependence on Aceh’s
natural resources complicates this. Additional
challenges are human rights violations by Aceh’s
authorities.
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6 resources and costs
“Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development
of his personality is possible.”
Article 29, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948
In this chapter, we will look at the means which are potentially available for
peacebuilding operations and rule-of-law assistance. What matters most is how
to encourage the domestic capabilities for peacebuilding and the rule of law in a
country. Foreign aid can be very important; it can encourage but cannot entirely
replace for long an absent domestic demand for improvement of the legal order.
6.1 internal resources
In all countries plagued by war, there is strong demand for peace and justice. 
The former war leaders may or may not heed these desires, but the population 
is usually sick and tired of the war and longs for a new future. In most wars, 
a relatively small percentage of the population was actively engaged in the
fighting, while those who did the suffering formed the great majority.
The basic needs, of all people everywhere, are safety of oneself, one’s family and
friends; safe drinking water, food, shelter, medical help, and a glimmer of hope
that an unbearable life will get better. It is important to hold objective opinion
polls in the country to measure and show what people want, as this may encour-
age the leadership to change policies, once confronted with the outcome. If the
leadership does not pay attention, polls might still encourage advocates of reform
to continue their work and not give up.
Those interested in reform have to identify potential, respected persons who
may become leading agents of change. The human resources for a new future are
always there, but they need to be marshalled and led in the right direction. They
may even form a considerable but not yet organised segment of the population,
particularly suppressed, educated persons, returning refugees, the many who
kept silent during the past but now see chances to exert some positive influence;
all those who were waiting for new, promising leadership. All countries, also the
poorest and least endowed, have human and natural resources and comparative
advantages that can be exploited more fairly and effectively, to the benefit of the
population.
Mobilising people and institutions for reform is the task of a leader. New leader-
ship has to arise from the population after a war. Reformists can be supported
by foreign ngos. Foreign governments or international business companies
(often of an extractive nature) may be supporting other leadership that they deem
more promising from their point of view. Even small ngos can make a crucial
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difference by supporting key moral and new political leadership in order to make
new voices heard.
As long as there is no able and firm new leadership in charge of the country,
interim administration by the international community may be the only viable
solution, as was discussed in section 4.6. Such interim administration has to
identify and encourage promising new leaders at different levels of government
and administration. Only once this leadership is strong enough and supported by
an adequate civil service, it will be possible for the international administration
to pull out gradually, without causing a collapse of the new beginning.
In many post-conflict countries, women’s organisations foster dialogue for peace,
the rule of law and equal rights. These may be women who lost family members,
women who were born and raised in families of the ‘opposite’ ethnic or religious
group who married men of the group which is now ‘the enemy’, and women who
want to open the political system to new representatives and leaders. These
women, once organised, can exert a strong influence in support of human rights.
Interfaith councils can exert similar influence, which helps to weaken the grip 
of former warlords and old-style politicians on the future of the country. The
contribution made by religious leaders depends, of course, on the political nature
and effect of their views. Although most religions (and also secular ideologies like
communism) preach peace and justice for all, religious and ideological leaders are
as fallible as all other human beings. Some Orthodox priests in Serbia blessed in
1995 criminal militia groups that were to participate in the mass killings of 
Bosnians. There were Roman Catholic priests in Rwanda who encouraged the
genocide in 1994. Certain Islamic mullahs preach self-sacrifice through terrorist
acts, killing countless civilian Muslims and others. In fact, most religions and
secular ideologies have been involved actively or passively in gross atrocities at
different times in history, also against people of their own group. Interfaith 
councils, however, generally consist of religious leaders who are keen to listen to
each other. We may assume that they will exhibit tolerance, and share a prefer-
ence for peaceful conflict settlement and reconciliation. Multi-religious institu-
tions are likely to play a positive role in peacebuilding and reconciliation.
Local and regional individuals of influence and eminent national figures can
persuade other opinion leaders, politicians and warlords to change old-style
government, abolish wrong attitudes and overcome organised group hatred. Such
contributions can be made by modern sports heroes, television, music and movie
stars as well as traditional clan heads or village elders. It is essential for foreign
donors to elicit support for peacebuilding from all these kinds of opinion leaders.
6.2 international rights and duties of states
As the quote on top of this chapter emphasises, the individual and his rights do
not exist in a vacuum, but in a community from which these rights derive. Rights
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exist because there are also duties to respect these same rights by others, and obli-
gations to contribute to the well-being of the community. It is everybody’s
responsibility to contribute according to capacity to the possibility of enjoyment
of these rights by everyone. Implementing these responsibilities gives rights their
substance. Rights create duties, and duties rights.
As much as the development of the individual requires the development of the
community with its institutions, and ultimately the human-rights state, the
development of the state requires the development of an international commu-
nity. But if these statements are truisms, it follows also that states have not only
rights but also legal and ethical duties to each other and to each others’ citizens,
even if some of these ethical duties are not yet clearly defined legal rights that are
subject to enforcement. The further development of the international order will
need to specify these duties of states to the international community and to citi-
zens of the states that form it. International human rights treaties create clear
rights, but the enforcement system is as weak as the international governance
system. In the following sections, we will attempt to look into the possibilities
that might flow from these responsibilities for further peacebuilding.
6.3 development assistance
First, the present development cooperation funds can be used, and increased, for
peacebuilding and encouragement of the rule of law. The international standard
for developed states is to contribute 0.7 percent of Gross National Product to
development cooperation. Many larger countries contribute proportionally much
less than smaller ones, which shows that the low aid performers still have
unutilised possibilities. The 2005 agreement of the eu that all members should
implement the aid target (set in the 1960s by the un) of 0.7 percent of gnp, will
lead to a considerable increase, if implemented. If other oecd countries follow
this pace of increase, vast additional resources will become available.
This is illustrated in tables 6.1 and 6.2.
Total development aid from oecd countries was $107 billion in 2005, which was
one third of one percent of their gnp. About 23 percent of this flows through multi-
lateral organisations like the World Bank Group, the European Union and undp.
If all oecd countries would implement the internationally agreed goal of 0.70
percent of gnp, aid would more than double. An additional $120 billion would
become available.
It should be observed that many non-oecd countries, which used to be ‘develop-
ing countries’, have similar capabilities once they reach a per capita annual
income of, say, € 5000. There is no economic or objective political reason to apply
the un donor target of 0.7 percent of national income (gnp) only to so-called
Western industrialised countries. Other countries also have aid possibilities that
are proportional to their wealth.
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In addition to the usual donors of foreign assistance (member states of the
oecd), it would be wise to widen the circle of donors of both financial and
personal resources to many non-Western states. The low level of international
assistance by non-Western middle income countries is not in accordance with the
oft-repeated calls of the international community for stronger action to improve
development efforts and peacebuilding. Large Asian economies have considerable
means and very appropriate expertise to render assistance to less fortunate states
and populations. The Conference of Islamic States and the Arab League can
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Table 6.1 Ten lowest development aid performers in 2005 among oecd members
Net Official Development Aid as % of gnp
Greece 0.17
Portugal 0.21
us 0.22
Australia 0.25
New Zealand 0.27
Spain 0.27
Japan 0.28
Italy 0.29
Canada 0.34
Germany 0.36
Average of dac oecd members: 0.33
Source: oecd, dac, February 2007
www.sourceoecd.org
Table 6.2 Ten largest donor countries of net official development assistance in 2005
in billion usd
us 28
Japan 13
uk 11
Germany 10
France 10
Netherlands 5
Italy 5
Canada 4
Sweden 3
Spain 3
Source: oecd, dac, February 2007
www.sourceoecd.org
mobilise significant financial and expert resources for the development of the
rule of Islamic law in many states in need, where the population demands
improvement of its own legal system, rather than introduction of oecd type
legislation. A stronger participation of these countries in international peace-
building programs and judicial reform, particularly by those states which attempt
to translate international human rights norms gradually into domestic legislation
and jurisprudence, should be welcomed strongly.
Similarly, developing countries which have experience in building democracy,
like a large state as India, could be encouraged to assume a larger role in the advo-
cacy and advising of democratisation in other non-Western states. Peacebuilding
and rule-of law reform which would turn into another self-appointed ‘white
man’s burden’ would certainly not be successful. It is a universal responsibility,
if un declarations and binding global treaties on human rights are to be imple-
mented. Engaging states and ngos from all over the multifarious world would
vastly improve possibilities.
Financial resources for international assistance can also be rapidly increased by
charging a small fee on suitable, frequent economic activities, particularly relating
to energy and raw material use. For instance, a small levy on every airplane ticket
or other easily taxable international transaction can help finance a un or eu
peacebuilding fund. This could yield vast resources..
Of course, the most crucial factor is not finance, but professional, experienced
people who can be motivated to contribute to peacebuilding. Expert personnel
for legal advice, interim management and administration, monitoring and train-
ing in peacebuilding countries can be recruited not only from academia and exist-
ing government services, but also from among early retirees with suitable experi-
ence. There is a vast reserve of experience in the 50-plus generation, which has
relatively low additional income needs and is easier to rapidly send on missions
abroad than less experienced younger professionals (with families).
Next to an increase in development aid funds, it is possible to devote a large share
of presently available funds to peacebuilding and rule-of-law support. There is
considerable room for re-allocation of existing development funds and budgets,
as only a small portion is presently devoted to peacebuilding and rule-of-law
assistance. It is clear that countries governed by law and strong institutions
develop much better economically than those that are not. The causes of this 
relationship are obvious. It follows that investment in improved rule of law has
generally high returns in economic growth, market expansion, social peace, and
political stability, apart from the values of and interest in human rights and
democracy in and of themselves. Economic progress financed by foreign aid is
often very vulnerable to political instability and corruption. From this, it follows
that shifts of expenditure towards rule of law projects would be very rewarding
in economic terms. Such additional expenses can be financed by changing priori-
ties away from pure economic assistance to institution building and training.
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6.4 defence organisations
The contributions of donor countries and international organisations for post-
conflict peacebuilding and rule of law assistance can already be improved
without major increases in government expenditure. Defence budgets, which
total over € 900 billion per year,1 finance capabilities that could be used in part
for peacebuilding as long as armed forces are not engaged in actual war. Armed
forces often have, by the nature of their special tasks in case of war, a large excess
capacity in peacetime, and military peacekeeping personnel are widely available
from standing armed forces of dozens of countries. See table 6.3.
It should be noted that the number of active troops per 1000 inhabitants varies
greatly between a high of 49 in North Korea (the most militarised state) and 0 in
the 24 countries without armies. For comparison: Russia has 7.24, the us 4.76,
China 1.71, and India 1.20 military personnel per 1000 people.
Of course, troops of some nations cannot be engaged in a number of peace
operations, either because of their regime, policies or quality, or because their
governments do not have enough objective distance from the operation, and
participation might complicate rather than solve problems. Even when this is
taken into account, the table indicates there are large unused capabilities for
participation in peace operations abroad. Some armies are overstretched (like the
us army) while others do not participate at all.
Only a small percentage of active troop strength is actually employed in peace
operations. While some countries are heavily involved, others participate with
small proportions or decline to participate altogether. Not only soldiers, but
military police, gendarmerie and other personnel with mixed military/police
training are also very suitable for the first phase of peacebuilding activities, when
physical security and public order are top-priorities. Here, too, burden sharing is
uneven.
Only a few percent of the un member states’ military personnel are deployed
abroad. Some countries are close to their capabilities for military peace operations
(the smaller North-West European nations) and have a high ratio of personnel
deployed abroad in relation to population size (like the uk). The us armed forces
are presently overstressed with unfortunate operations in Iraq and in
Afghanistan. Others, particularly the more populous European nations France,
Germany, Italy and others, have a low ratio of participation. This applies even
more strongly to Japan, even taking into account that this populous nation,
which still is the number two economy in the world, has only recently formed
a Department of Defence. Its self-defence forces are already considerable. So is
its interest in international stability and the rule of law.
If the reorganisation of armed forces, which started after the end of the Cold War
and is not yet completed in most un member states, were sped up and
completed, to enlarge the expeditionary capacity for peacekeeping and peace-
building, there would be vast additional means.
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One way to estimate the potential for peace operations is the personnel of un and
other peace operations divided by the total number of military personnel in the
world. In mid 2007, the un engaged 71,000 troops in peace operations. nato had
52,000 troops mainly in Afghanistan (36,000) and Kosovo (16,000). The us and
its coalition forces had 176,000 in Iraq. The un and nato total, including Iraq,
was 300,000.3 The total military strength in the world in 2006 was more than
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Table 6.3 Largest Armies in the World, 2006
Active troops in 10002
China 2,255
us 1,423
North-Korea 1,325
India 1,106
Russia 1,037
South-Korea 687
Pakistan 619
Iran 545
Turkey 515
Vietnam 484
Egypt 450
Myanmar 428
Ukraine 361
Indonesia 316
Thailand 307
Syria 296
Taiwan 290
Brazil 287
Germany 285
France 259
Japan 239
Italy 230
Colombia 207
Eritrea 202
Saudi Arabia 200
Morocco 196
Mexico 193
United Kingdom 188
Ethiopia 183
Iraq 180
Spain 178
Greece 178
Israel 168
Poland 163
Sri Lanka 158
20 million, measuring only active troops and not reserves and paramilitary.4
This means that only 1.5 percent of active military troop strength in the world was
engaged in peace operations.
6.5 reducing corruption
It is estimated that many billions of euros are lost every year through corruption.5
Fighting corruption by strengthening the rule of law and independent media has
a very high financial return, even though the exact amounts are not easily quan-
tifiable. The un Convention against Corruption (2003), mentioned in section
5.10, specifies the varied character of corruption, from demanding money for a
judge’s verdict, to donations to ‘development funds’ that enrich a ruler’s family.
The common feature is abuse of public and private power for private gain.
Corruption is rampant in post-conflict societies as war typically leads to war
profiteering, and warlords become local, regional or national rulers.
Donors have to be very alert; most corrupt officials are very wily in designing
ways to nullify counter-corruption measures. Foreign admonishments, dialogue,
diplomacy, patience, ‘change of attitudes’ and paper changes of regulations often
have little effect. It is important to strengthen domestic deterrents against corrup-
tion, such as free media, independent judges and professional prosecutors. Trans-
parency International has developed a National Integrity System to assess and
fight corruption. Prosecution of corrupt acts, exposure in the media, and severe
legal penalties are essential to make corruption a ‘high risk low return’ activity.
6.6 international division of tasks
As individual donor countries, non-governmental organisations and inter-
national institutions cannot address and take on all questions of rule-of-law
assistance everywhere in the world equally and at the same time, it is efficient 
to ensure an international division of donor tasks with different countries
specialising on various fields of assistance. This has to evolve on the basis of
multilateral cooperation, taking comparative expertise and national advantages
into account. (In section 8.2.2, some remarks are made on the comparative
advantages of different countries).
An international division of tasks should, of course, lead to a greater focus and
more momentum of certain donors in a particular set of countries, but not to a
rigid and thoughtless division among donors of countries in need. It is not
healthy if recipient countries become very dependent on just one or two donors,
while others turn a blind eye to what may go wrong or is neglected. The alloca-
tion of assistance never starts from scratch in a theoretical situation, but begins
with an existing pattern of needs, abilities to help, and available networks which
have already been built up. It is comparable to investment analysis: in which parts
of a portfolio can one expect the most progress? Which are the weakest spots that
need to be strengthened? The crucial question is: where can the highest marginal
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returns be made for the recipient? This leads to a certain specialisation on areas
and sectors or subjects of emphasis.
Countries with strong, expeditionary armed forces and much persuasive political
and military power (deterrence) would do well to take the lead in the military
aspects of peace enforcement, peacekeeping, arresting war criminals and the
demobilisation and disarmament of former warring parties, as well as assisting
in the fight against remaining pockets of armed resistance and terrorism. Smaller
well-established democracies with no particular foreign policy axe to grind,
would do well to focus more on assistance that is most politically sensitive in
recipient countries. This includes constitutional advice, police reform, security
sector reform, transitional justice, training prosecutors and judges, support for
independent media and gender equity programmes.
6.7 allocation and country choice
In the previous sections, it was shown that the means for peacebuilding and
assistance for the rule of law could be vastly increased if governments are
prepared to make this choice. The next question concerns how the volume of aid
should be allocated to various purposes and countries. After determining a given
volume of aid, the question is to which countries and subject matters these means
should be devoted, and in which order of priorities.
Country selection and allocation can take place by using a number of criteria, relat-
ed to the enlightened or narrow national interest of the donor, the donor’s national
values, membership of organisations and national comparative advantages.
One could use the following list of questions to find the best allocation of
resources for peacebuilding. These questions are not a list of independent criteria,
but a guide to arrive at an optimal use of resources, with the highest marginal
returns. This list might also help to limit the risk of failure.
– What is the actual or possible mandate under international law for the peace-
building operation in question? Is there a un Security Council mandate?
– Which countries needing post-conflict rule of law assistance are indicated as
priority states, of interest to the national foreign policy goals, and the goals of
crucial international organisations? For instance, which countries are most
important to the eu’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, for various
reasons such as proximity, refugees, cultural or historical bonds and strategic
importance?
– Which countries have organisational links to the eu and deserve, as a result 
of those links, special attention? The same question is relevant for nato, 
the osce and the Council of Europe. Which countries are participants in the 
Partnership for Peace programme of nato? Which are members of the osce?
See chart 6.4 for the concentric rectangles of memberships. It makes sense
that, if other factors are equal, members and applicant countries of organisa-
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tions like the eu, nato and osce deserve special attention when assistance is
needed. For instance, the entry of Romania, Bulgaria and the expected acces-
sion of Croatia and perhaps other Balkan states like Bosnia, Macedonia, Alba-
nia, Montenegro and perhaps a reformed Serbia in the eu in the foreseeable
future makes them especially interesting to other eu members as candidates
for legal reform assistance. As we note in Chapter 7 on the eu, the interest of
countries to attain membership gives the eu a reformist influence on these
countries, which reinforces potential effects of police and legal sector reform.
– In which countries is the donor government already participating in military
peacekeeping operations and would it also like to contribute to a lasting result
in civilian peacebuilding?
– With which countries does the government already have ties of development
cooperation where it can attain synergy and use some leverage by devoting
more attention to the legal sector?
– What contributions can be expected from other donors; which cases are
neglected but important, and where can one make a real difference? Neglected
cases pose a hard choice: they have a high need, but the tasks may be huge 
and the risk of failure is great, since others are not pitching in. This multiplies
negligence, particularly of the worst failing states.
– What is the donor’s national or institutional comparative advantage? If other
countries and organisations specialise as well, what is the area on which one
should concentrate? Or to put it in plain English: what are we best at, in
comparison to other states, and where can we make the most of our efforts,
given what others will be doing? We will elaborate on this in section 8.2.2.
– Is there a lead organisation or lead country to which we can attach our 
contribution to gain leverage and impact, not only in the recipient country, 
but also with respect to the policies of this leading donor? Is this main donor
likely to continue its efforts for a number of years to achieve results, or is it
inclined to leave after a quick fix, which might soon disintegrate after depar-
ture?
– Which human and financial resources are probably available from all donors
for this mission, and for how long? Will other countries agree to rotate with
our personnel once we run out of resources? If not, devotion to the tasks for 
a brief period might be in vain.
– Can we count on political and military support from other countries if our
own contribution, especially our peacebuilding experts are threatened or
endangered?
– What is the risk that peacebuilding and rule of law support will fall to pieces
due to domestic developments in the recipient country? What is the risk of a
return to war and the risk of the (new) government becoming obstructionist
or even more corrupt than it is already? The risk of war returning depends on
external threats that may upset the domestic peace and on the degree of
internal acceptance of the new domestic order as reasonably just and hopeful. 
Small but violent groups can disturb the new order that would be otherwise
accepted by most of the population.
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UN
Afghanistan India*
Algeria Indonesia
Angola Iran
Antigua and Barbuda Iraq
Argentina Israel
Bahamas* Ivory Coast
Bahrain Jamaica*
Bangladesh* Jordan
Barbados* Kenya*
Belize* Kiribati*
Benin Kuwait
Bhutan Laos
Bolivia Lebanon
Botswana* Lesotho*
Brazil Liberia
Brunei* Libya
Burkina Faso Madagascar
Burma Malawi*
Burundi Malaysia*
Cambodia Maldives*
Cameroon * Mali
Cape Verde Marshall Islands
Central African Republic Maurtania
Chad Mauritius*
Chile Micronesia
CHINA Mongolia
Colombia Morocco
Comorus Mozambique*
Congo Namibia*
Congo (DR) Nauru*
Costa Rica Nepal
Cuba Nicaragua
Dijbouti Niger
Dominica* Nigeria*
Dominican Republic North Korea
East Timor Oman
Ecuador Pakistan*
Egypt Palau
El Salvador Panama
Equatorial Guinea Papua New Guinea*
Eritrea Paraguay
Ethiopia Peru
Fiji* Philippines
Gabon Qatar
Gambia* Rwanda
Ghana* Samoa*
Grenada* Sao Toino and Principe
Guatemala Saudi Arabia
Guinea Senegal
Guinea-Bissau Seychelles*
Guyana* Sierra Leone*
Haiti Singapore*
Honduras Solomon Islands*
* = Commonwealth Coutries                ▲ = G8 Countries                Bold Capital Type - Permanent Members of the UN Security Counsil
Adapted from: UK Department of Foreign and Common wealth Affairs, 2004
Somalia Syria Uganda*
South Africa* Tanzania* Uruguay
St Kitts and Nevis* Thailand Vanuatu*
St Lueia* Togo Venezuela
St Vincent and the Grenadines* Tonga* Vietnam
Sri Lanka* Trinidad and Tobago* Yemen
Sudan Tunisia Zambia*
Suriname Tuvalu* Zimbabwe*
Swaziland* UAE
OECD
Mexico
Australia* New Zealand*
Japan ▲ South Korea
Switzerland
NATO
Canada ▲
Iceland
Norway
Turkey
UNITED STATES▲
Estonia Cyprus*
Latvia Malta*
Lithuania
Slovenia
Albania Kazakhstan San Marino
Andorra Kyrgyzstan Serbia
Armenia Liechtenstein Tajikistan
Azerbaijan Macedonia Turkmenistan
Belarus Moldova Ukraine
Bosnia and Herzegovina Monaco Uzbekistan
Croatia M ontenegro
Georgia RUSSIA ▲
OSCE
Belgium EU
Denmark Austria
FRANCE ▲ Finland
Germany ▲ Ireland
Greece Sweden
Italy ▲
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
UNITED KINGDOM ▲
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovakia
Holy
See
Table 6.4 Membership of main international organisations
6.8 preliminary cost estimates
Peace operations are costly. But wars are far costlier in killed and traumatised
people, refugees, destruction of the country, its nature, environment, cultural
heritage, and so much more. Peace building is an extremely rewarding invest-
ment in well-being and socio-economic progress. One (civil) war can destroy
hundreds of thousands of lives, traumatize millions, destroy billions of euros and
set back a country and its neighbours in their development for decades.
It is useful to roughly estimate what peace building operations might cost. There
is no systematic and complete picture. Only parts of the puzzle are available:
military costs of some operations, economic aid expenses in some countries, and
casualties. The Rand Corporation made calculations based on a number of coun-
try cases.6 The Rand study drew lessons from many case studies by a team of
country experts and analysts of peace operations. Only a handful of these have
been accounted for financially. It is, however, the most informative and practi-
cally relevant study we have seen so far.
Rand emphasizes that such calculations are only of indicative value, as all cases
are different. For the present study, we have adapted Rand’s estimates, first to
account for inflation and exchange rate changes.7 We also adapted Rand’s figures
to fit operations in a hypothetical country of presumably 10 million inhabitants.
We added an estimated number of years of the duration of separate elements like
police support and judiciary reform. These changes may make it easier for the
reader to apply these figures to specific future cases as ‘rule of thumb’ first esti-
mates. We refer to the many assumptions and caveats in Rand’s estimates. The
figures that follow only indicate the orders of magnitude that have to be consid-
ered when decisions are made about operations. They may be way off the actual
costs in specific operations. For instance, operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are
very expensive, but those in El Salvador, Mozambique and Guatemala were rela-
tively cheap.
The first cost model represents a ‘standard’ un operation in a poor country
(income per capita $ 500 which is about € 375). It is assumed that the former
warring parties agree with the un operation. There is no widespread resistance
among the population. Some domestic capacity for security, order and govern-
ment remains. The operation starts with blue-helmet peacekeeping and includes
police reform, rule of law reform, humanitarian aid, governance reconstruction,
infrastructure, economic stabilization and development, and assistance for
democratization. Most of the un soldiers come from other un members than
oecd countries, as nato and oecd country soldiers are expensive and cost
about € 150,000 per person per year. We added assumptions about the duration
of separate elements and assume that inflation and exchange rate changes even
each other out. In the first years, the costs of 16,000 blue helmet troops and 2000
international police dominate the picture, but in later years the focus is on reform
and development. See table 6.5. The total amounts to about € 18 billion, which is
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liberia
Liberia Americo-Liberians (mostly freed
slaves) established the republic in 1847. 
Liberia was a largely peaceful one-party state
until 1980, when Samuel Doe came to power.
Rebels led by Charles Taylor of the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (npfl) took up arms in
December 1989 against the government of
Samuel Doe. The rebels split up in a faction led
by Charles Taylor (associated with Mano tribes)
and a faction led by Prince Johnson (associated
with Gio tribes). These three armed groups
became involved in a power struggle. This civil
war between 1989 and 1996 left 150,000 dead
and caused 850,000 refugees. 
The Economic Community of West African
States (ecowas) mediated peace talks and
established a military observer group ecomog
in 1990. The un Security Council imposed an
arms embargo and provided humanitarian assis-
tance. In 1993, the Cotonou Peace Agreement
was signed; the un authorized the observer mis-
sion unomil to support ecomog. The fighting
parties continued, however. In 1994 1.8 million
people needed humanitarian assistance. 
An amended peace agreement and expanded
mandates of ecomog and unomil created 
stability for elections in 1997. 
Charles Taylor was elected president. The un
left immediately after the elections in 1997 
in Liberia. Serious abuses of human rights 
continued and political opponents were
excluded. 
No security sector reform had taken 
place. In 1999, the Liberians United for Recon-
ciliation and Democracy (lurd) took control
over the north. The Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia (model) was based in the south.
A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed
in 2003. The un sent a peacekeeping force of
15,000 military and 1115 un police officers
(unmil). This mission disarmed more than
100,000 combatants, of which 65,000 benefited
from reintegration. Organized repatriation
helped 67,000 refugees.
Taylor was exiled in 2003. The transitional 
government was unable to curb corruption. 
In 2005, Taylor was arrested for trial of war
crimes. 
The case of Liberia highlights that when former
warlords become president, their election can
kill a beginning of democracy. The un made new
elections possible in 2005. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf
was elected president, started an anti-corruption
program and installed a Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission.
L i b e r i a
Greenville
Robertsport
Buchanan
Zwedru
Harper
Monrovia
€ 1800 per inhabitant, or € 180 per person per year during 10 years, equalling
almost one-half of the per capita income of the country concerned. Many peace
operations have cost much less, but we prefer to err on the high side.
The second type is a heavy and extremely difficult peace building operation,
which starts against the will of one or more warring parties. One could imagine
this as an operation which is driven by the new conviction in the un that there 
is a ‘responsibility to protect’.8 It concerns a seriously endangered population
group in a country with either a very weak and incapable government, or its
opposite, a violent, suppressive and genocidal government. In this heavy peace-
building model, one or more major un members, with the support of a coalition
of other states, have to force their entry and impose a un Security Council 
resolution (or a decision of another organization – which would have less than
universal legitimacy9 and might be more difficult). At least part of the population
is presumed to be hostile or much divided. The war which is being ended left
very little domestic capacity for security and governance. This type we call 
heavy peace building with enforcement. It is assumed that 130,000 green-helmet
soldiers of nato and oecd quality and equipment, and 16,000 international
police officers, are deployed in a country of 10 million people. See table 6.6. This
operation totals € 157 billion, or € 1570 per inhabitant per year, which is 4 times
the income per capita of the country concerned.
Striking in these tables are the heavy costs of the international military, particu-
larly of nato-quality, and the relatively low cost of police and legal assistance
items.
The differences between the standard and heavy operations are not only in the
requirements for foreign troops (numbers, qualification, equipment, salary) and
foreign police. Non-military assistance is assumed by Rand to be equal for both
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Table 6.5 International costs of light peacebuilding operations in a country of 
10 million inhabitants
Items Persons ¤ mln. Years ¤ total mln.
un blue-helmet military 16,000 720 5 3,600
Local troops paid by donors 30,000 100 5 500
un police 2,000 140 5 700
Local police paid by donors 22,000 36 5 180
Legal assistance 36 10 360
Humanitarian aid 340 2 680
Governance asst. 520 5 2,600
Democratisation 100 10 1,000
Infrastructure and econ. development 840 10 8,400
Rounded off total 18 billion
types, but that may be rather optimistic. We have changed this in our calcula-
tions, assuming some costs to be double in the heavy, difficult operation as
compared to the light version, erring again on the safe side. Expenses for infra-
structure and development are assumed to be the same in both types.
An important difference, not shown in the tables, is that the costs of the standard
operation are usually spread among the un members, as they are paid from the
budget and special peacekeeping funds to which many countries make contribu-
tions, also those not sending personnel. Generally, enforced operations are more
controversial among the un membership, as they impinge on state sovereignty,
and are supported only by a coalition of willing states, e.g. a lead nation like the
us and a number of nato members, which pay for their own troops and the
development assistance costs.
Even the enforced peace building operation assumes that the intervention comes
at the time that warring parties suffer from war-fatigue but need to be pushed
into a cease-fire. Imposing peace from the outside on a country that is in an early
phase of a full-swing civil war, may require such high foreign troop numbers,
expected battle casualties and high expenses that foreign donors are simply not
prepared to accept the burdens. (This was, for instance, the case in 1991-5, when
the us and other nato members were not willing to enforce peace on the former
Yugoslavia.)
For police and judiciary assistance it is assumed that the light peacebuilding 
operation in a poor country of 10 million inhabitants might require about 600 
local judges, 600 local prosecutors, 4200 local corrections staff for 40 correctional 
institutions, with altogether about 120 international advisors. Domestic costs 
of the entire rule of law system are estimated at € 26 million p.a. and international
costs of reform at € 17 million p.a.10 It is assumed that of the total of € 43 million, 
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Table 6.6 International costs of heavy peacebuilding operations in a country of 
10 million inhabitants
Items Persons ¤ mln. Years ¤ total mln.
Foreign soldiers 130,000 26,000 5 130,000
Local soldiers 30,000 100 5 500
Foreign police 16,000 2,500 5 12,500
Local police 22,000 36 5 180
Legal assistance 72 10 720
Humanitarian aid 680 2 1,360
Governance asst. 520 5 2,600
Democratisation 100 10 1,000
Infrastructure and econ. Development 840 10 8,400
Rounded off total 157 billion
a substantial share of the local expenses is also paid for by foreign donors, and their
bill will be about € 36. In the heavy peacebuilding operation, this is doubled to 
€ 72 million p.a.
Let us now assume that in a particular year the un is responsible for peace opera-
tions in ten countries that total 100 million inhabitants. One of those countries
had a hopeless regime and was engaged in genocidal campaigns. Many outside
powers could not bear watching mass murder to continue and decided to under-
take a heavy peacebuilding operation, starting with a forced military entry, and
followed by a 10 year peace building program. This might cost € 157 billion for the
total of 10 years, based on assumptions shown in table 6.6.
Let us also assume that nine light peace building operations are carried out during
these ten years. This would cost € 180 billion, based on table 6.5. The sum of one
heavy and 9 light would cost € 34 billion per year (Euros of 2007).
These amounts seem very high. But are they really? The annual military expendi-
tures in the world amounted to € 903 billion in 2006.11 Annual development assis-
tance from oecd-countries was € 107 billion12. Their sum was € 1010 billion p.a.
One heavy peacebuilding operation and 9 light operations in different stages would
average just over 3 percent of the global military and development aid expenses.
This expense would be a sound investment in human security. These calcula-
tions, though imprecise, show that these are within the realm of the possible.
This is not to say that all such expenses are prudent; the us and uk expenses for
regime change in Iraq are extremely high and have not improved security in the
world, but probably worsened it. un peace operations in Cyprus, Sierra Leone,
Ivory Coast, El Salvador, Cambodia, East Timor, Mozambique and many other
forms of peacebuilding with the consent of the parties are deemed by most
observers to be relative successes that improved the fate of the population and
their neighbours over what might have happened without such outside help.
These preliminary estimates show, that the un, nato, eu and other interna-
tional organizations and donor agencies need not refrain from necessary and
feasible peacebuilding operations for lack of financial or military resources.
Available economic and military means suffice to implement several peacebuild-
ing operations in various countries in turmoil. What matters most is not lack of
resources, but poor national and international decision-making, serious waste of
resources in wrongly designed interventions, and uneven burden sharing. With
large resources available, money is another word for priority. Priorities are set by
governments, opinion leaders and the electorates, which shape each other.
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notes
1 sipri Yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press, 2007.
2 En.wikipedia.org based on 231 national and international sources, accessed July
12, 2007. The table is limited to armies larger than 150,000 troops.
3 Sources: un.org; nato.int; en.wikipedia.org, accessed July 12, 2007.
4 Calculated from en.wikipedia.org, based on 231 national and international
sources, accessed July 12, 2007.
5 www.transparency.org.
6 Dobbins, J. et. al. The Beginners guide to Nation-Building Rand Corporation,
Santa Monica, 2007. Hereafter referred to as Rand 2007.
7 We added 25% inflation given that Rand’s figures relate to the first years of the
21st century and changed dollars to euros at the rate of 0.75.
8 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsi-
bility to Protect. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001.
9 un Security Council resolutions have the highest level of legitimacy based on the
un Charter. A decision by a regional organisation like the Organisation of Ameri-
can States, the African Union the Association of South East Asian Nations, the
European Union or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation could also legitimise
the use of force, depending on the Security Council, the relation of the country 
of operation to the regional organisation, the position of the government of that
country, and other factors determining the legality of the use of force.
10 Rand 2007, p. 106-7.
11 sipri Yearbook 2007, Oxford University Press, 2007.
12 www.oecd.org/dac, accessed 18-06-07.
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Iraq
Iraq became independent in 1932. Its
population is estimated at 27.5 million and
contains an Arab majority (75-80%) of Sji’ite
and Sunni Muslims, a large Kurdish minority
(15-20%) and many smaller minorities.
The Baath party of mainly Sunni Muslims came
to power by a coup in 1963. Saddam Hussein
gained leadership of this party in 1979. His dicta-
torship ruled Iraq until 2003. Territorial disputes
and the Sji’ite revolution in Iran tempted Sad-
dam to invade its neighbour in 1980. An eight-
year war between Iran and Iraq (1980-88) took
the lives of 1 million people. Chemical weapons
were used widely against Iranian troops, and also
killed 5000 Kurds in an attack at Halabja in 1988.
Iraq gained no territory in this bloody war.
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The un
Security Council imposed economic sanctions.
Iraq did not pull out on the deadline of 16 January
1991. The un mandated its members to take all
necessary
steps to end the
occupation.
A coalition of 26 un members, led by the us,
Great Britain and France, attacked Iraqi forces 
in Operation Desert Storm. Air campaigns and
ground offensives quickly drove Iraq from
Kuwait. The us decided at the time not to push
on to Baghdad and not to topple the Saddam
Hussein regime, fearing this would cause great
instability in Iraq and the region. Later events
proved this to be a wise decision.
The ceasefire agreement included a call for the
elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruc-
tion, ballistic missiles and related arms produc-
tion. A verification system was set up. Iraq
refused to cooperate with the un and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency between 1991
and 2003, despite stiff economic sanctions. 
Saddam violently suppressed a Sji’ite uprising 
in the south and attempts to topple him.
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iraq
The us and uk considered the supposed devel-
opment of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq
a threat to international security. In February
2003 these countries asked the un Security
Council to authorize the use of force against Iraq.
France, Germany and Russia opposed this.
A coalition led by the us and uk decided to inter-
vene in Iraq without un authorization. The main
stated reason was Saddam’s refusal to cooperate
with the un and remove all weapons of mass
destruction. Other reasons to topple Saddam
were the violent repression of the population,
suspected links with the terrorist organization
al-Qaeda, and a belief that Iraq could be reformed
into a pro-Western democracy. This would 
have a beneficial effect on the Middle East, it 
was thought. A pro-Western Iraq might also
improve the world oil market.
On March 19 2003 the first troops were sent. 
The regime of Iraq was overthrown by a brief
‘shock and awe’ campaign with much military
force of high technology.
The Baath party and the Iraqi army were dis-
banded by the Coalition Provisional Authority
(cpa), which ruled until June 2004 when sover-
eignty was returned to the Iraqi interim govern-
ment. Legislative elections held in January 
2005 were followed by a new constitution. Most
Sunni Arabs boycotted the December 2005 
elections, but a high turnout of 70 percent and
low levels of violence made the elections suc-
cessful. A Sji’ite dominated coalition of four 
parties took office six months later. The un
Assistance Mission for Iraq (unami) supported
this political process.
In other aspects, the intervention in Iraq was
much less successful. The coalition troops failed
to bring stability in 2003-7. Various insurgency
forces launched terrorist attacks against the 
opulation, coalition troops, the cpa and the new
Iraqi government. Opponents included former
members of the army and police, Saddam Hus-
sein loyalists, Sunni Muslims, Sji’ite Muslims,
Al-Qaeda, and others using chaos to further
their aims. Many Iraqis died in internecine 
violence. Tensions between Sunni and Sji’ite
Muslims escalated since 2006 to a civil war.
Rebuilding an Iraqi police force, army and a judi-
cial system proved to be very difficult. The dis-
banding of the Iraqi army left 2.5 million jobless
without re-integration programs. nato got
involved in training, equipping, and technical
assistance of a new security force. The removal
of 30,000 civil servants of the Baath-regime, in-
cluding teachers, town administrators and doc-
tors, slowed down the reconstruction process.
A special tribunal was set up for Saddam 
Hussein, who was hanged in December 2006.
The continued insecurity and the worsening
humanitarian situation led to 1.8 million inter-
nally displaced people and 2 million refugees in
neighbouring countries in 2007. Official num-
bers of civilian deaths are lacking; estimates 
of independent organizations range between
70,000 and 650,000.
As of June 2007, the number of mainly us
troops in Iraq increased to 176,000. The 
estimated costs between 2003 and mid-2007 
are 500 billion dollars. The operation has led 
to 3500 killed us soldiers and 25,000 wounded
us and uk soldiers.
This intervention remains extremely controver-
sial in the us and uk and across the world. 
Much echoed criticism includes incorrect inter-
pretation of intelligence information about the
threat of weapons of mass destruction, a failure
to provide post-combat security in Iraq; poor
preparation for the reconstruction phase;
wrongly disbanding the Iraqi armed forces and
underestimating terrorist insurgence after initial
military victory. The us accuses Iran and Syria 
of stirring up violence and resistance. Iran may
encourage a Sji’ite South Iraq.
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At the time of writing, the northern Kurdish
state seems all but independent. The southern
Sji’ite part of Iraq may develop into a separate
state. The Sunni middle, and parts of Baghdad
and other cities are subject to violent internecine
strife which the us appears unable to stop.
Some lessons of the intervention in Iraq are: do
not intervene if there is no urgent threat to
regional security; if there is no mandate under
international law; do not underestimate the
opportunities for terrorist resistance; plan not
only for the military campaign but prepare in
advance for the restoration of public security;
and use domestic authority structures and alle-
giance patterns to restore order. From a humani-
tarian point of view, this intervention was coun-
terproductive. It also appears to have
destabilized the Persian Gulf region. The likely
outcome seems not in the interest of the inter-
vening countries and has weakened us leader-
ship in world politics.
7 the european union and post- conflict
peacebuilding
“We are committed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the world and to ensuring
that people do not become victims of war, terrorism and violence. The European Union
wants to promote freedom and development in the world. We want to drive back 
poverty, hunger and disease. We want to continue to take a leading role in that fight.”
Berlin Declaration of the European Union Heads of State and Government, 2007
7.1 introduction
After the exploration of peacebuilding in the previous chapters, it is useful to
look specifically at the policies and instruments of the European Union. It may
be the largest source of assistance for rule-of-law support activities in the fore-
seeable future. The European Union and its members have already become the
largest source of bilateral and multilateral assistance in the world for develop-
ment, humanitarian, emergency and peacebuilding programmes.
This chapter explores how its members have empowered the eu to play a role in
peacebuilding since the 1990s. Even though the eu and its members form the
main source of funds, their activities are still fragmented. The eu and many of
its members still lack much influence on peacebuilding in recipient states,
because of the weakness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) of
the eu and a lack of coherence of the activities of individual member states in
some recipient countries.
7.2 polic y and institutions
7.2.1  the establishment of a common foreign and securit y polic y
The member states of the European Union (eu) have aspired to coordinate
elements of their foreign policies since the 1970s. The first efforts in the 1970’s
and 80’s were motivated particularly by the wish to play a role in the conflicts
among Israel, the Palestinians and Arab countries, as well as a desire to reduce
dependence of eu countries on the us.  But it was not until the early 1990s
– when Germany had just been unified and the Soviet bloc had collapsed – that
coordination of foreign policies became more than just an aspiration. Members
desired a common foreign and security policy in particular to help guide the
developments in Central and Eastern Europe. Even though the eu was not very
successful in this area in the 1990’s, the tasks ahead encouraged further coopera-
tion. Since the us presidency of G.W. Bush and the intervention of the us and
Britain in Iraq, the desire of the eu members for more intense eu foreign policy
cooperation has grown further.
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Albania  Most of its 3.5 million citizens are
Albanian; minorities are predominantly Greek.
Albania was occupied by Romans, Byzantines
and eventually Ottomans until 1912. The Italian
occupation in 1939 annexed territory and 
created an ethnic Albania. In 1944, communist
resistance came to power and established a
repressive collectivist system under Enver Hoxa.
His rule isolated the country.
Shortly after the Berlin wall collapsed, Albania
tried to connect with the West. Initial elections
were corrupt, but democratic parties eventually
came to power. Economic liberalization did not
put the country on track, as it lacked institutions
to manage markets. In 1997, accessibility of
weapons, civic unrest caused by poverty and a
corrupt savings fund led to riots. Militias took
hold of cities and southern parts of the country.
Neighbouring Italy led a un peacekeeping 
force of 7000 un troops (Operation Alba) to
restore order. Large numbers of refugees entered
from Kosovo in 1998-1999. The short-lived 
governments suffered from internal disputes
and corruption scandals. After the 2005 elec-
tions, democratic parties returned to power. 
In 2006, Albania signed the stabilization and
association agreement with the eu taking the
first step towards accession.
Albania struggles with its poor economic posi-
tion. A large share of the working age population
migrated to wealthier countries. Political parties
remain unstable. There is much organized crime.
The goal of eu-membership gives a drive for
reform. Under eu guidance, Albania is creating
stability by developing its economy and redis-
tributing wealth more equally among the popu-
lation.
A l b a n i a
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Durres Tirana
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) was already introduced in the
Maastricht Treaty of the European Union (teu), which came into force in 1993.
‘cfsp’ was set up as a separate, second pillar of the European Union, to ensure the
intergovernmental nature of the policy, meaning the countries did not want to 
be bound by majority decisions. Five overlapping goals were set out in the treaty:
(1) to safeguard the common values and fundamental interests of the union, (2) to
strengthen the security of the union, (3) to preserve peace and strengthen inter-
national security, (4) to promote international cooperation, and (5) to develop
democracy and the rule of law, including human rights.1 Setting these goals
opened the door for joint post-conflict peacebuilding activities.
The leading institution in the European foreign and security policy is the Council
of the European Union and its Secretariat. The European Commission and the
European Parliament have a less pronounced role in this area. The member state
governments regard foreign affairs as an area where they should keep the initia-
tive and not lose national control.
7.2.2 policies
The treaty of Maastricht distinguishes common positions and joint actions. Com-
mon positions require the member states to implement national policies that
comply with the position defined by the union on a particular issue.2 For instance,
the Council adopted a common position in 2001 on combating illicit traffic in
conflict diamonds for areas in armed conflict, as a contribution to prevention and
settlement of conflicts. It stated that it would “support and contribute to the
efforts of the international community to break the link between conflict dia-
monds and the financing of armed conflict” in countries such as Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Angola.
Joint actions are activities by the member states under the auspices of the cfsp.3
An example of this is the Council Joint Action on a European assistance
programme to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist
activities emanating from the territories under its control.4 Another example is
the Joint Action on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq
(eujust lex), in which the council declared its intention “to address the urgent
needs in the Iraqi criminal justice system through providing training for high and
mid level officials in senior management and criminal investigation”.5
Although the establishment of the cfsp, especially its security element, was a
step forward, the policy often remained declaratory, slow and weak.6 The Coun-
cil often only came together to discuss an issue at the moment when an interna-
tional crisis was already acute. Every member state had then already made its
own analysis, which resulted in months of arguing to reach a common diagnosis.
To solve this problem, the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999,
established a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the General Secretariat
of the Council – which would pool information and provide analysis of interna-
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tional issues for more effective and united policy responses. The tasks of the unit
are to monitor and analyse developments in areas relevant to the cfsp, to provide
assessments of the eu’s interests, and to write policy papers with options for the
Council. In practice, however, the unit became more preoccupied with the day-
to-day policy of the cfsp than with planning and early analyses.7
The treaty also launched ‘common strategies’ for areas in which the member
states have important interests in common. These strategies specify the objec-
tives, duration and the means to be made available by the union and the member
states. The first was the Common Strategy on Russia, in which the European
Council declared the eu would support Russia’s transformation to a stable, open
and pluralistic democracy.8
7.2.3 institutions
It is important to stress that it is the Council of the European Union, particularly
the General Affairs and External Relations Council of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, as well as the European Council of the Heads of State or Government,
which are the prime actors in European foreign and security policy. These poli-
cies are part of the so-called second pillar of the eu.
In the first pillar,9 which is focussed on the common market and external trade
policies, it is the European Commission that most often has the initiative. Some
elements of this first pillar are also very relevant for the second pillar (common
foreign and security policy). These are: common trade policy, boycott and sanc-
tion decisions, development assistance and cooperation with the African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries regulated in separate treaties. The institutional
set-up of the eu therefore requires good cooperation between the first and 
second pillar to reach an effective external policy in various peacebuilding tasks.
Council decisions on the cfsp require unanimity. This downgrades the decisions
to what is acceptable to the most reserved member. The Amsterdam Treaty did
not change this. As a result, decision making on post-conflict peacebuilding
activities is generally not forceful. There is a possibility of ‘constructive absten-
tion’, meaning members abstain without blocking a decision. Moreover, deciding
by qualified majority is possible for decisions applying a common strategy
defined by the European Council, as well as for any decisions implementing a
joint action or common position already adopted by the council. This opens up
new possibilities. There is, however, a safeguard clause, enabling states to block
qualified majority voting for important reasons of national policy.
The Nice Treaty opened the possibility of ‘Enhanced Cooperation’ in the
common foreign and security policy, to safeguard the values and serve the inter-
ests of the Union. But the Treaty limits enhanced cooperation to joint actions and
common positions and stipulates that this enhanced cooperation shall not relate
to matters with military or defence implications.
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cyprus
Cyprus, south of Turkey, has nearly 800,000
inhabitants, who are predominantly Greek
orthodox. In the North there are mostly Turkish
Muslims. Cyprus became independent from
Britain in 1960 after years of resistance by the
Greek Cypriot eoka party that strived to be
united with Greece. The new constitution allo-
cated three out of ten minister positions, 30 per-
cent of parliamentary seats and public service
jobs, and 40 percent of army positions to the
Turkish minority, which constituted 18 percent
of the population.
Greek Cypriots proposed amendments to the
constitution to reduce Turkish Cypriots influ-
ence. Three years after the independence these
tensions became a violent conflict. The un tried
to encourage peace in 1964, but riots continued
throughout the peacekeeping intervention. The
un Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (unficyp)
was unable to stop the violence that drove Turk-
ish Cypriots into enclaves.
The conflict intensified when in 1974 the Greek
military government attempted to take control
of the island. In response, the Turkish army took
control over vast areas of Northern Cyprus. un
peace talks failed and peacekeepers were sent to
Cyprus to prevent a civil war. The country was
divided into a northern area controlled by Turk-
ish Cypriots, an area to the South under Greek 
Cypriot control, in the middle a un buffer zone,
and two British Sovereign Base Areas.
In 1983 the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(trnc) was declared. It was recognised by
Turkey but other countries did not. Between
1992 and 1995, un led peace talks failed to end
the separation. The Greek part of Cyprus strove
for entry in the eu.
A new round of un peace talks resulted in the
partial opening of the buffer zone. The Annan
Plan tried to create a loose federation of the
Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot parts.
When 75 percent of the Greek Cypriots voted
against it in the reunification referendum, while
65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots supported the
plan, re-unification was blocked by the Greeks.
In 2004, Cyprus joined the eu. The southern
section became part of the eu, whereas areas
occupied by the Turkish community were not.
Both parties are to date unwilling to compro-
mise.un blue-helmet peacekeeping was success-
ful in that it prevented renewed war since 1964,
but un peace talks failed due to intransigence 
of the parties and their parent states Greece and
Turkey. Even the eu accession procedure was 
unable to bring the two parts together. Still, the
eu may be able in due course to unite both parts.
C y p r u s
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The Nice treaty, in force since 2003, did make decisions of the Council somewhat
easier. It states that if no members object to or call for a unanimous decision in
the European Council (the so-called emergency brake), enhanced cooperation is
adopted in the Council by a qualified majority, with a threshold of only eight
member states. This provision is, however, rarely used.
An improvement already introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty is the appoint-
ment of a senior official to personify the cfsp. It was decided that the Secretary-
General of the Council would also fulfil the role of ‘High Representative’ for the
cfsp. Javier Solana Madariaga was the first to take up this post. His task is to
improve the visibility and consistency of the cfsp, and lead the Policy Planning
and Early Warning Unit. At the request of the presidency, he enters into political
dialogues with third parties.
The Nice Treaty introduced qualified majority voting to appoint the Secretary-
General of the Council (High Representative for the common foreign and secu-
rity policy) and the deputy.10
The previous Amsterdam Treaty had already introduced the possibility for the
Council to appoint special representatives for certain political issues. These
representatives support the work of the High Representative by representing the
eu in trouble spots. In 2006 there were Special Representatives for nine conflict
regions: (1) Bosnia and Herzegovina, (2) the Former Yugoslav Republic of Mace-
donia (fyrom), (3) Central Asia, (4) Sudan, (5) Moldova, (6) the Middle East
peace process, (7) the South Caucasus, (8) Afghanistan, and (9) the African Great
Lakes Region. There was also a representative for the negotiations on the future
status of Kosovo and a Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact for South-East-
ern Europe.
7.2.4 securit y and defence
The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (esdp) within the
common foreign policy cfsp is probably the most significant element of the post-
conflict peacebuilding activities of the eu. The Maastricht Treaty had already
determined that the cfsp would encompass all eu security issues, including 
“the eventual framing of a common defence policy” which could “in time lead to 
a common defence”.11 For the elaboration and implementation of decisions and
actions, however, the eu needed to request action by the West European Union
(weu), which was determined to be an integral part of the development of the eu.
The Amsterdam Treaty went a step further by incorporating the so-called
Petersberg tasks.12 The Petersberg tasks were “humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including
peacemaking”.13 They had been formulated during the 1992 conference of the
ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the weu member states in the
Petersberg Hotel near Bonn. The task of conflict prevention was added later.
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macedonia
Macedonia was a nation within the Republic
of Yugoslavia. In 1991, Macedonia gained inde-
pendence peacefully and entered the un as 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
A naming dispute with Greece continues as yet. 
The 2 million inhabitants are predominantly
Macedonian with a substantial Albanian minor-
ity and smaller Turkish, Roma and Serbian ones.
Governed by socialist parties, Macedonia was
not actively involved in the Yugoslav wars that
took place in the nineties. The un Preventive
Deployment unpredep of some 800 soldiers
on the border with Serbia kept it out of the war.
Ethnic tensions between Macedonians and
Albanian citizens exacerbated when Macedonian
nationalist parties came to power in 1998. In
1999, the country housed over 300,000 Kosovar
Albanian refugees. The refugees returned to
their homes after the Kosovo war.
In 1999, the ethnic Albanian National Liberation
Army (nla) targeted Macedonian security
forces near the border of Kosovo, capturing small
areas to the North and West. Ethnic Macedo-
nians protested in the streets and attacked
Albanian villages and the Muslim minority.
The Ohrid Agreement in June established a
ceasefire. Albanian rebels agreed to give up sep-
aratist demands, disarm, and respect Macedon-
ian government institutions in return for
decentralization, increased participation in the
government, police force and army, and
acknowledgement of the Albanian language.
The nato and Macedonian army cooperated in
the 30-day operation ‘Essential Harvest’ to
retrieve weapons from the rebels. After a few
shooting incidents, the ethnic war ended in
2002.
Macedonians were confronted by atrocities, but
both sides managed to keep them relatively
small. Macedonia was able to recover from this
ethnic war, because the Ohrid agreement
addressed the problem of ethnic inequality.
Macedonia also proved that preventive involve-
ment of a un peace force can avoid war. Interna-
tional involvement remained limited to nato’s
assistance in arms recollection. As Macedonia
wants to become a member of the eu and nato,
both organizations had considerable positive
influence on the Macedonian leadership to
encourage it to award the Albanian minority its
share of decision-making in government.
M a c e d o n i a
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After a summit in Saint Malo in 1998 – which took place in the midst of the
Kosovo crisis – France and Great Britain declared for the first time that the eu
should have “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military
forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to
respond to international crises”.1 4 This statement was endorsed during the Euro-
pean Council held in Cologne in June 1999 – immediately after the Kosovo war –
and was included in a common declaration.
At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the member states set
themselves the goal of being able to deploy rapidly [within sixty days] and then
sustain [for at least one year] forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as
set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations
up to army corps level (up to 15 brigades, or 50,000-60,000 military) by the 
year 2003.15 The purpose of this European Rapid Reaction Force (errf) is “to
intervene in crises before they become full-scale wars, and to release nato from
participating in some military interventions”.16 The errf undertook its first
military mission on 31 March 2003 in Macedonia and was officially declared ready
for action in May 2003.
The European Rapid Reaction Force can be used both separately and together
with other international organisations. It can deploy at the request of the Organi-
zation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) and the United Nations
(un). It can share expertise and resources with nato, but it cannot deploy at the
sole request of this alliance.17 A Capabilities Development Mechanism (cdm) was
created to avoid duplication between the eu and nato and enhance communica-
tion between the two organisations. eu and nato were already cooperating in
Kosovo and in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
The Political and Security Committee (psc) was established to manage the esdp.
This committee has to keep track of international developments, define policies
and to monitor implementation18. It is assisted by (1) the Politico-Military Group,
which examines the political-military aspects of all proposals within the frame-
work of the cfsp, (2) the Civilian Crisis Management Committee, which is estab-
lished to improve relations between military and civilian components, (3) the
European Union Military Committee eumc, which gives military advice to the
psc as well as to the High Representative for the cfsp, and (4) the eu Military
Staff eums, which is part of the Secretariat of the Council and is responsible for
early warning, strategy planning and situation assessment.
As civilian aspects have often been neglected by the international community in
peace operations, an eu civilian crisis management capability has been devel-
oped. At the Göteborg European Council of 2001 four instruments for this civil-
ian management capability were launched: (1) police action, (2) rule of law, (3)
civil administration, and (4) civil protection.19 With regard to police action, the
objective is to create the possibility of providing up to 5000 policemen – includ-
ing 1000 within 30 days – for various tasks, ranging from restoring order in coop-
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eration with a military force to the training of local police. With respect to the
rule of law, the eu attempts to be able to contribute up to 200 officials – judges,
prosecutors and other specialists – to supplement police in the criminal justice
process. In the field of civilian administration, the aim is to dispose of a pool of
experts – capable of deployment within a short timeframe – who can offer their
expertise in the field of civil registration, taxation, education, water supply, etc.
Regarding civil protection, the objective is to be able to assist humanitarian
actors through emergency operations. Here the eu is expected to be capable of
providing two or three assessment and/or coordination teams consisting of ten
experts that can be dispatched within three to seven hours, as well as civil protec-
tion intervention teams consisting of up to 2000 persons at short notice.
The Göteborg European Council paid special attention to cooperation with other
international organisations in civilian aspects of crisis management. Guidelines
were set to ensure that the eu should add to the work of other international
organisations in conflict prevention and crisis management.20 It should learn
from their experiences and make sure that its work will be compatible with those
other organisations. eu action is expected, however, to be visible as eu contribu-
tions, also when the eu only adds to the work of others. The eu can also be
tasked to take the lead in an international peace support operation.21
In late 2003, the European Council held in Brussels adopted for the first time a
European Security Strategy. This strategy states that the member states aim to
tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasises multilateral insti-
tutions and the rule of law. Since the eu only has limited military power itself,
the strategy highlights that priority security objectives should be addressed
through effective ‘multilateralism’, whatever form that may take.
7.2.5 european agenc y for reconstruction
The European Agency for Reconstruction (ear) was established in February
2000 as the main reconstruction arm of the European Union in Kosovo. The
ongoing activities of the agency were formally confirmed and expanded to Serbia
and Montenegro in December 2000.22 At that time, a general legal framework for
ec assistance for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the then Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was
established by the so-called Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Devel-
opment and Stabilisations (cards) Regulation.23 The European Agency for
Reconstruction would manage the majority of cards activities in the two areas
that it covered. In December 2001, the agency’s activities were extended to the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.2 4
The ear built on the experiences of the European Commission Task Force for the
Reconstruction of Kosovo (ec tafko) – a temporary task force that was set up in
the summer of 1999 to implement emergency programmes in Kosovo – and took
over the completion of this task force as part of its 2000 programme.25 The head-
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Kosovo is
located in the
south of Serbia.
Its population of 
2 million is predomi-
nantly Albanian; the
Serb minority is shrinking. Serbia and Kosovo
used to be part of Yugoslavia. In 1989, Milosevic
became president and abolished Kosovo’s 
autonomy. Kosovo’s Albanian leaders have been
striving for independence since 1990.
The Republic of Yugoslavia fell apart in violent
conflict as of 1991. Slovenia, Croatia, and Mace-
donia were the first to leave Yugoslavia. Bosnia
declared independence in 1992. Milosevic
attempted to strengthen with violent means 
Serbians living in adjacent territories.
In 1998, the insurgency of the Kosovo Liberation
Army (kla) provoked a counterinsurgency by
Serbian forces. This caused many refugees and
deaths. un resolutions condemned the violence
and urged a solution that respected the fry’s ter-
ritorial integrity but restored Kosovo’s auto-
nomy. After the 1999 Rambouillet negotiations
failed and the Serb forces continued violent prac-
tices, nato initiated a 78-day bombing campaign
against Serb military and infrastructural targets.
Subsequently, Kosovo’s governance was taken
over by the un administration Mission in
Kosovo (unmik) and the nato-led kfor troops
to provide security. Kosovo developed
governing institutions and witnessed
its first parliamentary elections. In
September 2000, Milosevic lost the
fry elections and Kostunica became
president. Later that year the reformist
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (dos)
won the Serb elections.
Montenegro declared independence
from Serbia in 2006 after a refer-
endum. Serbia then adopted a
new constitution which assumes
continued membership of Kosovo.
State-building in Kosovo is guided by
the un, the eu and osce. Suspects of
war crimes appear for the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Many in the
international community argue for Kosovo’s
independence under international tutelage, as
suggested by the mediation report by Athisaari,
but Serbia remains unwilling to grant independ-
ence. Kosovo’s future is left in the hands of the
divided un Security Council.
The case of Kosovo shows that a humanitarian
intervention can lead to secession, which
requires long-term support to a weak, new state.
Secession risks encouraging other secessions
elsewhere. The second lesson is that the primary
oppressing party (Serbs) can become an
oppressed minority after external intervention.
The international community should guarantee
the rights of all to avoid reverse ethnic cleansing.
A third lesson is that immediate deployment of a
police and criminal justice assistance is needed
after cease-fire.
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quarters of the agency are in Thessaloniki in Greece, but there are operational
centres in Pristina, Belgrade, Podgorica and Skopje.
The ear is an independent agency of the European Union; it is accountable to the
Council and the Parliament and is overseen by a Governing Board – which is
composed of representatives of the 25 member states of the eu and the commis-
sion. The agency has managed a total of about € 2.6 billion since 2005. The ear
programmes are designed to support good governance, institution building and
the rule of law as well as the development of a market economy. At the same time,
the agency invests further in critical physical infrastructure, environmental
protection, social development and the strengthening of civil society. Thus it
aims at reinforcing the region’s own reform processes by strengthening the ‘state
machinery’ of central and local administration, the police, the judiciary, public
finances and state utility providers. The areas that the ear covers – Kosovo,
Serbia and Montenegro and fyrom (Macedonia) – can also benefit from Euro-
pean Commission assistance not managed by the agency – which includes macro-
financial, humanitarian, democratisation, customs and fiscal planning aid,
support for higher education cooperation programmes, a Western Balkans’
regional programme, and support for the European Union’s contribution to the
un administration in Kosovo. Several eu member states also offer bilateral
contributions to the region.
In 2005, the eu adopted a Civilian Capability Improvement Plan, which was
followed by a Civilian Headline Goal 2008, to develop rapidly deployable civilian
aid capabilities. Member states nominated 260 experts, of which the eu selected
100. Also eu police units were placed for rapid deployment. For military contri-
butions to crisis management, the Headline Goal 2010 was set and possible
contributions by member states were listed. A crucial weakness appeared to be
strategic (large) airlift capacity. The eu continued to depend on other nato
members for such airlift capacity, especially the us.
7.3 financing eu peacebuilding activities
7.3.1 cfsp
The budget of the cfsp was still quite small, only € 62.6 million for the year
2005. This was considered inadequate for crisis management, which is a rapidly
developing activity of the eu. Much larger in financial volume are the humanitar-
ian assistance activities of the eu, and the sums managed by eu institutions for
development, peacebuilding and human rights, as we will see below. In 2006, the
total funds of the eu and its member states for development assistance amounted
to € 58 billion, which forms well over half of the total Overseas Development
Assistance from rich oecd countries, making the group of eu states the largest
donor group in the world.
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Georgia became independent from the ussr
in 1991. Secessionist wars and severe economic
crisis, as well as crime and corruption hampered
statebuilding. The bloodless Rose Revolution
of 2003 installed a new, reformist government,
whose aspirations to join nato and attempts 
at bringing breakaway territories back 
under Georgia’s control led to poor relations
with Russia. New elections in 2004 brought
Saakashvilli to power with the National 
Movement party.
The secessionist regions Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are ruled by unrecognized governments,
supported by Russia. Russian-led peacekeeping
operations continue in both regions. Georgia put
forward a new peace initiative for the status of
South Ossetia in 2005. Most of the troops have
already been withdrawn by 2007, with the last
remaining base in Batumi due to be evacuated in
2008.
The conflict in Abkhazia, strategically located on
the Black Sea, began with social unrest and
attempts by local authorities to separate from the
Republic. It escalated into armed confrontations
in 1992 when Georgia deployed 2,000 troops in
Abkhazia. Fierce fighting resulted in some 200
dead, hundreds wounded and more than 20,000
Georgian refugees.
In the 13-month war between Georgian forces
and separatist Abkhazians, Armenians and Rus-
sians, separatists were supported by North Cau-
casian and Cossack militants and Russian troops
from Gudauta.
Russia and Georgia have agreed on 80 percent of
their common border, leaving small, strategic
segments and the maritime boundary unre-
solved; osce observers monitor volatile areas
such as the Pankisi Gorge in the Akhmeti region
and the Argun Gorge in Abkhazia. The un
Observer Mission in Georgia (unimog) has
maintained a peacekeeping force in Georgia
since 1993. The boundary with Armenia remains
undemarcated. Ethnic Armenians in the
Javakheti region of Georgia seek autonomy from
the Georgian government. Azerbaijan and Geor-
gia continue to discuss their boundary.
Between 220,000-240,000 people are displaced
from Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2006). A
peacekeeping force of Russian troops is deployed
in the Abkhazia region of Georgia with a un mil-
itary observer group (unimog); a Russian
peacekeeping battalion is deployed in South
Ossetia.
The Georgian-Abkhaz peace process has
remained stalled. unomig continues daily
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7.3.2 echo
The European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (echo) – the European
Commission’s department for humanitarian aid – was established in 1992. In
1996 the office was given the mandate to provide emergency assistance and relief
to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European
Union.26 Seven objectives were defined:
(a) to save and preserve life during emergencies and their immediate aftermath
and natural disasters that have entailed major loss of life, physical, psycho-
logical or social suffering or material damage;
(b) to provide the necessary assistance and relief to people affected by longer-
lasting crises arising, in particular, from outbreaks of violence or wars,
producing the same effects as described in (a), especially where their 
own governments prove unable to help, or where there is a vacuum of
power;
(c) to help finance the transport of aid and efforts to ensure that it is accessible 
to those for whom it is intended, by all logistical means available, and by
protecting humanitarian goods and personnel, but excluding operations 
with defence implications;
(d) to carry out short-term rehabilitation and reconstruction work, especially 
on infrastructure and equipment, in close association with local structures,
with a view to facilitating the arrival of relief, preventing the impact of the
crisis from worsening and starting to help those affected regain a minimum
level of self-sufficiency, taking long-term development objectives into
account where possible;
(e) to cope with the consequences of population movements (refugees,
displaced people and returnees) caused by natural and man-made disasters
and carry schemes to assist repatriation to the country of origin and resettle-
ment there when the conditions laid down in current international agree-
ment are in place;
(f) to ensure preparedness for risks of natural disasters or comparable excep-
tional circumstances and use a rapid early-warning and intervention system;
(g) to support civil operations to protect the victims of fighting or comparable
emergencies.
echo has been financing emergency aid, food aid and aid to refugees and
displaced persons amounting to more than € 500 million per year.27 Aid has been
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patrols, except in the upper Kodori Valley, where
patrolling was suspended for security reasons.
The local population in both sectors feels ter-
rorised by armed groups. The Ceasefire Agree-
ment of 1994 is repeatedly violated and restric-
tions on the freedom of movement of unomig
continue.
Local law enforcement agencies are unable to
curb serious crime.
There are acute food and medical needs of vul-
nerable segments of the population. Mine clear-
ance and small-scale rehabilitation activities are
hindered. There are serious human rights viola-
tions in Abkhazia and the Gali region.
provided in more than 85 countries through hundreds of partner organisations
such as the Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (icrc), the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (unhcr) and the World Food Programme (wfp).
echo has two sources of funding: the general ec budget and the European
Development Fund. These funds are also used to carry out studies for
humanitarian operations, to monitor humanitarian projects, to provide training
for humanitarian operations, to set up coordination, to provide technical
assistance for humanitarian projects, to finance information campaigns and to
fund mine-clearance operations.28
7.3.3 errm
The European Rapid Reaction Mechanism discussed above offers another
financial source for peacebuilding activities. This mechanism was created in 2001
within the first pillar of the eu to allow the community to respond immediately
to urgent situations.29 The mechanism can be used when there is a threat to
public order or public safety or in other circumstances that destabilise a country.
It can provide financial aid in the short term – for no longer than six months –
and it encompasses the activities that are not covered by echo. For instance, the
errm was used to launch the eu contribution to the political, economic and
social rebuilding of Afghanistan.
7.3.4 the european initiative for democracy and human rights
The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (eidhr) encourages
human rights and democracy in countries outside the European Union. This was
prompted in 1994 by the European Parliament. A human rights and democracy
committee started its work in July 1999. The committee assists the European 
Commission by advising on aid projects of at least € 1 million. Most of the aid is
channelled through non-governmental organisations. About € 100 million is
available per year for human rights, democratisation and conflict prevention 
support carried out with ngos and other international organisations. Its support
also includes international criminal tribunals and the International Criminal
Court. eidhr has also carried out training courses to create a pool of civilian 
experts in the rule of law and civilian administration and for deployment in crisis
management missions. It has established a European network of professional train-
ing institutes and elaborated curricula for civilian crisis management courses, con-
flict prevention and peacebuilding. An evaluation of the training project showed
no clear link to actual deployment in eu missions, however. The evaluation report
recommended courses and seminars which are more tailored to specific missions.30
The European Union started sending observer missions to foreign elections in
1993 in Russia and in 1994 in South Africa. Since then, election assistance and
observation have taken place in several other countries.
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The eidhr has four priorities for its financial aid: 1. democratisation, good gover-
nance and the rule of law; 2. abolition of the death penalty; 3. fighting torture and
impunity, supporting international tribunals and criminal courts, and 4. fighting
racism and discrimination against minorities and indigenous peoples. The funds
of eidhr for ngos can be used without host government approval.
7.4 conclusion
The eu is nowadays engaged in development assistance, improvement of civilian
administration, and military peace operations in dozens of fragile, troubled
states. The European Union and its members have, in comparison to other
donors, a relatively large potential to encourage post-conflict peacebuilding, state
building, democratisation, human rights and the rule of law. Almost all of the 27
member states are rule-of-law societies, even though the newest members still
have an internal agenda of reform to carry out.
The eu is based on the common goal of the rule of law and full respect for human
rights. The eu and its members are the largest source of international financial
assistance to poor countries and represent 55 percent of the flow from rich oecd
states to poor other states31. One-fifth of this 55 percent is managed by the Euro-
pean Commission, the other four-fifth through bilateral and other multilateral
donor institutions. The resources of the eu for external assistance consist of joint
assistance programmes (phare32, tacis33, ala3 4, meda35), which amount to
about € 5 billion per year. The European Development Fund spent an additional
€ 13.5 billion in the period 2000-2007 in African, Caribbean and Pacific coun-
tries. A small part of these assistance flows is available for the promotion of
human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
In December 2006, the European Parliament approved a new budget law,
enabling the European Development Cooperation Instrument dci to commit
almost € 12 billion between 2007 and 2013 for Asia, Latin America, the Middle
East and South Africa. Another € 6 billion of this dci budget is destined for addi-
tional thematic programs, cutting across countries, like health, education, gender
equality, environment, food security and refugees. Other countries in Africa and
the Caribbean and Pacific, which have a special relation with eu members, can
receive commitments from the separate European Development Fund during
2008-2013 totalling € 22.7 billion.
Most of the eu assistance is for projects of recipient governments, and the larger
part of this money is used for projects that aim to reduce poverty. Financial help
for countries which are candidates for accession to the European Union gives
relatively more attention for human rights and democracy questions than aid to
other, third countries.
If the eu and its members would follow similar, coordinated policies, the eu
could be the prime actor in rule-of-law support to troubled countries. This would
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even become much stronger if and when the eu members carry out their 2005
promise to devote 0.7 percent of their gnp to official development assistance. In
2006, only 4 out of 27 eu states were doing this. Those that lagged behind prom-
ised to increase aid to reach a level of 0.56 percent of gnp by 2010 and 0.7 percent
by 2015. If this decision is implemented, it will increase resources for peacebuild-
ing considerably.
The policy decisions and institutions created by the eu have prepared the eu in
principle for an increase in rule-of-law support, which also enables the eu to
shift more resources from economic aid to institution-building for the rule of
law.
The attractiveness of membership of the eu to non-eu states gives the eu a
special influence on applicant countries. To qualify for membership, applicants
have to comply with the Copenhagen-criteria (in brief: democracy and human
rights, stability, market economics, and good governance). The eu has large
funds to help achieve these requirements. This offers the eu a strong influence 
in favour of democracy, rule of law, and human rights.
Strengthening border controls, police and other means to reduce trafficking of
persons, drugs, weapons and illegal movement of money is a good example of
assistance for the rule of law in other countries that directly serves also the
national interests of the donors.
Support for the rule of law in weak states outside the eu offers the eu a possibil-
ity to advance its enlightened self-interest in the rule-of-law in neighbouring
areas and carry out its vision and mission for European values as democracy and
human rights. In doing so, it could give substance to its desire for a European
identity, both distinct from and supportive of the foreign policies of other main
democratic powers on the global scene.
There are, of course, also serious weaknesses of the eu, which limit the potential
which was just outlined. First, the eu needs near-unanimity to take decisions on
many subjects in the realm of external political affairs. eu members were deeply
divided on the us-uk intervention in Iraq, which aimed at the removal of a 
dictatorship. The main difference was not on the values supporting this purpose,
but on the basis which this intervention had in international law and the political
prudence of this military action. The eu has shown greater coherence in other
foreign policy goals, such as its European neighbourhood policy.
The requirement of near-unanimity continues to slow down possibilities to act
swiftly. The draft constitution for the eu, rejected in referenda in France and the
Netherlands, would have opened in due course some possibilities to further
develop a European Common Foreign and Security Policy, which might lead to a
stronger peacebuilding effort.
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A crucial improvement of the role the eu can play has to await a new intergov-
ernmental agreement which would improve the decision-making of the eu in
external political affairs. An agreement to take foreign policy decisions by quali-
fied majority voting seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, however. It might
be possible to agree on a restricted form of qualified majority voting on foreign
aid, in particular peacebuilding activities. Member states could determine the
main goals and means for such assistance by consensus or near-unanimity (minus
one or two members) and decide the implementation of that policy by qualified
majority. The decision of the European Council of June 23, 2007 to negotiate a
new treaty for the eu offers a new opportunity to strengthen the provisions for a
peacebuilding role in the world which would measure up to the self-proclaimed
vocation of the European Union in the 21st century as advocate of peaceful devel-
opment.
In the absence of real improvements, a minimum of 8 members might use the
option offered by the Treaty of Nice to enhance their cooperation in a particular
field, under the conditions of this treaty, which exclude military action. Even as
long as the possibilities for enhanced cooperation remain unutilised, the eu has
many practical instruments and possibilities at its disposal to enlarge its peace-
building role in support of the rule of law and human rights, as were shown in
this chapter.
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Lebanon used to be a prosperous, multi-cul-
tural state but was almost destroyed by foreign
interventions and internecine wars. Its 4 million
inhabitants are predominantly Arab with an
Armenian minority. Nicknames for Beirut like
‘Paris of the Middle East’ and ‘banking capital of
the Arab world’ signify the country’s wealth
during the twentieth century.
Lebanon gained independence in 1943. Its
political system of confessional representa-
tion gave the Christian minority much influ-
ence. The Lebanese National Movement voiced 
Muslim leftist opposition. In 1975, sectarian
civil war broke out. Palestinians assassi-
nated two leading Maronites (Christians).
Opposing sides formed militias. The
Lebanese army could not contain inter-
religious strife. On black Saturday,
nearly 600 people were murdered,
which led to all-out-fighting.
The war paused in 1976, after a
Syrian dominated Arab Deten-
tion Force intervention, and Arab League media-
tion. The West was occupied by Christian mili-
tias, the East by Syrian troops and the South 
by Muslim militias receiving support from the
Palestine Liberation Organization (plo).
In 1977-1978 Palestinian attacks on Israel from
Lebanese territory provoked retaliation. Israel
occupied southern Lebanon. Israel violated the
ceasefire in 1982 and invaded Lebanon after
Palestinians had initiated a counterattack. Israel
marched towards Beirut and forced the plo’s
withdrawal causing many civilian casualties
along the way. In the mid-eighties, two inter-
national interventions stabilized the country,
but chaos returned after foreign troops left. 
Sectarian-strife re-emerged during the late
eighties. Lebanon became a proxy battleground
for other tensions in the Middle East.
The war ended in the early nineties when con-
stitutional amendments created an equal distri-
bution of parliamentary seats among Christians 
and Muslims.  The
majority of militias
slowly disarmed.
Hezbollah violently
opposed Israeli occupation,
which was lifted in 2000. In 2005
Hariri and other prominent Lebanese
figures were assassinated. Mass protests led
Syrian troops to retreat, known as the cedar
revolution.
The 2006 July War between Hezbollah and
Israel destroyed the largely rebuild economy,
infrastructure and political stability. Both sides
claimed success but lost considerably. 
The un decided to renew its peacekeeping
mission unifil and sent 13,000 un soldiers
from 30 countries who try to keep the peace in
the south together with 15,000 Lebanese
government troops.
Syrians, Palestinians, Israeli’s, Iraqi’s and Irani-
ans used the Lebanese civil strife to carry on their
own battles. The brief international interven-
tions have not contributed much to solving the
problems underlying the war. Lebanon would
benefit more from a long-term international
peace force that helps to build the rule of law and
a political system of multi-party equilibrium.
Interference of neighbouring states and regional
extremist movements remains a constant threat.
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L E B A N O N
8 conclusions and recommendations
“Let there be a community of you who invite to what is good, advocate righteousness, 
and forbid evil. These are the winners.”
Qur’an, Sura 3:104
What can be learned from the previous exploration of many attempts at
peacebuilding and rule of law reform? How can policies be improved? There 
are neither sound-bite lessons nor quick fixes. We can only try to give an
overview, based on our still incomplete reading of case studies (in 2005-7) and
visits to a number of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations (in the period
1984 – 2005). We refer to the limitations set out in chapter 1. Recent, very
sobering experience in Iraq and Afghanistan could only be partially included.
This exploration was written during the ongoing operations in those countries.
These two unfolding, vexing cases and many current emergencies in Africa
deserve further study. It seems possible, however, to give, on this incomplete
basis, some suggestions for future improvement of peacebuilding operations.
8.1 gener al conclusions
What can be observed in many peacebuilding programmes for helping countries
establish rule of law after (civil) wars could be summarised as follows: the efforts
are too little, too late, too short, too fragmented and too foreign. Yet peacebuild-
ing projects are very necessary for humanitarian reasons (human security). They
are extremely valuable investments in socio-economic progress.
1. The cost of a standard complete un peacebuilding operation in a low-income
country of 10 million inhabitants with the consent of the parties during 10 years 
is estimated at € 1.8 billion a year. The cost of a heavy complete peacebuilding
operation with military enforcement in a similar country but a hostile
environment is estimated at € 16 billion a year. We refer to section 6.8 for the
sources, calculations and assumptions. If the world community undertook one
heavy (green-helmet) and nine standard (un blue-helmet) peacebuilding
operations lasting on average 10 years in countries totalling 100 million people,
the annual cost would amount to 3 percent of global military and development
aid expenditures. Most of the states that enjoy peace themselves have a large
financial and military capacity for peacebuilding in troubled states. At present,
only 1.5 percent of active military troop strength in the world is used in all peace
operations combined (even including the heavy us involvement in Iraq, which 
is not a un peace operation.) These orders of magnitude show that un peace-
building operations need not be excessive in cost and may, on the contrary, be
excellent investments in stability, rule of law, and human and economic
progress.
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2. The legitimacy under international law is an extremely important factor which
strongly contributes to the chances of success. If there is no un Security Council
mandate, the acceptance the population and warring parties of the intervention
by the international community may be low. Lack of cooperation and weak
authority increase the duration, costs and casualties. International burden
sharing among un members and regional organisations is very uneven when
legitimacy is disputed. This puts a heavy responsibility on the veto-holding
Great Powers in the Security Council. They can make or break peace operations
which many other nations would advocate, or would, on the contrary, deem 
ill-advised. We refer to the text-boxes on the responsibility to protect and
criteria for military interventions.
3. It is important to avoid that un peacekeepers, police and civilian personnel
represent mostly the Western powers. Wide representative participation of
personnel from various countries, cultures and religions is important to reflect
the universalistic intent of peace operations. This puts a strong responsibility on
non-Western nations with means to come forward and share burdens. The prob-
lem is not that oecd countries are doing too much, but that other countries are
often doing too little. A particular scarcity is participation of Islamic countries in
peace operations for the benefit of other Islamic countries in need. Reformist
members of the Arab League and the Conference of Islamic States may want to
play a much larger role in the near future.
4. From the previous observations follows that it would be ill-advised for nato
to aspire to the role of a global peacekeeping organisation. It is true that nato is
the largest and most capable military alliance in the world, which the un Security
Council can use to perform heavy peacekeeping operations for which it gives its
mandate. The Security Council could consider making special combinations of
nato and non-Western states for complex peace missions outside the European
area, for various reasons discussed above.
5. What is commonly underestimated in peace-operations is the need to rapidly
impose basic public order and security after the end of combat. The population
usually experiences a crime surge after cease-fire, while it yearns for personal
security and emergency assistance. International organisations and foreign
donors often leave a public security gap after a ceasefire is achieved and before
peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities begin. This security gap coincides with
the ‘window of opportunity’ to set the country on track towards new govern-
ment and lasting reform. This window requires fast decisions and early action.
6. This means that an assessment of a country’s needs has to be made well in
advance, long before an intervention, and well before the end of combat opera-
tions between the warring parties. The warning signals are there of countries in
trouble, of failing and collapsing states. Much of politics is unpredictable, but the
indications in the international media and indices like the Failing States Index
(Chapter 3) can help to avoid nasty surprises. Peacebuilding should start with a
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thorough analysis of the history, politics, geography, culture, sociology and legal
systems of the country. All countries and wars are different. Experience of previ-
ous peace operations gives guidance, but cannot offer solutions of the one-size-
fits-all type. Before promises are made, a thorough feasibility study should
answer the questions which limited goals should be set and what might be
attained during a sustainable number of years (about 10) with reasonably avail-
able funds and personnel.
7. Peacebuilding needs to respond to the domestic demand of the local and national
population groups for peace and justice. Domestic civil society must play a major
role, and needs encouragement to develop and diversify. Donors should start 
by taking these domestic desires into account. They should impose neither the 
Westminster Model nor most other foreign inventions. If most of the population
believes, for instance, in Islamic law, it is Islamic law that must provide the begin-
nings for domestic peacebuilding and legal reform, while those elements of
Islamic or other law that are not in agreement with international human rights
treaties, such as discrimination of women and harsh punishments, should be
reformed step by step. Rapid imposition of very foreign laws and legal concepts 
is likely to fail after the donors leave. If the legal and justice sector is a heteroge-
neous mix of colonial heritage, local customary law, religious laws, communist
laws and imported modern commercial law, the recipient government and 
political leaders must determine the desired nature of the future system. 
Foreign experts can analyse the options and give advice on their consequences,
but generally cannot make the choices that national leaders have to make.
8. Too little international attention to the police and judicial sector is a common
feature of development aid programmes since they started in the 1960s and ‘70s.
After a war is ended, donors typically withdraw quickly from the security sector
and focus instead on the economic development of the country. They tend to leave
other areas of activity ‘within the domestic jurisdiction’ to the government of the
country, thinking that the legal sector is very much the sovereign concern of the
country, too political to meddle with, and not in their direct interest. This used to
be an often repeated mistake, but since the middle of the ‘90s many assistance pro-
grams started to include reform of this sector. These efforts deserve to be stepped
up.
9. Much of ‘too late’ is due to lengthy donor deliberations about new aid
programmes. Donors need time to shift current activities that were not foreseen
in their budgets, and valuable months can be lost after a cease-fire. Undefeated
warlords and war profiteers continue to determine the scene for the new govern-
ment and the police and judicial sector. Once international assistance arrives,
many crucial positions are already taken. The old functionaries remain powerful.
The formative phase or ‘rebirth’ of the country is going wrong. It is often impos-
sible to correct afterwards the missed opportunities and mistakes made in the
first three months after the new start. This means that ‘first aid’ policies should
avoid determining the future reform track.
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Democratic Republic Congo
The conflict in the drc is one of the
world’s worst humanitarian crises
since the late 1990s. Most armed
clashes took place in the Eastern
mineral-rich North- and South
Kivu, Katanga and
Ituri between mili-
tias from within
and outside of Congo and the Con-
golese Army fardc. The un deployed a
small peace-keeping mission since 2000 to rein-
force state building and oversee the instalment
of an elected government.
The conflicts have various economic, historical
and cultural causes. The legacy of the Mobutu
dictatorship with patronage networks caused 
an unequal distribution of income and access to
land and resources along ethnic lines. Population
movements from earlier conflicts in Uganda 
and the Rwandese genocide in 1994 intensified
the pressure on the rich natural resources.
War broke out in 1998 when president Kabila
moved to purge Rwandans from his govern-
ment. Rwandan troops invaded backing Con-
golese Tutsi. Kabila called on Zimbabwe, Angola
and Namibia for help. An estimated 4 million
people died in the ensuing conflict between 1998
and 2004, mostly from war-related diseases 
and starvation. State parties, later joined by non-
state actors, signed a ceasefire in Lusaka in July
1999, allowing the un Security Council to send
a peacekeeping mission (monuc) in 2000.
Violence continued, fuelled by Congo’s mineral
wealth. Peace negotiations continued through-
out 2002 to get withdrawal of Rwandan and
Ugandan troops in exchange for the demobilisa-
tion and disarmament of Rwandan Hutu rebels 
in drc territory. By the end of 2002 
Rwanda and Uganda claimed full withdrawal
from the drc, although proxies remained. 
In December 2002 all Congolese belligerents and
political groups signed a peace deal which led 
to a transitional government. The son of Kabila
became the first elected government in 40 years.
In the Eastern provinces, fighting continued
over land and mineral wealth. Ethnic militias
continued murderous raids on villages. The un
mission monuc did not have the means and
manpower to prevent all these attacks. This un
operation strongly combated criminal military
gangs and spoilers of the peace and the election
process with only a small un force.
The country and its problems are too large, 
however, for a really effective peace- and state
building operation which would have long-
lasting results. The resources made available to
the un were too small. It is unclear how stable
Congo will remain.
D e m  R e p u b l i c  o f  C o n g o
Pweto
Bumba
Bondo
Likasi
Kolwezi
Kikwit
Kabalo
Isangi
Gemena
Kindu-port-empain
Tshela
Madimba
Lisala
Kenge
Kamina
Dilolo
Boende
Uvira
Tshilenge
Mbanza-Ngungu
Lusambo
Luebo
Kalemi
Isirio
Inongo
Goma
Buta
Bunia
Basankusu
Kisangani
Kananga Mbuji-mayi
Mbandaka
Bukavu
Bandundu
Lubumbashi
Kinshasa
10. ‘Too little, too late’ also has another cause: it takes usually at least three
months to free experts from current tasks to send them abroad on a peacebuild-
ing mission. Experts from various countries need to learn to work together.
Particularly in the area of police assistance, the language training and professional
levels are often inadequate. Sometimes large numbers of ‘experts’ offered by
some donor countries are hardly professional and should be refused for lack of
basic abilities, but diplomatic considerations make rejection of incompetent
personnel difficult. If international advisors establish little authority, they remain
ineffective. A related problem is that many international functionaries who are
accepted continue to follow national directives, rather than their international
superiors, who derive their powers from the un, eu, or other organizations.
11. In the first months after cease fire, all needs seem urgent and everything has to
be done at once – which is simply not possible. Foreign aid is limited, promised
experts are still to arrive, and the absorptive capacity of the indigenous adminis-
tration and civil society organisations is still low. Keen sequencing of urgent
actions is unavoidable. This sequence will differ from country to country. It may
be useful, as a general guideline, to look at schedule 8.1
It goes without saying that optimal and feasible sequencing differs from case to
case and depends heavily on the resources that are made available. The earlier
certain subjects can be started, the better.
12. A frequent criticism of international aid is poor donor coordination. Peace-
building requires a coherent approach, coordinated by an influential international
organisation, or the largest, or most active member, of a group of like-minded
states.
Donors want different things due to different interests, notably their national
foreign policy goals, or the aid resources they happen to have available. They
differ on the diagnosis of what the recipient needs. As international assistance is
not just a humanitarian but also an economic activity, even the most idealistic
organisations and people want to emphasise their identities, plant their flags and
criticise others’ short-sightedness and seeming self-interest. It is a Herculean
task to combine all international donors, large and small, official and private,
into one well-oiled machine. For example, in Bosnia after 1995, some 450 donor
organisations were working next to each other. The eu and un representatives
had a hard time coordinating all this. Recipient governments are generally too
weak and dependent to force donors to coherence. The few national unctionaries
capable of organising productive donor visits and meetings may have a full-time
job in receiving foreign delegations of ministers, experts, parliamentary
committees and other dignitaries. It is the donors who should shoulder more
responsibility for getting their act together, not the recipients.
External influence and assistance for improvement of the legal order in a country
can only be strong if major external powers and international organisations act in
unison.
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13. If one or more major powers pursue very different purposes, like increasing
the imports of oil, gas, precious metals or minerals from that country, and
continue to support a ‘cooperative’ corrupt regime in the country concerned, the
influence of others, who are acting in favour of the rule of law, will be severely
undercut.
Increasing energy demand and competition among main importing states seri-
ously undermines efforts to strengthen the rule of law and human rights in many
weak or corrupt states, due to two mechanisms. First, large export revenues
strengthen thedomestic regime and weaken reform-advocating donors which
may also be dependent on these exports. Second, domestic advocates of reform
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Table 8.1 INDICATIVE TIME LINE OF OPTIMAL SEQUENCING
END OF COMBAT    >>> STABILISATION    >>> REFORM         >>>
Negative peace               >>> Secure public order >>> Positive peace    >>>
PARTY NEGOTIATIONS
MAIN POWER PRESSURE
MEDIATION
UN RESOLUTIONS AND MANDATE
CEASEFIRE
PEACE AGREEMENT
PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE
CONSTABULARY FORCE
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
INFRASTRUCTURE REPAIRS
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION, DEMINING, BASIC PUBLIC SERVICES
PUBLIC WORKS /EMPLOYMENT GENERATION
RESETTLEMENT OF IPD’S AND REFUGEES
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROGRAM
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
POLICE REFORM
COURT REFORM
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
RECONCILIATION MEASURES
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
ECONOMIC REFORMS
PRIVATE SECTOR
ELECTORAL REFORM
HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS
GENDER REFORMS
BASIC HEALTH REFORMS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS
OTHER REFORMS
are made powerless if a corrupt regime receives large revenues from foreign
supporters. The quest for energy and other raw materials divides outside powers,
by giving a premium to those who do not participate in an attempt to reform the
regime. Coordination of the policies of major powers may become more difficult
in the future vis-à-vis countries which possess large energy and metal resources.
Coordination is the task of the un Security Council, the G-8, and other multilat-
eral forums. At the very least, nato and eu members can avoid undercutting
each other.
14. Coordination needs to be organised in concentric circles and should not
exclude neighbouring states, even if they seem hostile to the peacebuilding
operation. Brushing them aside as unwelcome guests and shunning them in
international diplomacy, only makes things worse and pushes their actions 
into the dark. One could imagine four linked circles of coordination:
a. un, host country government and main donors and international organisa-
tions;
b. all donor countries, large and small;
c. un, ngos and domestic civil society;
d. un, organisations of the region and neighbouring states, including cultural
and religious international organisations.
Of course, the composition, mix and interconnections have to be designed case
by case.
15. Adding emergency and development projects to peacebuilding and rule-of-
law support increases the participation and rewards for the population and local
leaders and helps overcome past divisions. Examples are various basic needs proj-
ects (water, food, health care, shelter, education and employment). Rapid emer-
gency aid may determine the chance of success of all following programs. A
malnourished, desperate population, on the run because of counter-insurgency
operations, may turn against international peacekeepers and foreign aid workers,
to side with local insurgents.
16. Peacebuilding programmes need to be better evaluated during and after
completion. Only a few donors have done so (notably Norway, Canada and the
World Bank), and their experiences are varied. Our exploration of many different
cases has led to the conclusion that similar mistakes are made over and over
again.
17. Peacebuilding should be impartial in the sense that strict equality under the
law is followed, but it should not be neutral by ignoring which groups and people
continue to upset the peace and which are likely to strengthen it. Neutrality that
turns a blind eye on warlords and hate mongers is likely to increase the risk of
future violence by aiding unwittingly aggressor parties. All peacebuilding is
intervention in the power relationships in a society full of violent tensions and
conflicts.
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Interior power players are jockeying for position and political, economic, mili-
tary, tribal, ideological, religious and – foremost – personal gains. Foreign diplo-
mats, politicians, donors and international organisations which negotiate and
assist national and local leaders change the domestic power configuration, as they
strengthen some and weaken others. This may be well-intended, but can be
poorly informed, and can run counter to the feelings and convictions of many
local and national groups. It is often difficult to assess how representative those
leaders are who claim to represent ‘their’ parts of ‘the population’. Financial and
military aid strengthens some leaders and weakens others, who do not push
themselves into the picture and are left out. Those leaders who see the aid dollars
streaming, are inclined to please foreign donors with promises of peacebuilding
behaviour and the rule of law, human rights and democracy. But will they keep
those promises once the foreign donors leave? Even impartial international assis-
tance for electoral democracy is not a neutral intervention. It strengthens some
and weakens others. Are the candidates for elections really the most democratic
and representative, and the most peaceful? Or do they use international support
to usurp their offices soon after electoral legitimisation? This has happened too
often to ignore. Foreign donors have to face and answer these difficult questions
before they act.
18. The strong urge to intervene to counter human rights violations in failing
states or oppressive governments is generally a response to indignation of media
and public opinion. But is the urge to intervene militarily always guided by 
a thorough analysis of short and long term effects on the population at risk? 
Under the pressure of international publicity, there is sometimes a risk of 
political and diplomatic posturing. This can lead to half-hearted or ill-designed
interventions. Moreover, good intentions can lead to bad results. Damage that 
may be done to another state or society may not be immediately discernable, 
and can manifest itself late, when opportunities for more prudent non-military
action may have passed. The need to reflect on unintended consequences before
intervening shows how important it is to make in time a social and anthropo-
logical impact study, next to the usual military assessment of intervention
options.
19. Peacebuilding takes at least ten years, as a rule of thumb, if not two or three
decades to achieve lasting results. Donors should realise this before they start.
Projects that are prematurely aborted by donor fatigue and a short media atten-
tion span may in the end do more harm than good. Donors respond to needs as
they are featured in the media, and the media soon turns to other, newsworthy
crises. Policy makers in many Western countries prefer ‘quick fixes’. There is
often little understanding for the historical roots of the problems to be solved.
Most donor governments and electorates do not like long-term commitments,
so results have to be measurable in the short run. Funds are limited and there
are, indeed, so many other needs elsewhere. Donors are sometimes content
with the appearance of results and less worried about sustainability. Most diplo-
mats and foreign experts serve only a few years in the recipient country.
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The responsibil ity to protect
In recent years the debate about military
intervention for humanitarian purposes has
intensified. There are many examples of in-
action (e.g. Rwanda), late action (e.g. Cambo-
dia) or wrong and weak action (e.g. Bosnia
1993-5 and Darfur). Traditional views of state
sovereignty conflict with modern views of
the responsibility of states. The International
Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (iciss) was established to
provide guidelines. It recommends 
‘The Responsibility to Protect’ (2001). The
international community embraced this
principle at the un World Summit 2005.
(1) Basic Principles
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility,
and the primary responsibility for the
protection of its people lies with the state
itself.
B. Where a population is suffering serious
harm, as a result of internal war, insur-
gency, repression or state failure, and the
state in question is unwilling or unable to
halt or avert it, the principle of non-inter-
vention yields to the international
responsibility to protect.
(2) Foundations
The foundations of the responsibility to
protect, as a guiding principle for the inter-
national community of states, lie in:
A. obligations inherent in the concept of
sovereignty;
B. the responsibility of the Security 
Council, under Article 24 of the 
un Charter, for the maintenance of 
international peace and security;
C. specific legal obligations under human
rights and human protection declarations, 
covenants and treaties, international 
humanitarian law and national law;
D. the developing practice of states, regional
organizations and the Security Council
itself.
(3) Elements
The responsibility to protect embraces three
specific responsibilities:
A. The responsibility to prevent: to
address both the root causes and direct
causes of internal conflict and other
man-made crises putting populations
at risk.
B. The responsibility to react: to respond
to situations of compelling human need
with appropriate measures, which may
include coercive measures like sanctions
and international prosecution, and in
extreme cases military intervention.
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to
provide, particularly after a military
intervention, full assistance with 
recovery, reconstruction and reconcilia-
tion, addressing the causes of the harm
the intervention was designed to halt or
avert.
(4) Priorities
A. Prevention is the single most important
dimension of the responsibility to
protect: prevention options should
always be exhausted before intervention
is contemplated, and more commitment
and resources must be devoted to it.
B. The exercise of the responsibility to both
prevent and react should always involve
less intrusive and coercive measures
being considered before more coercive
and intrusive ones are applied.1
Programmes may fall to pieces after a few years. Excuses are easy to find: the
recipient country does not have the proper culture, its people lack training, or
corruption destroyed ‘the good work we started’. Moreover, donors get worn
out after a few years.
20. Improving the police and judicial sector should start with a profound analy-
sis of the weakest spots in the system. Haphazard assistance to weak services
may actually worsen the situation. If the police system is strengthened by inter-
national assistance, but the judiciary and the prisons remain as bad as they used
to be, a well-intentioned programme to improve police capacity can actually
strengthen the means of suppression.
21. Private military and security firms have become frequent and important
participants in many operations. Their work, responsibility and liability need to
be regulated in comprehensive contracts. Their tasks should be restricted as
soon as possible to training and advising domestic security services. Private
security services often serve for long periods of time to bolster indigenous
police and detention capacity. The legal liability and who is responsible for their
use of arms should always be clearly regulated in contracts.
22. Various weapons, particularly small arms, have to be collected and their
possession restricted to reduce the risk that group violence erupts again. Buy-
back programmes and exchange for much-desired goods (building materials,
petrol, etc.) are required. This needs to be supported by a new international
treaty limiting the sale and transportation of small and light weapons to others
than legitimate authorities. We refer to the text box on the scourge of small
arms.
23. A particularly difficult task of peacebuilding is re-socialising child soldiers. 
In Africa, there are armies of very young children, made orphans by war or
kidnapped from their communities, who have not had normal upbringings, but
are brainwashed by beliefs that turned them into ‘warrior machines’. How to 
re-educate them, how to give them a normal sense of conscience and a feeling
for values that are essential for constructive civilian life, is a daunting therapeu-
tic task of social psychology. In the present brief study, the experience gained
with this task was not evaluated. It is an extremely important question for
peacebuilding in sub-Saharan Africa.
24. In or near many war zones, large numbers of refugees and displaced persons
flock or are driven together, often for many years. They are ‘warehoused’ in
camps or enclaves, which often turn into overcrowded, makeshift slum cities
with very high levels of crime. Millions of people live there in limbo. The host
country’s resources and refugee aid organisations are usually not able to
guarantee safety and minimal rule of law. These camps are recruiting grounds 
for political extremism and violent crime. Criminals hide among the refugees
and often go unpunished. Some receive asylum in other countries and hide their
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war records. The often near-explosive situation in these camps makes peace
negotiations and peacebuilding very difficult. Refugee camps can spread civil
war or ‘state failure’ to neighbouring states. New solutions should be found to
resettle inhabitants of permanent refugee camps in more promising conditions
elsewhere.
25. Peacebuilding is not just removing the causes of a distinct, incidental civil war
or imposing peace and rule of law from the outside. Peacebuilding is encouraging
the growth of domestic institutions, laws and attitudes needed for non-violent
settlement of all kinds of conflicts. Conflicts will continue to arise. It is this insti-
tution-building, and the training of people to train others for the next generation,
which enables peacebuilding to reach its objective: the rule of law in a state of
peace, in both senses of the word ‘state’.
8.2 recommendations
The exploration in the previous chapters of main questions that arise in peace-
building operations in countries that have suffered war, civil war, contemporary
armed conflict and other forms of massive political violence, leads to some
general recommendations for donor institutions (governments, international
organisations and ngos, where applicable).
8.2.1 strengthen international organizations for peacebuilding
1. It is of great importance that the new Peacebuilding Commission of the un, a
large new advisory body, focuses its work in smaller subcommittees of leading
donors to coordinate the often fragmented contributions of various institutions,
and that the European Union and its members provide leadership in this global
institution by acting with one voice.
2. The European Union and its members form the largest source of funds for
peacebuilding and rule-of-law support. To become also the most effective actor,
the eu needs to improve the speed and consistency of its decision-making and
the efficiency of its operations. The unanimity rule slows down and weakens the
potential beneficial influence of the eu. With 27 and soon even more members, it
is necessary to move from unanimity to consensus (near-unanimity) and gradu-
ally to qualified majority. This requires an improvement of the Nice-treaty. Such
changes may become possible in the near future on the basis of the agreement of
June 23, 2007 on an improved treaty. Even before such new legal possibilities are
approved for the entire eu, the provisions of the Nice-treaty for enhanced coop-
eration of at least 8 members might be used for the purposes of post-conflict
peacebuilding.
All eu-members may come to realise that they can be the strongest actor in the
field of peacebuilding in the world once they overcome their fragmented deci-
sion-making. Such a role for the eu would also improve its influence in global
international organizations that are important to the rule of law. A united eu
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Darfur (Sudan)
One of the worst humanitarian crises
of the early 21st century is in Darfur, a large west-
ern region of Sudan. Its 6 million inhabitants are
mainly dependent on subsistence agriculture.
Historical tensions between African farmer
tribes and Arab nomads about scarce water and
land frequently led to conflicts. Desertification
and periods of droughts reinforced this in recent
years. Lake Chad to the east is shrinking.
In February 2003, two rebel groups, the Justice
and Equality Movement (jem) and the Sudan
Liberation Army (sla), attacked government
installations. These groups accused the Sudanese
government of political and economic marginal-
ization of Darfur. The government had most of 
its own troops located
in the south and
encouraged Arab
militias, Jan-
jaweed, to fight
opponents in Darfur.    
These militias launched a cam-
paign that also targeted countless civilians.
This devastating civil war between rebel groups
and a coalition of government troops and 
Janjaweed militias has caused at least 200,000
deaths and more than 2 million refugees. A
un commission of inquiry found evidence that
severe crimes against humanity were commit-
ted, including systematic killings of civilians,
sexual violence, forced displacements, torture,
and enforced disappearances. Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International confirm this.
Some countries, including the us, called the 
situation in Darfur genocide. The conflict is also
threatening the stability of eastern Chad.
Geneina
Dongola
Al Fashir
Ad Damir
Wadi Halfa'
Suakin
Shendi
Mongalla
Kutum
Korti
Karima
El Muglad
El Lagowa
El Hawata
El Fula
Ed Damazin
Berber
Yambio
Wau
Rumbek
Nyala
Malakal
Kadugli
Juba
Umm Ruwaba
Rufaa
New Halfa
El Manaqil
Wad Medani
Port Sudan
Gedaref
Singa
Nimule
Kosti
En Nahud
El Odaiya
Ed Dueim
Dilling
Atbara
El Obeid
Umm Durman
Khartoum
S u d a n
could be the prime mover in most international financial organisations which
have become active in peacebuilding programmes and rule-of -law support.
3. The mandate of a peacebuilding operation should be determined by the un
Security Council separately from the prior military peace operation. Disagree-
ment on the latter may hinder fair and broad burden sharing in the post-conflict
phase. Civilian peacebuilding should generally be able to count on much wider
support than the military peace operation.2
4. International and national donors would do well to set up peacebuilding funds
within their own budgets to jump-start activities when needed and encourage
rapid cooperation of emergency aid, peacekeeping activities and development
cooperation. The eu’s financial instruments are relatively large, but decision-
making is fragmented. Some bilateral donors like the uk and the Netherlands
have set up peacebuilding funds in which development aid and peacekeeping
expenses are joined. Their experience is encouraging. The slow and incidental
manner in which many donor countries and institutions finance peace operations
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The international community reacted slowly and
failed to stop this crisis. The Security Council has
been very slow to authorize a un peacekeeping
force. The peace negotiations that would end 
the war between the North and the South were
almost finished and the international communi-
ty feared that an intervention in Darfur would
disrupt this peace process. China has large oil in-
terests at stake in Sudan. China and Russia supply
the government with weapons. These countries
also adhere to the non-intervention principle.
The us is already heavily engaged in Iraq. The
controversial war in Iraq has increased reluctance
towards military interventions in general.
International jurists and human rights organiza-
tions argued that the international community
must act upon its recently accepted principle of
‘the Responsibility to Protect’ which states that
“where a population is suffering serious harm
(…) and the state in question is unwilling or un-
able to halt or avert it, the principle of non-inter-
vention yields to the international responsibility
to protect”. However, it seems that stopping the
humanitarian crisis in Darfur is not in the direct
interest of members of the Security Council.
Although the Security Council did not yet send a
un peacekeeping mission, it did establish an 
arms embargo and referred the situation in
Darfur to the International Criminal Court. 
It has also authorized an African Union peace-
keeping mission (amis) to monitor the ceasefire
of N’Djamena (2004). This mission largely
failed because of a lack of resources and a weak
mandate. Insufficient troop levels, training,
equipment, and logistics make it almost impos-
sible for amis to respond to attacks. au capaci-
ties in command, planning, and information
management should be strengthened.
After a new peace agreement in 2006, a
combined un and au peacekeeping force is
being prepared, but this will not be operational
before 2008. Jan Pronk, the un Special Repre-
sentative and head of unmis, was expelled by
the government of Sudan at the end of 2006.
Questions remain about the willingness of the
government of Sudan to really stop the slaugh-
ter and hunger. Khartoum has hindered and
delayed a un peacekeeping force, and has not
implemented the peace agreement (including
the disbanding of the Janjaweed militias).
from regular budgets results in long delays at crucial times, causing lost windows
of opportunity after a cease-fire.
5. The un Stand-By Agreement System for military peacekeeping units
earmarked by member states for un duty needs to be further enlarged with many
more police units, civilian administrators, health workers and technical engineer-
ing experts, as well as prosecutors, judges, trainers of legal personnel and other
experts who are often in short supply and can only be freed for international
service after several months. Police, legal and judicial reform assistance is, of
course, not simply an activity which can be added on the back of a military peace-
keeping operation. It requires professional expertise and management of individ-
ual experts’ work to achieve best results. Such personnel need to be prepared and
trained for international operations well in advance. It is necessary to have three
systems of rapidly deployable police officers who can monitor, advise and train
local police forces. These should be available at the national, the regional and the
global level.
6. The military and police forces play the crucial role in the early stages of peace-
building and rule-of-law reform, as they have to provide the country with the
security so necessary for the return to normalcy. The military role should
decrease as soon as possible, and the police and civilian role grow as quickly as
feasible. What is needed is a doctrine for post conflict security reconstruction
involving main donors and international agencies engaged in peacebuilding oper-
ations.3 This doctrine needs to be agreed upon by military and civilian agencies.
Without active support of Justice, Interior and Police ministries, it cannot work
effectively.
This doctrine will have to be based on experience in various international
settings, and apply the lessons learned from many failures. A general doctrine
needs to be translated to specific situations with the aid of country specialists,
especially knowledgeable nationals of the country concerned. Such doctrine
needs to comprise both the immediate task of providing basic public security and
order, as well as the more time-consuming task of police and justice sector
reform. It would be useful to develop this as a mixed civilian-military doctrine
for stabilisation operations which sets out what to do after violent military oper-
ations are concluded and before the time that peacekeeping forces can be with-
drawn. This stabilisation doctrine aims at filling the void between war and peace,
between chaos and order, between the rule of violence and the rule of law.
7. Prior to any peace operation, a social-anthropological analysis is needed for the
country in trouble, in order to make a civilian impact study and to formulate a
plan to help establish personal security for the population. This approach helps
to balance the current over-emphasis on military operations planning.
8. It is recommended that the un, the eu and individual donors set up pools of
police and justice sector experts who are prepared for rapid international duty.
This can be done by pre-arranging selection and training for possible missions
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and making ‘headquarter formations’ beforehand, much like the shirbrig
formula, which was designed for military peacekeeping.4
9. Consideration should be given to establishing a global rule-of-law support
fund, attached to influential international donor organisations like the eu or the
World Bank, to coordinate and finance legal reform programmes in peacebuild-
ing operations.
10. A major question in peacebuilding programmes is: who takes the lead and who
will be boss or ‘coordinator’? Generally, a representative of the un Secretary Gen-
eral should perform this task. It can be delegated or mandated to a special envoy 
of another major international organisation, such as the World Bank, the eu,
undp or, in the peacekeeping phase, to nato. Donors should meet immediately
after a cease-fire to establish donor coordination and divide responsibilities in the
aid structure. This aid coordination meeting also requires agreement on division 
of tasks and specialties, i.e. which donors will do what: security sector reform,
police reform, justice sector reform, assistance to transitional justice, restoring
infrastructure, etc. Donors’ comparative advantages and interests have to be taken
into account from the outset. In the beginning, due to international media atten-
tion, many donors will be inclined to do a little bit of everything. This adds to the
confusion and also explains, in part, the short duration of many aid programmes.
11. It is recommended that donors conclude agreements with recipient govern-
ments (or, where no government is available, with the interim administration) on
long-term (ten-year) plans of what is to be achieved, who will help with what,
and which donors will take over certain assistance tasks after a number of years.
Pre-arranged rotation of tasks among donors for the medium and longer term
helps to share burdens, avoid donor fatigue and finish the long-term tasks.
12. Neighbouring states and potential spoilers of the peace should be invited to
the peacebuilding program from the start by forming a consultative group. This
improves communication and can reduce temptations to disturb peacebuilding
by clandestine operations to exploit a chaotic situation. Shunning neighbouring
states has short-term isolation effects, but will later on undermine the peace
process once the foreign donors leave and the usual geopolitical influences of the
neighbours re-assert themselves. Lasting peacebuilding should aim for equilib-
rium of political forces both inside and around the war-ravaged country. The
purpose of patient, transparent consultation is to show that nations’ enlightened
self-interests are served by construction and stability rather than renewed war.
13. The un might prepare a standard mandate for interim administration in coun-
tries without the beginning of an effective government. This mandate can be
adapted to specific circumstances as the need arises. Such interim administration
need not be implemented in all cases by the un itself. It can also be delegated by
the un to regional organisations or coalitions on the basis of a un mandate. These
groups of states should, however, report regularly to the Security Council.
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14. Expertise centres for constitutional reform should be set up by a number of
international organisations able to borrow advisors at short notice from different
academic and governmental institutions to assist the negotiators in their efforts5.
A related recommendation is to formulate, in the framework of the un, the stan-
dards for a constitution of a pluralistic state guaranteeing basic human rights,
available for adaptation to national circumstances.
15. If all oecd countries would implement the internationally agreed goal for aid
of 0.7 percent of gnp, the volume of available aid would more than double. An
additional $120 billion would become available every year. In fact, the develop-
ment assistance level could become even higher, if many non-oecd countries
(formerly developing countries which have become middle income countries),
which have similar aid capabilities once they reach a per capita annual income of,
say, € 5000, would also pitch in. There is no good reason to apply the un donor
target of 0.7 percent of national income (gnp) only to so-called Western industri-
alised countries. Middle income and energy exporting countries with high
revenue relative to their population have aid capabilities that are proportional to
their wealth.
16. More non-Western countries could be encouraged to participate in peace-
building. They have large human and often financial resources. Also reformist
Arab and Islamic states can contribute more military, police, legal and adminis-
trative experts to suitable peace operations, particularly in Islamic countries. This
would broaden the expertise, widen the political support in the un, and reduce a
Western bias in such operations. Engaging more non-Western states will take
time, but also save time in the end, when peace operations turn out to be more
broadly based and less vulnerable to criticism against ‘neo-colonial or human
rights imperialism’.
17. The means for peace operations could be greatly increased if the reorganisation
of armed forces that started after of the Cold War, and is not yet completed in
many countries, were sped up to expand the expeditionary capacity for peace-
keeping and peacebuilding. This applies not only to oecd-type countries, but
also to developing countries with professional armed forces that are trained to
abide by the rule of law, like India. Japan is a highly developed large country
which can contribute significant means. The considerable resources of other
Asian countries like China can also be engaged constructively.
18. As ‘good government’ is required to create respect for and enforcement of 
the most essential human rights pertaining to human security, which is the ulti-
mate purpose of peacebuilding, an international manual with standards of good
governance could help civil servants, media commentators, educators, field
workers and others to improve conditions in various countries. Such a manual
would ideally be adopted by un organisations. Several elements are already avail-
able or can be derived from international treaties on human rights, the conven-
tion against corruption, and many other treaties and codes of conduct. Adminis-
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Principles for militar y inter vention
The report ‘The Responsibility to Protect’
formulates the following guidelines for inter-
vention:
(1) The just cause threshold
Military intervention for human protection
purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary
measure. To be warranted, there must be
serious and irreparable harm occurring to
human beings, or imminently likely to occur,
of the following kind:
A. large scale loss of life, actual or appre-
hended, with genocidal intent or not,
which is the product either of deliberate
state action, or state neglect or inability
to act, or a failed state situation; or
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or
apprehended, whether carried out by
killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or
rape.
(2) The precautionary principles
A. Right intention: The primary purpose
of the intervention, whatever other
motives intervening states may have,
must be to halt or avert human suffering.
Right intention is better assured with
multilateral operations, clearly supported
by regional opinion and the victims
concerned.
B. Last resort: Military intervention can
only be justified when every non-mili-
tary option for the prevention or peaceful
resolution of the crisis has been explored,
with reasonable grounds for believing
lesser measures would not have
succeeded.
C. Proportional means: The scale, 
duration and intensity of the planned
military intervention should be the
minimum necessary to secure the
defined objective.
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a
reasonable chance of success in halting or
averting the suffering which has justified
the intervention, with the consequences
of action not likely to be worse than the
consequences of inaction.
(3) Right authority
A. There is no better or more appropriate
body than the United Nations Security
Council to authorize military interven-
tion for human protection purposes. The
task is not to find alternatives to the
Security Council as a source of authority,
but to make the Security Council work
better than it has.
B. Security Council authorization should in
all cases be sought prior to any military
intervention action being carried out.
Those calling for an intervention should
formally request such authorization, or
have the Council raise the matter on its
own initiative, or have the Secretary-
General raise it under Article 99 of the
un Charter.
C. The Security Council should deal
promptly with any request for authority
to intervene where there are allegations
of large scale loss of human life or ethnic
cleansing. It should in this context seek
adequate verification of facts or condi-
tions on the ground that might support a
military intervention.
D. The Permanent Five members of the
Security Council should agree not 
to apply their veto power, in matters
where their vital state interests are 
not involved, to obstruct the passage of
resolutions authorizing military inter-
vention for human protection purposes
for which there is otherwise majority
support.
trative law in several oecd countries also contains the rules which could become 
applicable gradually at the national and international level in less-organised 
societies. Academic institutions can help design such a un Convention on 
Good Governance. Ideally, good governance should be codified in a single 
internationally accepted set of norms, if possible in treaty form, by the United
Nations.6
8.2.2 develop compar ative advantages of donor countries
The ‘international community’ consists of changing groups of active, like-minded
countries and international organisations. It is useful, particularly for medium and
smaller powers, to concentrate on special contributions for which that country has
a particular reason and competence. Their expertise and funds can be contributed
to the total of other countries’ contributions. Not every donor state should try to
cover the whole spectrum, as this is not an efficient use of scarce resources.
1. A country the size of the Netherlands cannot be prominently active in all fields
of international assistance. Concentration on rule-of-law assistance in peace-
building operations can be further developed into a specialty and a comparative
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Source: The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre for iciss, 2001
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal
or fails to deal with it in a reasonable
time, alternative options are:
I. consideration of the matter by the
General Assembly in Emergency
Special Session under the ‘Uniting for
Peace’ procedure; and
II. action within area of jurisdiction by
regional or sub-regional organizations
under Chapter viii of the Charter,
subject to their seeking subsequent
authorization from the Security
Council.
F. The Security Council should take into
account in all its deliberations that, if it
fails to discharge its responsibility to
protect in conscience-shocking situations
crying out for action, concerned states
may not rule out other means to meet the
gravity and urgency of that situation –
and that the stature and credibility of the
United Nations may suffer thereby.
(4) Operational principles
A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous
mandate at all times; and resources to
match.
B. Common military approach among
involved partners; unity of command;
clear and unequivocal communications
and chain of command.
C. Acceptance of limitations, incremental-
ism and gradualism in the application of
force, the objective being protection of a
population, not defeat of a state.
D. Rules of engagement which fit the opera-
tional concept ‘are precise’, reflect the
principle of proportionality, and involve
total adherence to international humani-
tarian law.
E. Acceptance that force protection cannot
become the principal objective.
F. Maximum possible coordination with
humanitarian organizations.
advantage. This can be financed with relatively small shifts in the oda budget,
partially at the cost of some lower-priority economic assistance to developing
countries. The constitutional task of the Netherlands’ government is to
strengthen the international legal order. But in countries of chaos, where a
national legal order does not function, the international legal order cannot func-
tion either. It follows that helping to build or improve the legal order in other
countries is central to fulfilling the wider constitutional task of strengthening
international law. The Netherlands enjoys a reputation of having a modern legal 
order. The presence of the International Court of Justice, the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Court and
other international and national legal institutions, lends the country a compara-
tive advantage. The Hague takes pride in the name ‘legal capital’ of the world 
(a phrase coined by un Secretary-General Boutros Ghali). There are many
renowned training and research institutes for international legal activities that
can contribute to this comparative advantage.
2. The task of post-conflict peacebuilding is almost unlimited in geographical and
functional terms. It is, therefore, necessary to concentrate on presently accepted
tasks, to bring them to a reasonably successful conclusion. For the future, it is
necessary to clearly prioritise among possible tasks, according to national, eu,
nato and un interests. Chapter 6 discussed criteria for allocation. Among the
many deserving cases, it is important to bring peacebuilding programmes in the
Balkans to a good conclusion. This task was started by the eu in 1991 and is still
to be completed. In the meantime, many additional, urgent tasks have been taken
on, particularly in Afghanistan and Africa. It is important to bring as many as
possible to acceptable conclusions or find other donors willing to take over the
Dutch contributions after a number of years (rotation of responsibilities among
donors) before heavy other tasks are added to the agenda.
3. Peacebuilding deserves to be the focus of development aid. Socio-economic
progress which reduces poverty is not possible during (civil) war. A reorientation
of development cooperation, to helping to build institutions for stable states, the
rule of law and peaceful conflict settlement is advisable.
Funds for peacebuilding assistance can be found through re-allocation of present
budget items and through an increase of ‘Other Official Flows’ (in addition to
concessional Official Development Assistance). Other Official Flows (‘non-
oda’) was set as a proportion of Gross National Product (0.3 percent) in 1995, but
this benchmark was left behind in 1999, resulting in a gradual relative decline. It
is recommended to again set such a benchmark, to facilitate active participation
by the Ministries of Justice, the Interior, and Education in joint policies for
promotion of the rule of law in peacebuilding programmes.
4. If the foregoing is correct, it follows that in the broad field of peacebuilding,
the Netherlands can best focus on support for rule of law institutions, especially
police and the judiciary. The comparative advantage of the Netherlands and The
Hague lies in the rule of law. To further develop this comparative advantage, it is
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recommended to establish a Hague Centre for Peacebuilding, which can start as a
coalition of already existing elements.
5. In most peacekeeping missions and the following peacebuilding operations,
the lack of professional police with international peacekeeping experience is an
important obstacle. It is recommended to increase the size and training of the 
Netherlands’ Marechaussee (constabulary forces) for international missions, rela-
tive to other expeditionary forces.
6. It is recommended that the example of the joint policy paper of 2005 on 
‘Peace Building after a Conflict’ of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Develop-
ment Cooperation) and Defence be followed by a joint policy paper with the
Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Education, Culture and Science. The purpose
would be to define an active role of the Justice Department in international 
legal reform and training assistance, for the Interior Department in police 
monitoring, advice and training, and for the Education Department in further
developing academic institutions in the Netherlands with an up-to-date 
analytical and training capacity for international reform of the legal sector,
notably Islamic law.
8.3 some suggestions for further study
The previous pages touched upon many questions that need further contempla-
tion and require more policy research than was possible during this explorative
study. Institutions for policy analysis and advice may want to consider adding
one or more of these subjects to their agenda. These suggestions are listed in
order of urgency and importance. The reasoning leading to these recommenda-
tions is based on chapters 3 to 7. Subjects for further study are in particular:
1. The size, policies and training of a European Union rapid deployment facility
for police assistance to countries emerging from violent conflict, or in danger
of falling into anarchy. The eu has made such a decision, but its implementa-
tion needs further consideration.
2. Widening the possibilities for unhcr to maintain basic rule of law in large
refugee camps with local and internationally recruited police capacity, tempo-
rary courts and detention facilities.
3. An un-led international police facility for peacekeeping and peacebuilding op-
erations, similar to suggestion 1 and also available for carrying out suggestion 2.
4. A study of the possibilities for forming an international coalition of govern-
mental and ngo bodies (a global policy action network) which aim to encour-
age legal reform and its many related subjects, such as transitional justice. The
need for peacebuilding and rule-of-law assistance is growing, but the activities
of the main donors (official and private) are still very fragmented.
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A Small  Arms Treaty?
About 500,000 people are killed each year by
small arms and light weapons. It is urgent to
curb their spread. About 300,000 p.a. die
because of political violence and 200,000 by
non-political criminal violence and accidents.
Women suffer disproportionately from
firearms violence. Small arms make so many
casualties each year that they should be
viewed as weapons of mass destruction in
slow motion. Their effects are, up to now, no
less serious than nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons.
Each year, more than 8 million small and
light weapons are produced. The majority
ends up in the hands of civilians. Each year
an average of 22 billion dollars is spent on
weapons by countries in Africa, Asia, the
Middle East and Latin America. These
amounts could help achieve the Millennium
Development Goals of the United Nations,
such as primary education for all children
and the eradication of child and maternal
mortality and hiv/aids. The top five
exporters of weapons in the world are all
members of the un Security Council:
Russia, the us, France, the uk and China.
Thousands of people suffer from the effects
of unregulated global arms trade. Many 
people are killed or suffer because they are
injured, raped or forced to flee their homes.
The Control Arms campaign calls for an
international, legally-binding Arms Trade
Treaty to ease the suffering caused byirre-
sponsible weapons transfers. Since its start in
October 2003, ‘Control Arms’ has gathered
the support of over one million people
worldwide. In December 2006, 
153 governments voted at the un to start
work on developing an international Arms
Trade Treaty.
The treaty would establish common inter-
national standards for the import, export 
and transfer of all conventional arms.  This
would make a major contribution to 
the attainment of humanitarian, human
rights and development objectives world-
wide. The Economic Community of West
African States (ecowas) and the Council 
of the European Union (eu) expressed
support for stringent regulation of the global
arms trade. The un often declares separate
arms embargoes to curb violence in crisis
regions. But arms embargoes are systemati-
cally violated without punishment. During
the last ten years none of the 13 un arms
embargoes managed to stop the flow of
weapons to countries or armed groups
subject to these embargoes. un reports show
that individuals and companies operating in
at least 30 countries across the world were
involved in embargo busting.
Only a few of the arms embargo breakers
have been successfully prosecuted. The
authority of the un is greatly undermined by
persistent violations. The Security Council
should improve the design of arms embar-
goes based on a common set of criteria for
arms transfers that would be consistent with
international law. The un Sanctions Com-
mittees, the un Secretariat and un investiga-
tive teams require better support to improve
verification, especially from Member States
close to the embargoed entity, un peace-
keeping missions operating in the vicinity,
and other intergovernmental organisations.
International treaties are needed to outlaw
step-by-step various categories, and limit
possession and trade at least to legitimate
authorities (police and armed forces) rather
than persons and private non-state parties.
Sources: www.controlarms.org,
www.paxchristi.nl, www.oxfam.org
This could be undertaken as a national study, focussed on possibilities and
capabilities in and of the Netherlands, or could be done jointly with like-
minded countries in the eu. One could also conceive of a joint study with one
or more similar institutions outside the eu, especially with think tanks from
developing countries. Such a multilateral report would lessen the often-heard
criticism by non-western observers that Western proposals do not take 
‘non-Western values’ and interpretations of the rule of law into account.
The possibilities of reform of Islamic law have been highlighted in the report
by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy.7 It might be
considered to carry out suggestion 4 with one or more policy research insti-
tutes in reformist Islamic countries.
5. A different object in need of further study is the idea of an Organisation of
Democratic States. There are already some good, small initiatives, but also a
number of half-hearted, weak or failing initiatives in this direction. Deserving
special study are: how existing institutions like the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Reform could be strengthened, how the activities 
of the Council of Europe could be widened to non-European democracies, or
whether the us-sponsored idea of a Concert or Community of Democracies
should be given priority.
The main functions of such an ‘ods’ might be:
a. to advise other states on how to introduce and develop democracy, and how
to anchor it in rule-of-law systems;
b. to act as a caucus of democracies of all continents within the un system,
encouraging joint action and democratisation of other states as well;
c. to help bridge some of the gaps among the us, various European states, and
a number of important non-western democracies, e.g. India.
The mere existence of an ods would encourage democracy, as many semi-
democratic states would like to be admitted and recognised as fully democratic.
This is somewhat comparable to the strong reformist effect the eu has on 
countries that are in its waiting room for membership. An important subject 
to ponder about is what criteria should be applied for the minimum requirement
of membership. Also, what should be done if a member slides back into author-
itarianism or political violence: assist the member to improve, freeze member-
ship if the government refuses to cooperate, or start procedures to terminate
membership? Clear criteria for membership may encourage, by themselves,
some further democratisation, as most governments want to avoid loss of inter-
national prestige.
8.4 in conclusion
Are the words of John Rawls, the main philosopher on the nature of justice,
quoted at the outset of this book, really wise counsel? Should it be the long-term
goal of relatively well-ordered societies to bring burdened societies, like outlaw
states, into the ‘Society of well-ordered Peoples’? We leave the question of what
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is ‘well-ordered’ aside and refer to chapters 3, 4 and 5 for some observations on
legal order and human rights.
The present exploration dealt with only a part of Rawls’ observation, i.e. helping
those societies that are torn apart by massive political violence to rebuild them-
selves into more peaceful states. The previous chapters suggest that it is in the
interest of ‘well-ordered societies’ to reduce the frequency of (civil) wars in
others, and assist them in peacebuilding and development of the rule of law.
But it also became clear that the possibilities of bringing lasting fundamental
improvements to foreign cultures and political systems are limited. Risks of fail-
ure are considerable. A rational allocation is necessary of increased resources, to
well-chosen countries, after a thorough assessment of the likely effects of foreign
assistance to the people in trouble. We hope the foregoing analysis may help to
limit mistakes and improve results.
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notes
1 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Inter-
vention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa: International Development Research
Centre, 2001.
2 Advisory Council on International Questions, Failing States, The Hague, 2004.
3 Rand 2005, p. xviii and 226-228.
4 shirbrig is the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, a group of a dozen countries
that have earmarked military units for rapid deployment in un peacekeeping
operations under pre-arranged multinational headquarters. The units have
trained together. shirbrigs responsibilities are in principle limited to actions
under Chapter 6 of the Charter and the member states reserve the right to refuse
participation in specific actions.
5 Like the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe.
6 See Hirsch Ballin, wrr report 58, pp. 232-4.
7 wrr, Dynamism in Islamic Activism. Reference Points for Democratization and
Human Rights. Amsterdam University Press, 2006.
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afghanistan
Afghanistan is a war torn, landlocked, Islamic
country. The population is a mixture of 42 per-
cent Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Hazara,
9 percent Uzbek, 4 percent Aimak, 3 percent
Turkmen, 2 percent Baloch, and 4 percent of
other origins. The country counts approximately
26 million Sunni Muslims, 6 million Shi’a Mus-
lims and 32,000 citizens of other or no religious
affiliation (figures are changing due to refugees).
Its strategic position in Eurasia and Southern
Asia caused a history of war, invasion and occu-
pation. Current borders originate from the late
nineteenth century when the United Kingdom
tried to occupy Afghanistan from 1878 to 1919.
The British created Afghanistan as a buffer zone
between British India and Czarist Russia. The
so-called Durand Line divided the Pashtun tribal
area between Afghanistan and the later Pakistan.
British support enabled Amir Abdur Rahmad
Khan to establish a central Afghan government 
that administered internal affairs, while the
British Indian government managed its external
affairs. Independence followed in 1919 after the
Third Anglo-Afghan War.
During subsequent years warlords fought to gain
power. A period of stability commenced when
Pashtun King Zair Shah gained power in 1933
after his father was assassinated. Support of the
Pashtun tribes to the south and the elite of Kabul
enabled him to adopt a new constitution in 1964.
Religious militants opposed his policies and
modernizing reforms that were discriminatory
to non-Pashtuns.
In 1964, Afghanistan voted against Pakistan’s
un membership because Pashtuns in the border
region had not been given the opportunity to
vote on independence. Strong ethnic links with
Afghan Pashtun caused Pakistani fears for a
breakup of the North of Pakistan along ethnic
lines. King Zair Shahs policies and other Afghan
leaders encouraged Pashtun revolts.
Zair Shah’s policies undercut much of the coun-
try’s economy and infrastructure. Daoud Khan
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seized power in 1973, creating the Afghan
Republic whilst making himself president.
Daoud was assassinated by the communist Peo-
ple’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan in 1968.
Afghanistan then became a Cold War zone of
confrontation between communism and west-
ern influence. Whilst the us supported the anti-
government Mujahedin forces, the Soviet Union
(su) closed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation
and Good Neighborliness with Afghanistan. The
Treaty provided the su an excuse for the 1979
invasion, when 100,000 Soviet troops backed by
another 100,000 Afghans overthrew the Daoud
Khan government in the Great Saur Revolution.
Communist rule lasted until 1989 when mass
casualties led to the Sovjet Union’s departure.
During the occupation, the West had supported
and armed the opposition against communist
occupation. Pakistan played a key role by distrib-
uting funds and weapons among mostly Islamic
Pashtun warlords.
Six years of battles among Afghan warlords fol-
lowed, destroying many lives. On the one hand,
the Taleban, by origin an Islamic student move-
ment, struggled to gain power, supported by 
Pakistan. The opposition to the Taleban was inci-
dentally supported by the United States. The
Taleban seized Kabul in 1996 and imposed a strict
interpretation of Islamic Law. By 2000, the Tale-
bancontrolled nearly95 percentofAfghanistan.
The Taleban leadership allowed anti-American
terrorist training camps to arise. On the 11th of
September 2001, the Al-Qaeda organization led
by Osama bin Laden destroyed the Twin Towers
in New York, causing about 3500 dead. The us
identified Afghanistan as the hide out of Bin
Laden’s terrorist organization. When Taleban
refused to extradite Al Qaeda, the us invaded
Afghanistan with Operation Enduring Freedom.
The us contacted reformist Afghan leaders to
encourage establishment of democracy. Hamid
Karzai became Interim President, which was
confirmed by the 2002 Loya Jirga (a formal meet-
ing of elders in which most ethnic groups are
represented). In 2003, the constitutional Loya
Jirga drafted a new constitution which was rati-
fied in 2004. Karzai won the presidential elec-
tions that year and in 2005 democratic parlia-
mentary elections followed.
Afghanistan is currently struggling to establish a
functioning state with the support of a nato led,
un-mandated isaf mission. State building is
frustrated, among others, by Taleban fighters,
influx from Northern Pakistan of Pashtun
Islamic fundamentalist resistance, local leaders,
anti-western feelings, arms traders, terrorists
from other countries, abundant poppy cultiva-
tion and opium trade, presence of landmines, a
poor infrastructure, and a very weak economic
position.
Afghanistan’s ethnic diversity makes it highly
sensitive to foreign interference. Pakistan sup-
ported the us intervention, but did not stop the
Taleban’s resurrection from the North-West
Frontier Province, which enabled the increase of
insurgent attacks in 2006-2007. Militants have
also entered from other countries.
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